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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Motivation
In many industrialised countries, the apprenticeship system is an important
route to prepare young people for the labour market. A well-known example
is Germany, where about 60% of all young people enter an apprenticeship
(Casey, 1986; Steedman, 1993; OECD, 1994; Den Broeder, 1995; Soskice,
1994; Lieshout, 1996; Neuba¨umer, 1999). In the smaller European coun-
tries, such as Austria, Switzerland, Denmark and, to a lesser extent, the
Netherlands, as well as in Australia, the apprenticeship system is relatively
strong (Smits and Stromback, 2001). In Britain the apprenticeship system
has declined sharply from the late 1960s, but there has been a renewed inter-
est in occupation- oriented workplace training for young people during the
last decades, resulting in the launch of the ‘Modern Apprenticeship’ in 1993
(Gospel, 1994, 1998).
The key feature of the apprenticeship system is that an apprentice learns
a trade while working in a firm. The organisation of the apprenticeship
system differs between countries but there are also many similarities. Ap-
prenticeship training usually combines workplace training in a training firm
with school attendance one day a week. The typical entrance age of an ap-
prenticeship is between 17 and 19 years, normally after completing (lower)
secondary education. At the beginning of the apprenticeship the apprentice,
the employer and sometimes other parties involved, such as schools or train-
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ing authorities, sign an apprenticeship contract which specifies the rights and
duties of all parties and the conditions under which it may be terminated.
The typical duration of an apprenticeship is three years. Apprentice pay is
usually relatively low.1
Training in the firm differs greatly from one country to another but also
between different sectors within countries. It may be more or less formalised,
ranging from off-the-job training at special workshops to learning-by-doing
during work. The curriculum of the training programme is usually specified
by training authorities, often including representatives of employers, workers,
schools and the government. In most countries an apprenticeship leads to a
nationally recognised qualification.
The potential advantages of the apprenticeship system are multiple. First
of all, workplace training in combination with school attendance is said to
have many didactic advantages compared to school-based learning solely
(Resnick, 1987; Jacobs and Jones, 1995; Rothwell and Kazanas, 1994; Nieu-
wenhuis and Onstenk, 1994). Secondly, the apprenticeship system also en-
sures a close match between the acquired and required skills. Firms know
better than schools which skills are needed for a specific occupation. They
will respond faster to technological developments in a trade that demand
new skills. The apprentice thus acquires skills that are actually demanded
by firms.
However, whether these theoretical advantages of apprenticeship training
materialise depends on the way in which firms utilise the apprenticeship
system. For a firm, training is not a goal in itself but is subject to the primary
activity of the firm, which is the production of goods or services. Therefore,
the training needs of the apprentice may conflict with the production interest
of the training firm.
If the main reason for a firm to employ apprentices is their contribution
to the production process, the firm may be more interested in their direct
productivity than in their training. The training interest of the apprentice
will then conflict with the production interest of the firm. Indeed, many
economists have expressed the fear that firms only employ apprentices as
1A more detailed description of the apprenticeship system in different countries can be
found in Smits and Stromback (2001).
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substitutes for unskilled or skilled labour (Ryan, 1994).
A firm that trains apprentices because of a future need for qualified labour
wants to retain the apprentices after completion of their training. Therefore it
has itself an interest in providing the training. However, conflicts of interests
may still occur. The firm wants to teach the apprentice skills that are useful
in the training firm, while the apprentice may want to leave the training firm
after completing the training to work in another firm or industry. Therefore
the apprentice has an interest in learning not only skills that are specific to
the firm, the occupation or the industry he or she is trained in, but also some
skills that have a wider applicability, so-called generic skills.
It depends on the specific institutional settings of an apprenticeship sys-
tem how problematic conflicting interests will be in practice. For example,
are there any institutional arrangements to guarantee the quality of train-
ing? Is there any monitoring of the training in the firm by a third party,
such as a school or training authority? Is the training completed with an
external examination? Who decides on the curriculum of the apprenticeship
programme, the employers or the workers or both? Are there other parties
involved, such as the schools for vocational education or training authorities?
In the absence of any regulation, the apprenticeship system could become
very attractive for firms that search for cheap labour, but are not interested
in training. Especially when apprentice pay is relatively low and appren-
tice productivity relatively high compared to the pay and productivity of
unskilled workers. But even if firms train because of investment motives,
regulation may be necessary to prevent training from becoming too firm- or
industry-specific and the apprentice acquiring few skills that have a wider
applicability.
Conflicting interests of firms and apprentices demand regulation of the
apprenticeship system. However, it is unlikely that regulation can completely
solve the conflicts of interests between firms and apprentices. Too much
regulation may be even counterproductive. For example, if firms were not
allowed to adapt part of the training programme to their own specific needs,
the investment motive would be lost and the apprenticeship system would
become attractive only for firms with current production motives. Moreover
the training intensity will, in practice, be difficult to observe by a third
3
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party and therefore the training intensity cannot be regulated completely.
If firms have mainly current production motives for employing apprentices,
regulation of the training quality may not be sufficient to guarantee good
training for all apprentices.
Training motives of firms also determine the margins for government poli-
cies aiming to stimulate the apprenticeship system, for example to increase
the number of apprenticeship places. If such a policy were to stimulate
mainly firms without investment motives to participate in the apprentice-
ship system, without any additional measures to guarantee training quality,
average training quality may fall.
For a meaningful government policy regarding apprenticeship training,
it is therefore important to gain insight in firms’ training motives and the
consequences of these motives for the quality of the training programme.
This is the aim of the present study.
1.2 Outline of the Study
Most studies on apprenticeship training investigate why firms supply appren-
ticeship training (Acemoglu and Pischke, 1998; Clark, 2001; Elbaum and
Singh, 1995; Franz and Soskice, 1995). The present study approaches this
issue from a new perspective. Given that firms supply apprenticeship train-
ing, what are the consequences of their training motives for the quality of the
training? I considered two aspects of training quality. Firstly, the curriculum
of the training programme. A firm that trains an apprentice to fulfil a future
need for qualified labour, has an interest in teaching firm-, occupation- and
industry-specific skills and will be less inclined to teach skills with a wider
applicability. Secondly, I considered the training intensity. Firms that only
have current production motives to supply apprenticeships have no interest
in the training itself and may therefore be tempted to save on training costs
by giving less training. It is to be expected that both aspects of training qual-
ity are interrelated. The more specific the curriculum, the higher the firm’s
future marginal benefits from training will be and the higher the training
intensity it will choose.
Chapter 2 gives an overview of the economic literature on firms’ benefits
4
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of apprenticeship training. It discusses theoretical en empirical evidence on
current and future benefits of apprenticeship training for firms. I will in-
troduce a simple theoretical model to illustrate the different features of the
training models that can be found in the literature. Three main factors de-
termining the firms’ expected future benefits from training can be identified;
the degree of firm-specificity, the degree of monopsony power and the quit
rate.
In Chapter 3 I will develop a theoretical model for the investment in
specific and generic skills. Specific skills are defined as skills that are specific
to an industry or occupation. Both generic and specific skills are transferable,
in the sense that they can be used in other firms as well, but the market
for specific skills is smaller than the market for generic skills. Firms can
appropriate some of the returns to specific training but the returns to generic
training fully accrue to the apprentice. In fact, the level of generic skills acts
as an outside option for the apprentice and puts a minimum bound on post-
training wages. Firms want the generic component to be as small as possible,
because their share in the returns to specific training decreases with the level
of generic training. For the same reason, apprentices want the level of generic
training to be as high as possible. If the firm and the apprentice decide
jointly on the level of training, there will be overinvestment in generic skills
and underinvestment in specific skills. If the apprentice does not participate
in the training decision, there will be no generic training at all.
Chapters 4 to 8 deal with the second aspect of training quality, namely
the training intensity. First, Chapter 4 presents a theoretical model for the
training intensity if the training is not perfectly observable by the appren-
tice. Under imperfect information, the training level is lower than socially
optimal, because apprentices anticipate that the training firm will cheat and
are not prepared to accept a lower training wage in turn for more training.
The underinvestment problem is less severe the higher the degree of firm-
specificity of the training. If the training is partly firm-specific, the training
firm can appropriate part of the returns to training and is therefore less likely
to cheat. Therefore, the training level will be higher if part of the training is
firm-specific.
The relation between training motives and training intensity will be tested
5
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empirically for the Dutch apprenticeship system. Apprenticeship training in
the Netherlands is highly regulated and leads to nationally recognised qual-
ifications. Concentrating on the Netherlands enables me to test whether
regulation is sufficient to solve the moral hazard problem with respect to
training intensity. Chapter 5 gives a sketch of the Dutch apprenticeship.
It discusses the position of the apprenticeship system within the Dutch ed-
ucational system and the institutional arrangements of the apprenticeship
system. Special attention is paid to the way in which training quality is
monitored.
Chapter 6 derives an empirical model to test the relation between training
motives and training intensity to be used in chapters 7 and 8. It discusses
how training intensity will be defined and measured. A distinction is made
between training input and training output. Input is the variable of interest
since it shows what the firm really does in terms of training, but for the
apprentice the only inputs that matter are those that have a real impact on
output. Therefore the empirical strategy to test the relation between train-
ing intensity and training motives is first to test whether there is a relation
between the indicators for training motives and training input. Secondly it
will be tested whether there is a relation between training input and output.
Input is measured as the effort of the training firm to give priority to train-
ing relative to production. Output is measured by considering examination
results and labour market performance after completing the training.
Chapter 7 is based on a survey among former apprentices. Chapter 8
draws upon a survey among Dutch training firms in four sectors, the con-
struction industry, the printing industry the metal industry and the care
sector. Both surveys included questions about the way in which training and
work were organised in the firm. These questions tried to capture the extent
in which the training firm gave priority to training relative to production.
On the basis of these questions, I have constructed training input measures,
in Chapter 7 a single input measure and in Chapter 8 separate input mea-
sures for different aspects of the training. Furthermore, the training input
measures used in Chapter 8 all differ in the degree of observability, which
makes it possible to test whether the relation between training motives and
training intensity will be stronger if the training intensity is less well observ-
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able, as is predicted in Chapter 4. The training input measures are regressed
on measures of training motives. In Chapter 7 the type of contract during
the apprenticeship is used as a measure for training motives. In Chapter 8 I
have used several measures for the degree of firm-specificity of the training,
the degree of monopsony power and the quit rate.
Chapters 7 and 8 show that there is indeed a relation between training
intensity and training motives. Firms with investment motives provide better
training than firms with current production motives. Especially those aspects
of the training input that are not easily observable by a third party will
be neglected if the firm has no investment motives. Unfortunately these
are also the aspects that are most effective in terms of output. It follows
that regulation is not sufficient to guarantee good training to all apprentices
if there are firms participating in the apprenticeship system that have no
investment motives.
7
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
8
Chapter 2
Why Do Firms Supply
Apprenticeships? Theoretical
and Empirical Evidence
2.1 Introduction
The economic benefits of apprenticeship training for firms can relate to both
the training period (current benefits) and the post-training period (future
benefits). In the first case the apprentice’s contribution to output and any
training subsidies outweigh his wage and training costs. In the second case
the firm has a benefit from the apprentice staying upon completion of the
training. The question why firms supply apprenticeships is important for
the quality of the training. If a firm supplies apprenticeships because of
current benefits (current production motive) there is a potential conflict of
interest with respect to training intensity. If, on the other hand, a firm trains
apprentices because of future benefits (investment motive) there may be a
conflict of interest with respect to the curriculum of the training programme.
This chapter gives an overview of the economic literature on firm’s bene-
fits from apprenticeship training. The earliest empirical work on this subject
modelled the demand for apprentices as a function of current output and
relative costs, to capture the current production motive, and the expected
future output, to capture the investment motive (Lindley, 1975; Merrilees,
9
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1983). Lindley (1975) found that both the (apprentice) wage elasticity and
output elasticity were close to unit which is clearly supporting the notion
of a current production motive. Merrilees (1983) found that unfilled-orders
and investment as proxies for future labour need have the expected effect
on apprentice recruitment suggesting that the investment motive is impor-
tant as well. Stevens (1994a) has estimated a model for apprentice demand
in which the investment motive is made more explicit. In this model firms
train apprentices to save on recruitment costs for skilled workers later on.
The coefficient of the training cost variable is negative and the coefficient of
the recruitment cost variable is positive indicating again that firms have an
investment motive to take on apprentices.1
A weakness of these approaches is that they do not provide insight in the
size of current and future benefits. Other training costs than wage cost are,
for example, not taken into account. Also, it does not allow for differences
in costs and benefits between firms. Which firms do have current benefits
and which firms do have future benefits? This question is important for the
study of conflicting interests of firms and apprentices.
The last decade many studies of the costs and benefits of apprenticeship
training have been undertaken, especially for the German apprenticeship
system. In this chapter I will first present the evidence for current benefits
and I will show that although on average current benefits do not outweigh
the costs of training apprentices, there are still a lot of firms for which the
reverse is the case.
Secondly, I will concentrate on future benefits. An important question
here is why firms would bother to train their own workforce. After all, by
recruiting skilled workers who are trained externally instead, firms can save
on training costs. As mentioned above, Stevens (1994a) argues that firms
who train their own workforce can save on recruitment costs. During the
last decade many other theoretical explanations for an investment motive
have turned up in the literature. All these explanations focuss upon a wedge
between productivity and pay of an internally trained worker. I will present a
theoretical framework to classify these contributions and show that a wedge
1Training cost is measured by relative youth wages and the recruitment cost by a skills
shortage index.
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between productivity an pay can be decomposed into three components, the
firm-specific returns, a wedge between the worker’s value in external firms
and the market wage and a wedge between the market wage and the wage
paid by the training firm. Finally I will present the empirical evidence for
future benefits for firms.
2.2 Current Benefits of Apprenticeship
Training
If the value of an apprentice’s output outweighs the costs of employing and
training him, a firm may take on apprentices as substitutes for unskilled
or skilled workers. Apprentice’s costs include wage cost, and direct train-
ing costs such as wage cost of trainers and material and capital costs. As
some skills are more easily learnt than other skills, training costs will vary
between trades. Some skills can be learned without much supervising while
performing the work, while other more complicated skills demand intensive
additional training off-the-job. Clearly in the latter case direct training costs
are much higher than in the former. Moreover an apprentice who is trained
on-the-job also makes a contribution to output. Therefore apprentice output
will be much higher if training takes place mostly on-the-job than if part
of the training takes place off-the-job in training workshops. It is expected
that current production motives, if they exists, will prevail in trades where
apprentice pay is relative low and training takes place on-the-job, so that
direct training costs are low and the apprentice output is high.
A lot of studies in different countries have taken place to measure the
costs and benefits of employing apprentices. Smits and Stromback (2001)
give an overview of the estimated costs and benefits relative to the cost
of employing a skilled worker in a few countries, namely Australia, Great
Britain, Germany and the Netherlands (see Table 2.1). Gross cost is the
sum of wage and training costs (corrected for eventual subsidies). The most
important component of the training costs are the costs of trainers. These are
determined as the wage costs of trainers multiplied by the proportion of time
they are engaged in training. Furthermore training costs include material
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and capital cost. Deducting apprentice output from gross cost gives the
net apprentice training cost. Apprentice output is measured by the relative
productivity of an apprentice times the wage cost of a skilled worker.
It appears that, although there are considerable differences between coun-
tries, on average the benefits from employing and training apprentices no-
where outweighs the costs. On the contrary, the average net costs of training
apprentices are considerable. In all countries considered, the largest cost
component is by far the apprentice’s wage. Clearly there is a positive re-
lation between apprentice output and apprentice pay. In countries where
apprentices’ contribution to production is high, like Australia and Britain,
apprentices’ wages are high as well. Surprisingly, however, is that in sev-
eral countries, notably Germany, Britain and the Netherlands, wage costs
exceed the value of the (average) apprentice output. So in these countries
apprentices would be a net cost even if direct training costs were zero.
Table 2.1: Relative training cost and its main components: selected countries
Wage Training Subsidy Gross Value of Net
cost cost cost apprentice cost
output
Australia 0.57 0.21 0.02 0.76 0.59 0.17
Germany 0.33 0.33 - 0.66 0.26 0.40
Netherlands 0.46 0.10 0.02 0.54 0.29 0.25
(manufacturing)
Netherlands 0.18 0.03 0.02 0.19 0.17 0.02
(distribution)
Britain 0.57 0.22 - 0.79 0.39 0.40
(distribution)
Notes: Taken from Smits and Stromback (2001). Sources: Harhoff and Kane
(1997); Bardenleben (1997); Dockery, Koshy, Stromback, and Ying (1997); de Vries
and Heere (1993); Jones (1986). All figures are relative to the cost of employing
a skilled worker: Australia AUD 32,500, Germany DM 44,500, Netherlands Nfl
50,000, Britain £8000.
These average figures mask the enormous differences in training costs
that exist between firms within countries. In Germany net costs differ signif-
icantly between the (mainly) small firms in the craft sector (handwerk) and
the (mainly) large firms in industry and commerce. Firms in the industry
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incur much higher training costs than firms in the craft sector. These differ-
ences in costs are due to the different organisation of the training. In the craft
sector training takes place mainly on-the-job while large firms in the indus-
try often train off-the-job in special training workshops. Several economists
therefore argue that for many firms in the craft sector apprentices actually
constitute a net benefit and that this is the main reason for those firms to
take on apprentices (Soskice, 1994; Casey, 1986, 1991). However, although
net training costs in the craft sector are on average much lower than in the
industry and commerce they are still considerable. In 1991 the average net
costs in the craft sector were 12,352 DM per year per apprentice and 20,509
DM in the industry and commerce (Von Bardeleben, 1994).
Soskice (1994) argues that net training costs in small firms in the craft
sector are overestimated for two reasons. Firstly, the costs of trainers are
determined as the total costs of the trainer multiplied by the proportion of
time engaged in training. In small firms, however, supervising the training
is a part-time activity. Generally the trainer will supervise the apprentice
in slack periods when he is not busy with production himself. Therefore the
actual marginal cost of the trainer may be much lower than suggested by
the figures. Secondly, the apprentice’s contribution to output is underesti-
mated. The apprentice’s output is measured by multiplying the wage costs
of a skilled worker by the relative productivity of an apprentice. In small
firms apprentices will often not only perform skilled work but unskilled work
as well. A first year apprentice cannot perform many skilled tasks yet, but is
fully capable to do unskilled work. Therefore it would be more appropriate
to include the value of the apprentice contribution to unskilled work as well.
If wage costs of part-time trainers are not taken into account, the aver-
age net training costs in the craft sector would amount to 400 DM per year
(against 9,193 in industry and commerce (Von Bardeleben, 1994)). On av-
erage training is still a net cost in the craft sector but Wagner (1998) states
that for 30 % of the apprentices in the craft sector training costs are actually
negative. Surprisingly there are also many firms in the industry/commerce
for which net training costs are negative, nearly 20% of the apprentices in
these sectors is a net benefit to the training firm. This result suggests that the
contrast between the craft sector and the industry/commerce is not as sharp
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as could be concluded if only averages are compared between the sectors.
If, as suggested by Soskice (1994), in addition the apprentice output were
valued at half of the labour costs of an unskilled worker, approximately DM
15,000, the average net costs in the craft sector would be even negative.
So although on average German firms face positive net training costs,
there is plenty of evidence that the variance between firms is high and that
there is a considerable number of firms for which current benefits outweigh
the training costs.
For the Netherlands there is less information available on the costs of
apprentices. Kok, Groot, Hop, and Janssens (2002) investigated the costs
and benefits of apprentices in the care sector and concluded that the net
costs are considerable, in 2000 on average 11,100 guilders per year. De Vries
and Heere (1993) provide estimates of costs and benefits of apprentices in
a number of selected trades, namely chemical and process industry, metal
industry, building trade and the distribution sector. The results are not
entirely representative because only 31 firms were interviewed but still a
number of important conclusions can be drawn. On average apprentices are
a net cost to the training firm. Again, there are considerable differences
between trades and even between firms within trades.
In the distribution sector average costs are very small. Some apprentices
in this sector only have a learning and no employment contract, in which case
they do not earn a wage although they may receive some compensation.2 Net
costs are quite high in the building, metal and chemical industry. In these
sectors apprentice pay is high compared to apprentice output. Although on
average apprentices constitute a net cost, in 12% of the firms apprentices
are a net benefit to the firm. Some of these firms admitted that these cur-
rent benefits were the main reason to train apprentices. The share of firms
for which apprenticeship training is a net benefit is lower than in Germany
but De Vries and Heere (1993) suggest that firms with low training costs
are underepresented in the sample because mainly firms with a long train-
ing tradition were included. This is confirmed by qualitative evidence on
training costs. Borghans, Smits, Vlasblom, and Jacobs (2000) held a survey
2For a more detailed overview of the Dutch apprenticeship system and the types of
apprenticeships places see Chapter 5.
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among Dutch training firms and asked about apprentices’ cost during the
training period. Two thirds of the training firms stated that the costs of em-
ploying apprentices are earned back during the training period, that is, the
apprentice’s output fully compensates for wage and training costs (see Ta-
ble 2.2). This results suggests again that, as put forward by Soskice (1994),
quantitative estimates sometimes overestimate net training costs.
Table 2.2: Percentage of training firms that report that apprentices constitute a
net benefit during the training period.
%
Industry 73
Garages 87
Building Trade 65
Hotel and Catering Industry 76
Business Services 45
Wholesale/retail trade 59
Non-profit 71
Total 66
Source: Borghans, Smits, Vlasblom, and Jacobs (2000)
Information available on apprenticeship training in Britain suggests that
English firms incur high training costs (Jones, 1986). Apprentice pay in
Britain is high compared to the skilled wage rate. As apprentice output
falls short of the apprentice wage costs, British training firms incur high net
training costs. However, the information is based on a small sample of only
10 firms and more important only large firms are included. All firms have
more than 100 employees but six of ten firms even have more than 2.500
employees. So there is no evidence on training costs in small English firms.
Like in Britain, apprentice pay in Australia is very high but so is the
value of apprentice output. In fact apprentice output fully compensates
apprentice wage costs. Training firms bear the direct costs of the training.
As a consequence average net training costs in Australia are much smaller
than in Britain. Still average costs are quite large. Qualitative evidence on
training cost in Australia does not fit with quantitative measures, however.
The majority of Australian training firms think that apprentices constitute
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a net benefit during the training period (Smits and Stromback, 2001). This
finding suggests again that quantitative measures might overestimate net
training costs.
From the quantitative evidence it can be conclude that for the major-
ity of firms apprentices constitute a net cost, often quite large. There are,
however, also firms for which apprentices constitute a net benefit. These are
mainly small firms in which training takes place mainly on-the-job and as a
consequence the apprentice contribution to output can be quite considerable.
Also the cost of trainers is much lower in these firms because supervising ap-
prentices is a part-time activity that takes mainly place during slack periods.
It is not clear for how many firms this is actually the case. Quantitative ev-
idence for Germany suggest between 20% and 30% of all firms. Qualitative
evidence for the Netherlands and Australia suggests a larger share. Also,
it is not sure that all these firms take on apprentices for current benefits
only, future benefits may play a role as well. But, as the Dutch evidence
shows, there certainly are firms that train mainly because of current benefits
(de Vries and Heere, 1993).
2.3 Future Benefits of Apprenticeship Train-
ing
The majority of firms that train apprentices seems to do so because of future
benefits. Especially large firms, that have substantial training costs, retain
most of their apprentices. But what are these future benefits? Why do these
firms not simply try to recruit skilled workers that are trained elsewhere?
The common approach in the literature is to seek these benefits in the wedge
between productivity and pay of newly qualified apprentices that stay in
the training firm (Acemoglu and Pischke, 1999a,c). A wedge between pro-
ductivity and pay implies that the market for skilled labour is not perfectly
competitive. The literature provides many explanations as to why this would
be the case.
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2.3.1 Apprenticeship Training and the Human Capital
Theory
The human capital theory has played an important role in explaining train-
ing investments of firms and workers. Human capital can be defined as the
entire set of skills and knowledge, emotional and physical conditions that de-
termines someone’s productivity. Investments in human capital raise future
productivity. These include investments in training and education, but also
in medical care. The returns to investments in human capital may either
accrue to the worker or to the firm that employs him. With respect to on-
the-job training Becker (1964) makes a distinction between general and firm-
specific training. General training raises productivity equally in many firms
while firm-specific training raises productivity only in the training firm. In a
perfectly competitive labour market workers are paid their marginal product.
Therefore an increase in general human capital will be fully reflected in an
increase in the market wage. The worker, thus, receives the full benefit of
general training. Since the firm cannot appropriate the returns to general
training it will not be prepared to pay for it either. Following this theory,
firms will only supply general training if workers bear all the costs. Training
levels will be optimal as long as workers can finance the training investment
themselves.
Firm-specific training, on the other hand, will not raise the worker’s mar-
ket wage. Still, the firm will not be prepared to bear the full costs of an
investment in firm-specific skills. If the employment relation is not contin-
ued after the training the investment is lost. The same is true for the worker.
Both the worker and the firm risk to lose the investment if the other party
unilaterally breaks the employment relation. Hashimoto (1981) shows that
if both parties share the costs and benefits of firm-specific training they both
have an interest in continuing the employment relation after the training.
Applying the human capital theory to apprenticeship training, it follows
that firms will only have a share in the future benefits of training if some of
this training is firm-specific. However, apprenticeship training aims to pro-
vide occupation-specific skills that can be used in external firms. In practice
it is inevitable that the apprentice will learn some firm-specific skills as well
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but the question is whether this component is large enough for firms to be
willing to invest in apprenticeship training.
2.3.2 Theoretical Models on Firms’ Return to Training
In recent years the literature has come up with several explanation as to
why firms are willing to invest in technological general training. These ex-
planations have in common that they deviate from the assumption that the
market for general skills is perfectly competitive.
To illustrate this issue consider a two period training model. Training
takes place in the first period. In the second period the worker might either
stay in the training firm or quit to work in some other firm. Training increases
productivity, the increase in productivity may be higher in the training firm
than in external firms depending on the firm-specificity of the training. The
productivity of an internally trained worker is given by H(hg, hs), where
hg is the level of general training and hs the level of firm-specific training.
The firm’s expected return to training is determined by the wedge between
productivity and pay of an internally trained worker and the quit rate.
(1−Q) (H(hg, hs)− w2) (2.1)
where Q is the quit rate and w2 is the second-period wage paid by the training
firm.
Productivity of an externally trained worker is equal to H(hg, 0). The
difference between internal and external productivity is given by
U(hg, hs) = H(hg, hs)−H(hg, 0) (2.2)
If external markets are imperfectly competitive we may have a wedge between
external productivity and the market wage, ω, in the second period.
W(hg) = H(hg, 0)− ω(hg) (2.3)
Furthermore the second-period wage paid by the training firm, w2, may de-
viate from the market wage.
V(hg, hs) = ω(hg)− w2(hg, hs) (2.4)
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Note that V may be negative. In that case the firm shares some of the
training surplus with the worker.
The quit rate depends both on the wage offered by the training firm
and the attachment of the worker to the training firm. The worker will
quit if the gap between market wages and pay in the training firm exceeds
some threshold µ +m. Where µ is a random variable with E(µ) = 0, twice
differentiable distribution function F (µ), f(µ) and −µ¯ < µ < µ¯. The fixed
component of the threshold, m, may depend on hg and hs. If µ < V −m the
worker quits otherwise he will stay, The probability of quitting is given by
Q =
∫ V−m
−µ¯
f(µ)dµ = F (V −m) (2.5)
The expected quit rate if the firm offers a wage equal to the market wage
F (−m) can be interpreted as the exogenous quit rate.
By substituting for U , V , W and Q in equation (2.1), the firm’s expected
return can be rewritten as:
(1− F (V −m)) (U +W + V) (2.6)
The firm’s expected return to training consists of three components. The first
is the firm-specific returns to training U , the second is the wedge between
external productivity and pay, W , and the third component is the wedge
between the wage paid by the training firm and the market wage, V . The
wedge between external productivity and pay, W , can also be appropriated
by external firms if the worker quits the training firm.
Suppose training costs C(hg, hs), including training-wage cost and fore-
gone productivity, are increasing and convex in hg and hs,
∂C
∂hi
≥ 0,∂2C
∂h2i
≥ 0,
i = g, s. Also suppose that the firm chooses the training intensity.3 The firm
maximises profit with respect to hg, hs and w2 and then chooses to train if
3This does not imply that the apprentice does not share in the training costs, for
example by accepting a lower wage than the unskilled wage rate. The training wage is
incorporated in the cost function. If the apprentice shares in the training costs, training
costs will increase less with training intensity than if the apprentice does not. Whether the
apprentice shares in the training costs or not, does not affect the outcomes of the model,
however.
19
CHAPTER 2. WHY DO FIRMS SUPPLY APPRENTICESHIPS?
profits are positive. The first-order conditions are given by:
∂C
∂hg
= (1− F (V −m))
(
∂U
∂hg
+
∂W
∂hg
+
∂V
∂hg
)
− (U +W + V) f(V)
(
∂V
∂hg
− ∂m
∂hg
) (2.7)
∂C
∂hs
= (1− F (V −m))
(
∂U
∂hs
+
∂V
∂hs
)
− (U +W + V) f(V)
(
∂V
∂hs
− ∂m
∂hs
) (2.8)
(U +W + V) f(V) + F (V −m)− 1 = 0 (2.9)
Substituting for (2.9) in equations (2.7) and (2.8) gives:
∂C
∂hg
= (1− F (V −m))
(
∂U
∂hg
+
∂W
∂hg
+
∂m
∂hg
)
(2.10)
∂C
∂hs
= (1− F (V −m))
(
∂U
∂hs
+
∂m
∂hs
)
(2.11)
It is straightforward to see from equation (2.10) that if ∂U
∂hg
> 0, ∂W
∂hg
> 0
or ∂m
∂hg
> 0 the firm will supply general training.4 It will supply firm-specific
training if ∂U
∂hs
> 0 or ∂m
∂hs
> 0. In a competitive labour market ∂U
∂hg
= 0,
∂W
∂hg
= 0 and ∂m
∂hg
= 0. The firm will only supply firm-specific training. In the
following section I will discuss a number of models from the literature that
give explanations for ∂U
∂hg
> 0, ∂W
∂hg
> 0 or ∂m
∂hg
> 0.
From (2.10) it follows that firms will not provide training if the wedge
between productivity and pay is a constant, that is if ∂U
∂hg
= 0, ∂W
∂hg
= 0 and
∂m
∂hg
= 0. There are, however, a number of models in the literature that only
consider the size of the wedge and assume that firms will invest in general
training if this size is large enough to offset the training costs. Usually this
4Compare Acemoglu and Pischke (1999a,c). They introduced a general framework to
explain firms’ investments in general training. In this framework firms will provide general
training if the wedge between productivity and pay is increasing in training intensity.
However, post-training wages in the training firm equal the outside option (ω in the model
presented here) so the wedge between productivity and pay can only stem from U or W
and there is no role for m in explaining training investments.
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concerns models that investigate the firm’s decision on the number of workers
to be trained (for example, see Stevens (1994b); Booth and Chatterji (1998)).
The training firm will supply training places up to the point that the marginal
costs of an extra trainee equals the marginal costs. However, a constant
wedge assumes that the training level is also a constant and exogenously
given to the training firm, otherwise the training firm could lower the training
level without affecting the return to training. In the limit the training level
would then approach zero.
Firm-Specificity of Apprenticeship Training (U)
Models on firm-specificity of apprenticeship training seek to explain why
∂U
∂hg
> 0. The main argument is that firm-specific skills are essential to
function well within a company. Each firm has it’s own equipment and
machinery, procedures, culture etcetera. Franz and Soskice (1995) argue
that a minimum of firm-specific skills is in fact necessary for using general
skills. Firm-specific and general skills are thus technological complements.
Both Franz and Soskice (1995) and Acemoglu and Pischke (1999a,c) have
shown that the complementary of general and firm-specific skills provides an
incentive for firms to invest in general apprenticeship training.
Although apprenticeship training primary aims to provide occupational
skills which can be used outside the training firm, firm-specific skills can
be taught at very low costs. Simply by being in the training firm the ap-
prentice will learn about the firm’s organisational structure. While learning
occupational skills the apprentice will also learn to work with the firm’s own
machinery. So firm-specific skills are to some extent a by product of general
training (Smits and Stromback, 2001). A firm that hires skilled workers on
the external market will have to teach these workers firm-specific skills be-
fore the general skills can be made fully productive. As the value of general
skills increases with the level of firm-specific skills, (technological) general
skills are worth more in the training firm than at the external market. As a
consequence there is a wedge between productivity in the training firm and
the market wage that increases with the level of general training.
Lazear (2003) suggests an alternative way to define firm-specific skills.
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Skills may in itself be general but firms use them in different combinations
and attach different weights to them. A worker who leaves the training firm
after the training is not very likely to find a firm in which the set of general
skills he has acquired is valued the same as in the training firm and therefore
suffers a wage loss.
Kessler and Lu¨lfesmann (2000) give an additional explanation. In their
model general and firm-specific training are technologically separable (that
is H(hg, hs) = H(hg, 0) + H(0, hs)) but the value of both components is
uncertain ex ante. Using the ‘outside option principle’ they show that as
long as the realised value of firm-specific training exceeds the realised value
of general training, the returns to both firm-specific and general training
are shared between the worker and the firm. Otherwise the returns to firm-
specific training accrue to the firm and the return to general training to the
worker.5 Therefore firms are willing to pay for general training.
There is little empirical evidence on the importance of firm-specific skills
for the apprenticeship system. The curriculum of the apprenticeship program
is often regulated but these regulations mostly set a minimum standard and
firms are free to provide more training than that. Franz and Soskice (1995)
state that in Germany large companies train apprentices ‘well beyond mini-
mum standards’. Furthermore firm-specific skills are more important in large
complex organisations. Whether the firm-specific component is indeed the
reason for these firms to invest in apprenticeship training remains a question
that needs to be answered.
Wedge between External Productivity and Pay (W)
Imperfect Information on Training Quality In contrast to the training
firm, external firms do not observe what training is taking place. Therefore,
external firms might find it difficult to assess the value of a training program.
It follows that if an increase in the level of training is not observed by external
firms, then it will not lead to an equivalent increase in the market wage, so
∂W
∂hg
> 0. The asymmetry of information gives firms an incentive to invest
in training. The consequence of informational asymmetries with respect to
5More precisely U = H(0, hs) + 12P [H(0, hs) > H(hg, 0)] (H(hg, 0)−H(0, hs)).
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the content of training programs was first mentioned by Katz and Ziderman
(1990) and later modelled by Chang and Wang (1996). Katz and Ziderman
(1990) argue that the value of an externally trained worker is an increasing
function of the recruiting firm’s information about a worker’s training. If the
recruiting firm has no information about the training, it has to incur costs
to discover the worker’s skill level. The value of an untrained worker in a
job that requires training might be very low if not negative. Additionally,
it will probably take some time for a firm to discover the productivity of
an externally trained worker. Therefore, firms might not be willing to hire
externally trained workers for skilled jobs.
Nowadays, in most countries apprenticeship training is regulated to a
high degree. Amongst others, these regulations include monitoring and cer-
tification of the training. External firms can thus be sure that an externally
trained worker has attained some minimum standard. Beyond this mini-
mum standard, however, the quality of the training may differ considerably
between firms. So certification does not completely solve the private infor-
mation problem but it is not expected that this is an important reason for
firms to provide apprenticeship training. On the contrary, the apprenticeship
system is especially flourishing in countries where it is highly regulated.
Imperfect Information on Apprentice Quality Another type of pri-
vate information is the ability of workers. The training firm, by having the
opportunity to observe workers during the training period, has an informa-
tional advantage compared to external firms. Although external firms might
observe the training intensity, the outcome might depend on both the train-
ing intensity and the ability of the worker. Several authors have addressed
this issue, for example Elbaum and Singh (1995), Franz and Soskice (1995),
Acemoglu and Pischke (1998, 1999a,c), Autor (2001), Boom (2001) and Clark
(2002). The common feature of most models it the assumption that training
raises productivity more for high ability workers than for low ability workers.
That is, training and ability are complements. After the training period, the
high ability workers are offered the market wage and the low ability workers
dismissed or offered such a low wage that they will quit. However, some
of the high ability workers will also leave for exogenous reasons. Acemoglu
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and Pischke (1999a,c) show that in a competitive labour market the equilib-
rium market wage will equal the expected productivity of an externally hired
worker. The expected profits on externally hired workers are therefore zero.
Furthermore, since the market wage is lower than the productivity of high
ability workers, the firm earns a surplus on internally trained high ability
workers. It follows directly that the surplus on trained high ability workers
increases with the level of training (∂W
∂hg
> 0) and therefore firms will invest
in training.
Franz and Soskice (1995) provide some arguments why unobserved ability
differences between workers is an important reason for German employers to
train apprentices. In Germany, it is very costly to fire skilled workers. Thus,
externally hired workers that turn out to be of low ability cannot easily
be dismissed. Apprentices, on the other hand, can be dismissed after the
training period at no cost. This explanation suggests that the apprenticeship
system should be more common in countries in which the labour market is
highly regulated. In general, this seems to be the case, but with some notable
exceptions. However, using apprenticeships as a means to select the best
workers is a costly method if the training period is relatively long or if the
proportion of low ability workers is high.
Small Market for Skills Becker (1964) admitted that the dichotomy
general-firm-specific is not applicable for all types of training. He states
that ‘some training may be useful not in most firms nor in a single firm, but
in a set of firms defined by product, type of work, or geographical location’.
Stevens (1994b, 1996) defines training that can be used in more than one
firm as transferable. She argues that general training is only a special case of
transferable training, that is characterised by a perfectly competitive labour
market. If the labour market is not perfectly competitive Becker’s results
do not apply. Stevens (1994b) shows that in case of imperfect competition
post-training wages will not necessarily equal marginal product. The mech-
anism of the model is as follows. Ex ante there is uncertainty on the value
of training in the training firm and on the external market. Ex post it may
turn out that the training is worth more in some firm outside the training
firm than in the training firm. The worker will be employed in the firm in
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which he can attain the highest productivity at a wage equal to his second
highest value. This wedge between productivity and pay accrues to the firm
that employs him. In the limiting case, when the number of firms where the
training is of possible value approaches infinity, the difference between the
highest and second highest and thus the wedge between productivity and pay
approaches zero. In this model the wedge between wages and productivity
does not depend on the level of transferable training, however.
Booth, Francesconi, and Zoega (2002) present a similar model as in
Stevens (1996) in which there are only two firms competing for workers.
In this model there is again a wedge between productivity and pay increas-
ing in the level of training, due to the fact that there is uncertainty with
respect to the preferences of workers to work for either firm.6
Acemoglu and Pischke (1999a,c) present a different model for a small
market for skills. If the number of possible firms where the training has
some value is limited, there is a positive probability that a worker who leaves
the training firm will not find a skilled job. He would therefore be prepared
to accept a job in his own trade at a wage below his productivity. In this
model the wedge is again increasing in the level of training.
This explanation for a wedge between productivity and wages may have
some validity for trades that have a relatively small market, such as printing
trades, but less for apprenticeships in occupations that have a large market,
mostly occupations that are not linked to any specific sector of industry, for
example administrative occupations.
Imperfect competition can also stem from firm heterogeneity. Booth and
Zoega (2000) present a model in which firms are characterised by the average
quality of their workforce. Firms with a high quality workforce are able to
perform more complex tasks. As a result the more complex tasks can be
undertaken by a smaller number of firms than the less complex tasks. For
that reason high quality firms face less competitors in the labour market
than low quality firms. Due to this monopsony power high quality firms are
6In this model the retention rate depends on the wedge between wage paid in the
training firm and the other firm operating on the same market. In equilibrium both
wage rates are equal, so there is only a difference between productivity and market wage
(W > 0) and not between the market wage and the wage paid by the firm (V = 0).
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prepared to invest in general training.
This explanation is more convincing for professional training (lawyers,
auditors or doctors) than for apprenticeship training which usually aims at
vocational training at the intermediate level.
The Role of Institutions Specific institution in a country may enable
firms to appropriate part of the returns to general training. Examples are
minimum wage legislation and the influence of trade unions. A minimum
wage is commonly thought of as leading to less training than is socially
desirable. A minimum wage applicable to the training period can prevent a
firm from shifting the cost of training onto apprentices. However, a minimum
wage for the post training period may be an incentive for firms to provide
general training (Acemoglu and Pischke, 1999b). This would be the case if,
due to other labour market distortions, the wage the firm would otherwise
pay is strictly lower than the marginal productivity of the worker. Firms
then have an incentive to raise productivity exactly to that level for which
the wage they would otherwise pay equals this minimum wage. This is the
minimum level of training for which the firm can appropriate the surplus
from training.
Most apprenticeship training is specific to a trade or a sector of industry.
In several countries, like Germany or the Netherlands, wages in these sectors
are set by collective bargaining. Collective bargaining usually decreases wage
differentials between workers of different skill levels. Acemoglu and Pischke
(1999c) model the extreme case where the union sets an unique wage for
all skill levels. The post-training wage is then unaffected by the level of
training and the increase in the wedge between productivity and pay equals
the increase in productivity.
Wedge between Market Wage and Wage Paid by the Training Firm
(V)
Mobility Costs Apprentices may have a preference for staying in the train-
ing firm after the training, in which case we may have V > 0. This preference
may be a result of residential inertia, workers are unwilling to move too far
away from their home town (Harhoff and Kane, 1997). If the number of possi-
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ble employers within an geographical acceptable range is small an apprentice
who wants to switch employers probably have to leave the region. Other
reasons may play a role as well, for example the non-pecuniary attributes of
the job in the training firm. Anticipating on these high mobility costs for
ex-apprentices the firm can pay them a wage below their productivity. If the
number of potential employers in the surrounding will be smaller for high
skilled workers than for low skilled workers we may have ∂m
∂hg
> 0. Harhoff
and Kane (1997) show that in Germany firms are more likely to train if there
are fewer work opportunities for workers in the surroundings.7
Wage Guarantees Black and Loewenstein (1997) and Loewenstein and
Spletzer (1998) show that a wage guarantee from the side of the firm can
have the same positive effect on training as a minimum wage, if the value
of the training (both in and outside the training firm) is uncertain ex ante.
In their model the firm commits to pay at least a certain wage in the post-
training period. If the productivity of the worker turns out to be below this
wage guarantee the firm may lay him off. If the productivity turns out to be
above the wage guarantee the firm may choose to offer him a higher wage.
The worker will quit if he receives a higher wage offer of an external firm.
If the productivity of the worker in the training firm falls between the wage
guarantee and his market wage there is a wedge between productivity and
pay. A higher level of training increases this wedge given that the apprentice
does not quit.8 A wage guarantee can be seen as a promise of the training firm
to pay the apprentice the skilled wage rate upon completion of the training.
7Note the difference between the mobility cost model and the models for a small market
of skills discussed in the last section. In the mobility cost model it is assumed that the
worker would have difficulties to find another job in the region but would have no problem
to find a job in another region, so there are enough employment opportunities but they are
spread unevenly between regions. In the models for a small market for skills the worker
would face difficulties to find a job everywhere.
8This model does not fit exactly in the theoretical framework presented at the begin
of this section. The difference is that this model assumes that the market value of the
worker ω is uncertain ex ante. For that reason a higher training level at a given wage in
the training firm is not completely offset by a higher chance that the worker quits.
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2.3.3 Empirical Evidence on Future Benefits
For firms to have future benefits from apprenticeship training there must be
a reasonable probability that the apprentice will stay in the training firm for
some time after completing the training and there must be a wedge between
the wage and productivity of a retained apprentice. I will first discuss some
figures on average retention rates of apprentices in different countries and
next I will go into the empirical evidence on a productivity-wage gap for
ex-apprentices.
Retention Rates
The retention rate is an important factor in determining firms’ expected prof-
its from apprenticeship training. However, not all firms supply apprentices
because of investment motives. As we saw before, some firms employ appren-
tices for their contribution to production. These firms will probably lay-off
apprentices after the training period. Ideally, one would therefore make a
distinction between quits and lay-offs. Unfortunately most data sets do not
allow this distinction. However, by assuming that apprentices first accept
the job offer of the training firm and subsequently search for a better job
opportunity, the initial retention rate can give an indication of the lay-off
rate and the subsequent mobility an indication of the quit rate.
In Germany roughly 70% of all apprentices stay for some time in the
training firm after completing the training (Harhoff and Kane, 1997; Euwals
and Winkelmann, 2001). The proportion of stayers varies markedly between
sectors. In large firms in the industry the retention rate is much higher than
in small firms that can be find mostly in the craft sector. Two third of the
apprentices that initially stay leave within 3 years. After 3 years only 24%
of the apprentices is still in the training firm. For firms with more than 1000
employees this is 45% (Euwals and Winkelmann, 2001). In recent years the
retention rate has decreased somewhat (Euwals and Winkelmann, 2001). In
Australia the initial retention rate is quite high as well, about 85% (Centre for
Labour Market Research, 1997). But like in Germany subsequent mobility is
also high (Smits and Stromback, 2001). In Britain the retention rate seems
to be slightly higher. Only 16% of the apprentices is laid off at completion
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of the training (Booth and Satchell, 1994). A few years later the retention
rate has decreased till 45%.
In other countries retention rates are lower. In the Netherlands, less
than 50% of graduated apprentices is still with the training firm one and a
half year after graduation (Smits, 1999). There are considerable differences
between training occupations. Apprentices trained in technical and care
occupations stay more often with their training firm than apprentices trained
in administrative occupations. Apprentices in large firms stay more often
than apprentices in small firms. From a survey among Dutch training firms
it appears that the average chance that an apprentice is offered a continuation
in the training firm is more than 70%. It can, therefore, be concluded that
far less apprentices stay than firms would like. In Denmark retention rates
are not very high either, 40% to 50%, depending on stage of the business
cycle (Westergard-Nielsen and Rasmussen, 1997).
In France, the proportion of stayers is quite small. Less than 30% of all
apprentices remain for some time with the training firms after completing the
training (Vialla (1997) cited in Schwerdt (2001)). Schwerdt (2001) shows that
in 1998 only 12% of the ex-apprentices was still in the training firm one year
after the training. This low rate is partly due to the fact that apprentices who
continue the training on a higher level in the training firm are not included
in the figures. In 1998 29% of the apprentices continued the training and
40% of them did so in the training firm. Surprisingly the retention rate is
lowest for large training firms with more than 500 employees (only 7%). As
nearly 40% of apprentices trained in large firms gets unemployed after the
apprenticeship, it is clear that the majority of apprentices does not leave
voluntary.
All in all it can be concluded that, with the exception of France, in most
countries the lay-off rate after the apprenticeship is low but that the quit
rate in subsequent years is considerable. This suggests that the training
investment must be recouped shortly after completing the training.
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Wedge between Productivity and Pay
Empirical evidence on future benefits from training for firms is limited. A
major problem is that a wedge between wages and productivity is difficult to
measure as productivity is usually not observable. For that reason empirical
work on the wedge between productivity and pay concentrates mainly on
wage differences between workers who stay in the training firm after com-
pleting the training and workers who move to another firm. The idea is that
by moving to another firm workers can ascertain the market wage (ω). If
wages of stayers are higher than wages of movers, there must be a surplus
on training that is shared between the worker and the training firm. Note
that this approach assumes that the wedge between the market wage and
the wage paid in the training firm is negative (V < 0).9 If V > 0 movers
would earn more than stayers so this approach neglects the mobility costs
explanations for a wedge between productivity and pay. The surplus can be
either due to firm-specificity of training (U) or a wedge between external pro-
ductivity and the market wage (W) stemming from imperfect competition.
A complication of this approach is that apprentices that have had an offer
to stay in the training firm will only leave if the outside offer exceeds their
wages in the training firm. Therefore, without correcting for this selection
effect, the mover-stayers wage gap will be upwardly biased.
Having said this, we will take a closer look at the empirical results. Nearly
all empirical work on this issue concerns Germany. Werwatz (1996) aimed to
analyse the degree of firm-specificity of apprenticeship training by comparing
wages of stayers and movers using the data set Qualifikation und Berufsver-
lauf 1985/86. Including only those who move voluntary and correcting for
self-selection, he found that on average movers earn more than stayers. How-
ever, there is a difference between those who quit immediately or shortly after
the apprenticeship and those who quit later. Early movers face a wage loss
while late movers who quit after a year gain. Including lay offs the wage loss
is even bigger. There are also differences between sectors. Ex-apprentices in
the industry who move, on average face a wage loss while ex-apprentices in
the craft sector gain by moving.
9If the firm shares the surplus with the worker then by definition V < 0.
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Using the same data set, but without correcting for self-selection, Harhoff
and Kane (1997) also found that movers earn higher wages than those who
stay. However, contrary to the results of Werwatz (1996) early movers do
not face a wage loss. The wage differential decreases if the time of moving is
later. They also found that in the craft sector the wage differences between
stayers and movers are smaller than in the industry.
Acemoglu and Pischke (1998) used the same data set to test the relevance
of private information with respect to ability for the German apprenticeship
system. They compared wages of stayers and movers but made a distinction
between those who left the training firm to do their military’s service and
other quitters. The idea was that firms will retain the most able apprentices
and therefor stayers are on average of higher ability than movers except
for those who move for exogenous reasons, the military quitters. Therefore
the proportion of low ability workers among military quitters will be equal
to the proportion of low ability workers in the whole population while the
proportion of low ability workers among other quitters will be much higher.
It is therefore to be expected that military quitters on average earn more
than other quitters but less than stayers. They found that stayers earn more
than movers, and military quitters earn more than other movers although
the latter difference was not statistically significant. This finding supports
their hypothesis that firms train apprentices to select the most able workers
later on.
Euwals and Winkelmann (2001) used the IAB employment sample and
observed wages in the first job after the apprenticeship. When all gradu-
ated apprentices were included they found no difference between earnings of
stayers and movers. When they considered only apprentices trained in large
firms they found that stayers earn about 4% more than movers in the first
job.
Clark (2001) used the Social Economic Panel to analyse the mover-stayer
differential, thereby distinguishing different types of movers, those who quit
and those who move for other reasons. Again it is found that movers earn
more than stayers, but unlike Werwatz (1996) he found no difference between
those who quit and those who move for other reasons. Similar to Harhoff and
Kane (1997) he found also that early movers earn a higher wage premium
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than late movers. Bougheas and Georgellis (2001) used the same data set
and found that movers initially earn more on average than stayers but that
for stayers in large firms the situation is reversed after some years.
Concluding, it can be stated that the empirical evidence on a productivity
wage gap is not unambiguous. Some studies show a positive mover-stayers
differential other a negative. However, there seem to be important differences
between sectors of industry and between small and large firms. There is
some evidence that a productivity-wage gap for retained apprentices is more
important in large firms in the industry than in small firms in the craft sector.
This finding is in line with other empirical evidence suggesting that small
firms in the crafts sector train apprentices because of current production
motives and large firms in the industry train because of investment motives.
Small firms in the craft sector often face negative net training costs and low
retention rates while the opposite is true for large firms in the industry.
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2.4 Appendix to Chapter 2
2.4.1 List of Symbols
hg level of general training
hs level of firm-specific training
Q quit rate
w2 second-period wage paid by the training firm
ω second-period market wage
H(., .) human capital production function
C(., .) cost function
U wedge between internal and external productivity
W wedge between external productivity and market wage
V wedge between second-period market wage and wage
paid by the training firm
m fixed component of the threshold for V
µ random component of the threshold for V
F (.) distribution function of µ
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Chapter 3
Specific or Generic Skills?
3.1 Introduction
The main part of apprenticeship training is specific to an occupation or in-
dustry. The apprentice learns to cut hair, do carpentry work or to print. The
returns to specific training are to some extent uncertain. If a worker fails
to find employment in the industry or occupation he is trained for, a sub-
stantial part of the training investment is lost. For that reason, workers who
have to switch industries indeed suffer a significant wage loss as shown by
Carrington (1993), Neal (1995) and Weinberg (2001). Apprentices therefore
have an interest in acquiring not only skills that are specific to the industry
or occupation, but also generic skills that have a wider applicability.1 For
example academic skills such as reading, writing and mathematics, learning
skills, but also basic technical skills (Bishop, 1995). If firms, on the other
hand, train because of investment motives, they have little interest in pro-
viding apprentices with more training than is needed to function well in the
firm. If it is up to the employer to decide, apprentices will learn few skills
that are not specific to the industry or occupation they are trained for.
In this chapter I will model conflicting interests of firms and workers
with respect to the training level for specific and generic skills. I will show
1See also Schimmel (1998), who presents a theoretical model for the decision to acquire
universal or specific knowledge. Workers who choose universal education are able to work
in more occupations and have a higher probability of obtaining and keeping a job.
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that, although it is socially optimal to have a generic training component,
firms are not only unwilling to pay for generic training, they also want this
component to be as small as possible, because it offers the worker better
outside opportunities and forces firms in the industry to pay higher wages.
At the same time, the existence of a generic component induces firms to
invest in industry- or occupation-specific training. Given that firms in the
industry, due to the generic component, have to pay higher wages, it pays
off to increase the worker’s productivity within the industry as well.
The results of my model are confirmed by the stylised facts. Oulton
and Steedman (1994) argue that the content of the British Youth Training
programmes is too industry-specific due to the fact that employers have a
dominant influence on the curriculum. Heijke, Borghans, and Smits (2001)
conclude that in the Netherlands industrial bodies for vocational education
and training that develop training programmes tend to overestimate the im-
portance of skills that are needed in the sector but do not sufficiently take into
account the interindustrial mobility after the apprenticeship that demands
more generic skills.
In the economic literature on training, conflicting interests of workers and
firms with respect to the curriculum of the training programme receive little
attention. It is acknowledged that firms tend to pay too much attention to
firm-specific skills (Askildsen and Ireland, 1993), but the distinction between
generic and industry- or occupation-specific skills is never made.2 Using
a Beckerian framework, the distinction between specific and generic skills
would be superfluous. Both types of skills can be used in external firms and
can therefore be classified as general in the definition of Becker (1962), as
opposed to (completely) firm-specific skills that are only useful in the training
firm. Training for general skills raises the market wages of workers as much
as their (marginal) productivity. The training firm cannot appropriate any
of the returns to general training and as a consequence will not be prepared
to bear any of the training costs either. Since it is the worker who receives
the benefits from training it is also the worker who has to make the training
investment. If we extend this argument to specific and generic training, the
2In the remainder of this chapter I will use the term specific skills to denote industry-
or occupation-specific skills.
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conclusion will be that the firm will be indifferent between the two types of
training, since both types of training only have benefits for the worker. As
long as workers are not credit-constrained, they will choose the optimal level
of both specific and generic skills. The underlying assumption is, however,
that the market for both types of skills is perfectly competitive. As we will
see, this assumption will not necessarily hold for specific skills.
Some skills may be of use outside the training firm, but only in a limited
number of firms or jobs. The usual properties for general training will not
hold in this case. Stevens (1994b) therefore introduces the term transferable
training. She states that general training is only a special case of transferable
training, which is characterised by perfect competition on the market for
skills. In the case of imperfect competition between firms on the labour
market, wages will not rise as much as the productivity of trained workers,
which means that firms can appropriate some of the returns to training.
Firms therefore have an incentive to invest in transferable training. However,
not only the training firm, but also external firms will profit from the training.
The training firm risks to lose its trained workers to other firms and will
therefore invest less than the social optimum. If the market for specific skills
is not perfectly competitive, industry- or occupation-specific skills are not
general, although they are transferable, and a distinction between specific
and generic skills will make sense.
The model presented in this chapter is related to Stevens’ model for trans-
ferable training (Stevens, 1994b). The innovation of my model is that I con-
sider two types of transferable training, instead of one, that is generic and
specific training, each of which has a different market. I will show that im-
perfect competition for specific skills may lead to a distortion in the mix of
specific and generic skills.
3.2 A Model for Specific and Generic Skills
Consider a sector of industry in which n firms are operating. The number of
firms outside the industry is very large. Training may take place in any firm
in the industry. Initially, there are many identical untrained workers in the
economy. Assuming constant returns to labour, I will consider the training
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decision for a single worker. The world lasts two periods. The sequence of
events is as follows: At the beginning of period one, it is decided how much
training the worker will receive. Training takes place during the first period.
During the second period, the worker will work for the firm that offers the
highest wages. This may be a firm in the industry or, alternatively, a firm
outside the industry.
3.2.1 The Training Programme
The training may consist of a specific part h and a generic part a. It is
assumed that h has only value within the industry while a has less value
within the industry than outside the industry. The rationale behind this
assumption is that a worker who moves to another sector needs generic skills,
for example learning skills, to acquire the skills and knowledge required in
that sector.
The value of specific training is uncertain ex ante, because firms in the
industry are subject to productivity or demand shocks. There are two types
of shocks namely industry- and firm-specific shocks. An industry-specific
shock affects all firms in the industry in the same way, for example a demand
shock. Firm-specific shocks reflect ex ante uncertainty in the match between
the skills needed in the firm and the skills the worker actually possesses. Not
all specific skills are equally important in all firms in the industry. At the
same time, some workers will turn out to be better in one skill and others in
other skills. It depends on the relative importance of the various techniques
in a firm and the talent of the worker, how productive a trained worker will
eventually be in a certain firm.
The firm-specific shocks εi are independent and identically distributed
with zero mean, finite support [−ε¯, ε¯] and continuous distribution and density
functions F (.) and f(.). The industry-specific shock η has support 〈−∞,∞〉
and continuous distribution and density functions G(.) and g(.), with g(.)
symmetric and g′′(0) < 0. The assumptions on the support of the industry-
specific and firm-specific shocks ensure that there is always a positive chance
that the worker will leave the industry.
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The productivity of a trained worker in a firm i in the industry is given
by:
υ˜i = h+ (1− δ)a+ εi + η = υi + (1− δ)a (3.1)
where δ is a measure for the usefulness of generic skills in the industry,
0 ≤ δ ≤ 1. For δ = 1 generic skills are of no use in the industry and for δ = 0
generic skills are fully usable in the industry. It is supposed that generic
skills can always be fully used outside the industry.3 The productivity of the
worker in any firm outside the industry is thus given by a.
Training costs depend on the level of both specific and generic training.
The cost function is defined by C(h, a). This function is increasing and
convex in h and a, so ∂C
∂h
> 0, ∂
2C
∂h2
> 0,∂C
∂a
> 0, ∂
2C
∂a2
> 0. For simplicity, and
without affecting the key results of the model I will assume that there is no
interaction between h and a on the cost side, that is ∂
2C
∂a∂h
= 0.
3.2.2 The Social Optimum
The expected social return to training is determined by the probability that
the worker will leave the industry after the first period. Define υ1 ≤ υ2 ≤
· · · ≤ υn as the order statistics corresponding to υ1, υ2, . . . , υn.
Proposition 1 Perfect competition outside the industry ensures that indus-
try mobility is efficient, that is if υn < δa the worker leaves the industry.
Proof. The second period market wage outside the industry is given by
ω = a. The best wage offer in the industry w2 ≤ υn + (1 − δ)a. If υn < δa,
we have w2 < a. If υ
n ≥ δa, there is at least one firm in the industry that
can make non-negative profits by offering a wage w2 ≥ a.
3So, the value of generic skills may be greater outside the industry than inside the
industry. One plausible reason for this is that generic skills that facilitate the acquisition of
new skills, for example learning skills, once the trade has been learned, are more important
outside the industry than inside the industry, since a worker who moves to another industry
has to acquire some new skills and knowledge to function well, for example through learning
by doing.
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The expected social return is given by:
R = E[υn + (1− δ)a|υn ≥ δa]Pr[υn ≥ δa] + aPr[υn < δa] (3.2)
and the probability that a worker will leave the industry by:
Pr[υn < δa] = Pr[υn < δa, η > δa− h− ε¯] + Pr[η < δa− h− ε¯]
=
∫ δa−h+ε¯
δa−h−ε¯
F n(δa− h− η)g(η)dη +G(δa− h− ε¯)
(3.3)
since for η < δa− h− ε¯ the maximum productivity in the industry is always
below the productivity outside the industry ( Pr[υn < δa|η < δa−h−ε¯] = 1).
If the industry-specific shock is sufficiently small, the firm-specific shock has
no effect on the probability of moving.
Proposition 2 The probability of leaving the industry is strictly positive and
decreasing in the level of specific training (h) and the number of firms in the
industry (n) and increasing in the level of generic training (a).
Proof.
lim
n→∞
Pr[υn < δa] = G(δa− h− ε¯) > 0
∂Pr[υn < δa]
∂h
= −
∫ δa−h+ε¯
δa−h−ε¯
fn(δa− h− η)g(η)dη < 0
∂Pr[υn < δa]
∂a
=
∫ δa−h+ε¯
δa−h−ε¯
fn(δa− h− η)g(η)dη > 0
∂Pr[υn < δa]
∂n
= −
∫ δa−h+ε¯
δa−h−ε¯
log(F (δa− h− η))F n(δa− h− η)g(η)dη < 0
where fn = nf(.)F (.)
n−1
Proposition 3 The expected social marginal return to specific training is
equivalent to the probability that the worker stays in the industry and the
expected social marginal return to generic training is equivalent to one minus
the value loss of one unit of generic training if the worker stays in the industry
(δ) times the probability that the worker stays in the industry.
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Proof.
∂R
∂h
=
∫ ∞
−∞
(
1− F n(δa− h− η))g(η)dη = Pr[υn ≥ δa]
∂R
∂a
= (1− δ)
∫ ∞
−∞
(
1− F n(δa− h− η))g(η)dη + ∫ ∞
−∞
F n(δa− h− η)g(η)dη
= 1− δPr[υn ≥ δa]
Equalising the expected marginal returns to specific and generic training
with marginal costs we find that the socially optimal training levels (h∗, a∗)
are the ones that provide
∂C
∂h
= Pr[υn ≥ δa] (3.4)
∂C
∂a
= 1− δPr[υn ≥ δa] (3.5)
It is clear that even if the number of firms in the industry were very large
and generic training had no value in the industry (e.g. δ = 1), it would be
socially optimal for workers to learn some generic skills.
3.3 Private Training Decisions
The social optimum will not be attained if the private profits of the agents
who decide on training do not coincide with the social profits. To examine
whether private training decisions deviate from the social optimum we need
to know how the returns to training are shared between the worker and the
firm that employs him. From Proposition 1 it follows that a worker who stays
in the industry will earn a wage which lies somewhere between the outside
option a and the highest match in the industry υn+(1− δ)a. The final wage
outcome does also depend on the second highest match in the industry.
Proposition 4 If the worker’s value is highest in the industry then compe-
tition in the industry ensures that if υn−1 ≥ δa the best wage offer in the
industry will be w2 = υ
n−1+(1−δ)a and if υn−1 < δa ≤ υn it will be w2 = a.
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Proof. Stevens (1994b) shows that the following strategy for firm i (i =
1, ...n) is a Nash equilibrium: if υi = υ
n offer a wage w2 = κ + ²; otherwise
w2 = υi. Where κ is the second highest value of the worker in the economy,
that is if υn−1 ≥ δa then κ = υn−1 and if υn−1 < δa ≤ υn it will be κ = a.
Table 3.1: Labour market outcomes
value specific skills returns
υn υn−1 worker firm
υn < δa a 0
υn ≥ δa υn−1 < δa a υn − δa
υn ≥ δa υn−1 ≥ δa υn−1 + (1− δ)a υn − υn−1
Table 3.1 summarises the different labour market outcomes. The expected
return to the worker Rw is given by:
Rw = E[υ
n−1 + (1− δ)a|υn−1 ≥ δa]Pr[υn−1 ≥ δa]
+ aPr[υn−1 < δa]
(3.6)
The total expected return to firms in the industry:
Rf = E[υ
n − υn−1|υn−1 ≥ δa]Pr[υn−1 ≥ δa]
+ E[υn − δa|υn−1 < δa ≤ υn]Pr[υn−1 < δa ≤ υn]
(3.7)
Since there is no firm-specific training component, ex ante all firms in the
industry have equal probability to employ the worker in the second period
and the expected return to an individual firm i is given by Rf/n. Note that
the expected return to the training firm does not exceed the expected return
to any other firm in the industry. The return to firms outside the industry
is zero, because these firms pay the worker his full productivity.
Proposition 5 Part of the marginal expected return to specific training ac-
crues to firms in the industry
42
3.3. PRIVATE TRAINING DECISIONS
Proof. The expected private marginal returns with respect to h are equal
to:
∂Rw
∂h
= Pr[υn−1 ≥ δa]
∂Rf
∂h
= Pr[υn−1 < δa ≤ υn]
Note that this result is in contrast to Stevens (1994b), where the marginal
benefit of transferable training fully accrues to the worker. The reason for
this difference is that in my model, due to the option to work outside the
industry, an increase in the level of specific training will not always lead
to an increase in the worker’s second-period wages. Black and Loewenstein
(1997) and Loewenstein and Spletzer (1998) obtain a similar result for a
minimum-wage guarantee for the post-training period given by the training
firm. They show that if the firm has to pay a certain minimum wage in the
post-training period, it can increase its profits by increasing the productivity
of the worker by just as much as is possible without increasing the chance that
the worker will leave the training firm. Acemoglu and Pischke (1999c) also
show that the existence of minimum wages provides an incentive for firms to
provide transferable training in order to increase the worker’s productivity
level to the minimum wage level. In this respect, the outside option for
the worker in my model, ω = a, acts as a minimum wage, but while in
Acemoglu and Pischke (1999c) this minimum wage is exogenously given, here
it is endogenous to the model as it depends on the level of generic training.
As long as υn−1 < δa ≤ υn, the worker stays in the industry and the firm
that employs him has to pay wages equal to a, in which case the conditional
return increases in h.
Proposition 6
∂Rf
∂h
∣∣∣
h=0
attains a maximum for a > 0.
Proof. It is proved in the appendix that
∂2Rf
∂h∂a
∣∣∣
a=0
h=0
> 0 and
∂3Rf
∂h∂a2
< 0.
As the level of generic training increases, the chance that the worker
will be paid the minimum-wage guarantee increases, but the chance that the
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worker will stay in the industry decreases. If the chance that the worker will
stay in the industry approaches zero, for example if a becomes very large,
the effect of the minimum-wage guarantee on h diminishes. Note that for
δ = 0, the effect of the outside option is independent of a. Generic training
is worth just as much in the industry as outside the industry, but the option
to leave the industry still acts as a minimum-wage guarantee.
Proposition 7 For δ > 0, the expected marginal return to generic training
for the worker is greater than the expected social marginal return and the
expected marginal return to firms in the industry is negative.
Proof. The expected private marginal returns with respect to a are equal
to:
∂Rw
∂a
= 1− δ + δPr[υn−1 < δa]
∂Rf
∂a
= −δPr[υn−1 < δa ≤ υn]
Given the level of specific training, an increase in the level of generic
training increases the outside option for workers more than their productivity
in the industry and thus decreases the expected returns to firms.
Proposition 8 If n becomes very large, the marginal benefits of specific and
generic training of the worker approach the social marginal benefits and the
marginal benefit of the firms in the industry approaches zero.
Proof. We have
lim
n→∞
Pr[υn−1 < δa ≤ υn] = 0
Since
Pr[υn−1 < δa] = Pr[υn < δa] + Pr[υn−1 < δa ≤ υn]
it follows that
lim
n→∞
Pr[υn−1 < δa] = lim
n→∞
Pr[υn < δa]
In the following subsections, I will consider the training outcomes if (1)
the training firm and the worker decide jointly on training and (2) the training
levels are decided at the industry level.
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3.3.1 The Training Firm and the Worker Decide Joint-
ly on Training
Suppose that the training firm and the worker decide jointly on the levels
of specific and generic training, that is training levels are chosen such that
they maximise the joint profits of the firm and worker.4 Their joint private
optimum is given by:
∂C
∂h
=
1
n
Pr[υn ≥ δa] + n− 1
n
Pr[υn−1 ≥ δa] (3.8)
∂C
∂a
= 1− δ + δ( 1
n
Pr[υn < δa] +
n− 1
n
Pr[υn−1 < δa]) (3.9)
Proposition 9 In a labour market in which the worker and the firm decide
jointly on the training program we have that, for δ > 0, the level of generic
training will be too high and the level of specific training will be too low
compared to the social optimum
Proof. The social optimum (h∗, a∗) is given by (3.4) and (3.5) and the
private optimum (hˆ, aˆ) by (3.8) and (3.9). Since C(h, a) is convex in h and
a, 1
n
Pr[υn ≥ δa] + n−1
n
Pr[υn−1 ≥ δa] < Pr[υn ≥ δa] and 1
n
Pr[υn < δa]
+n−1
n
Pr[υn−1 < δa] > Pr[υn < δa] it follows immediately that aˆ > a∗ and
hˆ < h∗
The private marginal return to specific training is below the social mar-
ginal return while the private marginal return to generic training is above
the social marginal return. The reason for this is that the return to the other
firms in the industry is not incorporated in the training decision. The worker
always wants more generic training than is socially optimal because the level
of generic training puts a lower bound on the wage he will be paid during
the second period, irrespective of whether he stays in the industry or moves.
For the same reason, the training firm wants to offer less generic training
4For the outcomes of the model it is not important how this is done. One scenario
one could think of is that the expected benefits of the worker enter the profit function of
the firm through the training wage. Assuming that the firm has all bargain power, the
training wage of the worker would then be equal to the unskilled wage rate minus the
expected value of the training benefits for the worker in the post-training period.
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but since the firm only accounts for its own loss and not for the loss of other
firms in the industry, its weight in the training decision is low compared to
that of the worker.
Furthermore, the worker wants less specific training than is socially op-
timal because it will only increase his expected future wage if not only his
maximum productivity (υn) exceeds his outside productivity but also the
second-best match (υn−1). If the second-best match does not exceed his out-
side value, the extra returns accrue to the firm that will employ him. This lat-
ter result is in contrast with Stevens’s model where, as mentioned before, the
marginal benefits of transferable training fully accrue to the worker and, as a
consequence, the choice of the level of transferable training is not directly af-
fected by the externality.5 This externality disappears if the number of firms
becomes very large since limn→∞ Pr[υn−1 ≥ δa] = limn→∞ Pr[υn ≥ δa].
Note that for δ = 0, the expected wage increase is equal to the expected
increase in productivity, both within and outside the industry. In that case,
the private optimal level of generic training will be equal to the social opti-
mum.
3.3.2 Training Levels are Decided on at the Industry
Level
Since all firms in the industry may profit from the training, the expected
profits for the industry may increase if training decisions take place on the
industry level. Suppose that workers do not pay for their training and as a
result do not participate in the training decision.6 For example because they
are credit-constrained or because they have insufficient information on the
quality of the training. Also suppose that there is a co-ordinating body that
first decides on the level of training and then levies a training contribution
of 1
n
C(h, a) to all firms in the industry. Firms that train are refunded the
training costs. So, all firms pay an equal amount of the costs of training
workers, irrespective of where this training takes place. The co-ordinating
body decides on the training levels by maximising profits at the industry
5Although it might be indirectly affected through the costs function.
6That is, the benefits of the worker are not allowed for in the training decision.
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level. The first order conditions for the private optimum in this case are
given by:
∂C
∂h
= Pr[υn−1 < δa ≤ υn] (3.10)
∂C
∂a
= −δPr[υn−1 < δa ≤ υn] (3.11)
Proposition 10 If training decisions take place at the industry level than (i)
there will be no generic training (aˆ = 0) and (ii) the level of specific training
might be above or below the social optimum, that is hˆ may be greater than or
less than h∗.
Proof. (i) Since the right-hand side of (3.11) is negative or zero and ∂C
∂a
> 0,
there is no internal solution for a. A corner solution is given by aˆ = 0. (ii) hˆ
is given by:
∂C
∂h
= Pr[υn−1 < 0 ≤ υn]
and the social optimum h∗ by (3.4). In the appendix it is shown that
Pr[υn−1 < 0 ≤ υn] attains a maximum for h < 0 and is decreasing on
[0,∞〉. Proposition 2 shows that Pr[υn ≥ δa∗] is continuous in both h and
a, increasing in h and decreasing in a.
Furthermore lima→∞ Pr[υn ≥ δa]|h=0 = 0. Therefore ∃a¯ > 0 for which
Pr[υn ≥ δa¯]|h=0 = Pr[υn−1 < 0 ≤ υn]|h=0. If a∗ > a¯ then there is an interval
[0, h¯] for which Pr[υn ≥ δa∗] < Pr[υn−1 < 0 ≤ υn]. In that case hˆ may be
greater or less than h∗ depending on ∂C
∂h
. If a∗ < a¯ then hˆ < h∗
The industry provides no generic training since generic training lowers the
expected future profits of the firms in the industry. Compared to the social
optimum, the level of specific training is affected in two ways, as is illustrated
by Figure 3.1. Firstly, the training firm does not allow for the expected parts
of the returns to specific training that accrue to the worker(Pr[υn−1 ≥ δa]).
This direct effect,(h˜− h∗) is negative.
Secondly, the level of generic training indirectly affects the level of specific
training. The level of generic training acts as a minimum-wage guarantee and
given that firms in the industry have to pay this minimum wage, profits can
be increased by increasing the level of specific training. A decrease in a
may either increase or decrease the marginal return to specific training since
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it lowers the minimum-wage guarantee but also leads to less interindustrial
mobility. Therefore this second effect, (hˆ − h˜), may be either positive or
negative. Note that for δ = 0 this second effect does not occur. In that case,
the lower bound on the second-period wages does not depend on the actual
level of generic training. If the second effect is positive and outweighs the
first effect, the private optimum for h will be above the social optimum.
From (3.10) it follows that if the number of firms in the industry becomes
very large, it will be optimal not to provide any specific training at all. It is
only profitable for the industry to provide specific training if competition is
less than perfect.
Note that the level of specific training that is chosen if training decisions
take place at the industry level, exceeds the level of specific training that
would be chosen by an individual training firm as an individual firm would
not take into account the expected returns to other firms in the industry.
Figure 3.1: Level of specific training: the social and private optimum compared
Note: The social optimal level of specific training (h∗) is given by the intersection
of the social marginal returns given a = a∗, (Pr[υn > δa∗]), and the marginal costs
(∂C∂h ). hˆ and h˜ are the private optimal training levels for firms in the industry given
a = a∗ and a = 0.
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3.4 Discussion
In this chapter, it is shown that firms and workers have conflicting interests
with respect to the curriculum of training programmes. I considered two
types of skills, specific skills, which only have a value in one particular sector
of industry or occupation, and generic skills, which have a value in a number
of industries or occupations. Imperfect competition for specific skills allows
firms in the industry to obtain a positive share of the returns to specific
training. However, the expected returns to specific training for firms decrease
with the level of generic training. This is because the expected future wages
that firms in the industry have to pay increase more with the level of generic
training than the expected productivity of workers. More generic training
thus directly lowers the expected profits of firms in the industry. Therefore
firms are not only unwilling to pay for generic training, they also want this
training component to be as small as possible. Workers, on the other hand,
want more generic training than is socially optimal at a given level of specific
training.
The model also shows that the industry can increase it’s profits by co-
ordinating training activities as not only the training firm profits from the
training but also the other firms in the industry. However, if workers do not
have a voice in the training decision the industry will not supply any generic
training at all.
The results of the model have important policy consequences for worked
based systems of vocational education like the apprenticeship system. In
most countries the apprenticeship system is part of the national system of sec-
ondary education and not only aims to provide young people with industry-
or occupation-specific skills but also with generic skills. It is clear that this
aim is only attained if apprentices join in the training decision. The model
thus provides a rationale for the German apprenticeship system where worker
representatives have considerable influence on the content of the training
programme (Lynch, 1993; Soskice, 1994). As a result, the generic training
component in German apprenticeship training programs is relatively large
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compared to other countries (Oulton and Steedman, 1994; Finegold, Wagner,
and Mason, 2000) and the training is highly transferable across a wide range
of occupations (Clark and Fahr, 2001).
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3.5 Appendix to Chapter 3
3.5.1 Maximum Expected Marginal Return for the In-
dustry
The expected marginal return for the industry can be rewritten as follows
∂Rf
∂h
= Pr[υn−1 < δa ≤ υn]
=
∫ δa−h+ε¯
δa−h−ε¯
nF n−1(δa− h− η)(1− F (δa− h− η))g(η)dη
=
∫ ε¯
−ε¯
nF n−1(−η)(1− F (−η))g(δa− h+ η)dη
≡
∫ ε¯
−ε¯
Fn,n−1(−η)g(k + η)dη
where k ≡ δa− h. If g(.) has zero skewness then it follows from Fn,n−1(η) >
Fn,n−1(−η) for 0 < η < ε¯ and n > 2 that
∂
∫ ε¯
−ε¯ Fn,n−1(−η)g(η + k)dη
∂k
∣∣∣∣∣
k=0
=
∫ ε¯
−ε¯
Fn,n−1(−η)g′(η)dη
= δ
∫ ε¯
0
Fn,n−1(−η)g′(η)dη + δ
∫ 0
−ε¯
Fn,n−1(−η)g′(η)dη
= −δ
∫ 0
−ε¯
Fn,n−1(η)g′(η)dη + δ
∫ 0
−ε¯
Fn,n−1(−η)g′(η)dη
> −δ
∫ 0
−ε¯
Fn,n−1(−η)g′(η)dη + δ
∫ 0
−ε¯
Fn,n−1(−η)g′(η)dη = 0
Furthermore if g′′(0) < 0 we have
∂2
∫ ε¯
−ε¯ Fn,n−1(−η)g(η + k)dη
∂2k
=
∫ ε¯
−ε¯
Fn,n−1(−η)g′′(η)dη < 0
So Pr[υn−1 < δa ≤ υn] reaches a maximum for some k > 0. It follows
immediately that Pr[υn−1 < δa ≤ υn]|h=0 reaches a maximum for some a > 0
(Proposition 6) while Pr[υn−1 < 0 ≤ υn] reaches a maximum for some h < 0
(Proposition 10).
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3.5.2 List of Symbols
h level of industry- or occupation-specific training
a level of generic training
εi firm-specific shock for firm i
η industry-specific shock
F (.) distribution function of firm-specific shocks
G(.) distribution function of industry-specific shocks
υ˜i productivity of a trained worker in firm i
υi specific part of productivity of a trained worker in firm i
δ measure for the usefulness of generic skills within the industry
C(., .) cost function
ω second-period market wage
w2 second-period wage in the industry
n number of firms in the industry
R expected social return to training
Rw expected return to the worker
Rf expected return to firms in the industry
52
Chapter 4
Imperfect Information and
Training Intensity
4.1 Introduction
In Chapter 1 it was explained that firms may supply apprenticeships either
because of a current production motive or because of an investment motive.
In the first case, the main reason to employ apprentices is their contribu-
tion to the firm’s current production. The firm then uses apprentices as a
substitute for unskilled or skilled labour. In the second case, the firm trains
apprentices to fulfill a future need for qualified workers.
The incentives for firms to train apprentices may impact on the quality
of training places. Firms that train apprentices because of a future need for
qualified workers have an interest in providing good training. Firms that have
no future benefits from training are probably more interested in apprentices’
current productivity than in their training (Ryan, 1994; Borghans and Smits,
1997).
Absence of future training benefits may result in apprentice exploitation
if the training intensity is not perfectly observed by apprentices or not ver-
ifiable by a third party. Apprenticeship training usually comprises various
components, such as courses at a training institute, training-on-the-job and
learning-by-doing. Not all components are equally well observed by the ap-
prentice. Training off-the-job in training institutes is better observed than
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the ‘learning-by-doing’ component of the training. It will be difficult for an
apprentice to judge whether certain tasks he has to fulfil are useful for his
training or not. This is confirmed by research from Barron, Berger, and
Black (1997a,b). A survey on training incidence and intensity among both
firms and workers reveals that firms more often mention informal training
such as ‘informal co-worker training’, workers mention more often training-
off-the-job. Another finding is that firms report much more training than
workers actually observe.
In this chapter, I will develop a theoretical model in which the training
intensity or training level is not perfectly observed by the worker. The mech-
anism of the model is as follows. Training wages depend on the worker’s
observation of the training level. Since this observation is imperfect, a de-
crease in the training level will not be fully reflected in the training wages.
The training firm can thus increase its profits by saving on training costs.
As a result the training level will be below the social optimum. Both the
firm and the worker would be better off if the training firm could commit to
the socially optimal training level in turn for low training wages. However,
as such a commitment is not credible, the worker will not be prepared to
accept sufficiently low training wages. If the training is partly or entirely
firm-specific, the firm will be able to share in the benefits from training and
will harm itself if it decreases the training level. Thus, the underinvestment
problem will be more severe to the extent that the training is more general.
I will show that for this reason it may be socially optimal to ensure that
part of the apprenticeship training is firm-specific even in the presence of
turnover.
Several authors have considered the issue of the training level as private
information of the training firm. Both Chang and Wang (1996) and Katz
and Ziderman (1990) have addressed informational asymmetries not between
training firms and workers, as in this chapter, but between the training firm
and other firms. As an increase in the training level is not observed by other
firms, it will not lead to an equivalent wage increase after the training period.
Again, workers will not be prepared to share in the costs of general training
but, in contrast to my model, underinvestment will be less severe as firms
can now appropriate some of the future returns to general training and will
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thus invest in general training, although in the case of labour turnover the
investment will still be less than the social optimum.
My model is also related to the work of Schlicht (1996) and Malcomson,
Maw, and McCormick (1997), who looked at informational asymmetries with
respect to the training level between firms and workers. In Schlicht (1996),
the training level is private information of the training firm and trainability
of the worker is unknown ex ante. In my model, all workers are similar but
firms differ in training efficiency, represented by differences in training cost
functions. In some firms, it may be possible to embed training activities in the
production process (training on-the-job and/or learning-by-doing), while in
other firms most training has to be off-the-job. This explains the considerable
differences in the level of apprenticeship training provided which appear to
exist between firms in, for example, Germany (Lieshout, 1996). Not only
between firms in different trades, but also between large and small firms
and between traditional and technologically advanced firms (Damm-Ru¨ger,
Degen, and Gru¨newald, 1988). I will show that if there is perfect information
on training intensity, efficient training firms can provide general training and
make profits, whereas in the case of imperfect information, the training level
will be very low for all firms.
Malcomson, Maw, and McCormick (1997) considered the regulation of
contract length to solve the underinvestment problem. If contract length
exceeds the period needed to learn the trade, then the firm will have an
interest in providing good quality training, since near the end of the contract
the apprentice will be as productive as a skilled worker but still be receiving
relatively low apprentice wages. In my model, I will consider a different
solution. I will show that by making part of the training firm-specific, firms
also profit from the training and as apprentices know that the firm now has
less incentive to cheat, they will be prepared to accept low training wages.
4.2 A Model for Training
I will consider a model for training in an economy with many unskilled work-
ers and (training) firms. Firms live infinitely and workers live two periods.
Workers can either undertake an apprenticeship during their first period or
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remain unskilled. Assuming constant returns to labour, I consider the train-
ing decision of a single firm and a single worker. Before the start of an
apprenticeship, the worker and the firm negotiate about the worker’s train-
ing wage. If they reach an agreement, the apprenticeship will start. If not,
the worker will find unskilled employment in both periods.
At the beginning of the second period, the firm offers the worker a second-
period wage. At that moment, both the training firm, the worker, and all
other potential employers have complete knowledge of the worker’s increase
in human capital. If the worker accepts the wage offer, the employment
relation continues. It is assumed that a fraction of the workers, denoted by
γ, leaves for exogenous reasons. Other workers stay as long as the wage
offer of the firm is not below their market wage. Assuming that the training
firm possesses all bargaining power, the wage offer will equal the market
wage. Since the returns to training in the training firm are always at least
equal to the returns in any other firm, there is no risk of turnover due to
wage differences in this model.1 Furthermore, without loss of generality, it is
assumed that there is no discounting between periods.
4.2.1 Returns to Training
The training level, h, is expressed as the worker’s increase in productivity.
The potential productivity of the worker in the first period is given by:
y1 = h
0 (4.1)
where h0 is the initial amount of human capital of the worker. This is the
productivity that could be achieved without training. In the second period,
the worker’s productivity in his training firm becomes:
y2 = h
0 + h (4.2)
The human capital acquired is partly firm-specific. δ is a measure of the
degree of firm-specificity of the training and is exogenous to the model,
1Unlike in many other training models (e.g. Hashimoto, 1981), there is no random
component involved in the returns to training inside or outside the training firm. In
models with such a random component, there is a positive probability that the returns to
training are higher outside the training firm, which leads to extra turnover.
56
4.2. A MODEL FOR TRAINING
0 ≤ δ ≤ 1. For δ = 1 the training is wholly firm-specific and for δ = 0 the
training is wholly general. δ is known by both the firm and the worker.
The value of the training to other firms is (1−δ)h. Since the post-training
wage in the training firm, w2, will be equal to the market wage, we have
w2 = h
0 + (1− δ)h (4.3)
It follows that the returns to training for the firm are given by δh. The
worker will capture the general part of the returns, while the firm will capture
the specific part of the returns to training.
4.2.2 Training Costs
During the first period, the firm incurs training costs. Training costs include
both lost productivity as a result of the training and the costs of supervision,
materials, et cetera. Even if firms all operate on the same market (produce
the same goods), they may differ as to their organisational and production
structure, which will be reflected in different training cost functions. Some
firms may be more efficient in providing training than others, and hence
training costs at a given level of training may differ between firms. These
differences in costs are explained entirely by differences between firms and are
not the result of differences between workers. The cost of training for a firm
i as a function of the training level is given by Ci(h). Ci (h) is characterised
by: C ′i (0) = 0, C
′
i (h) > 0 if h > 0 and C
′′
i (h) > 0. This difference in cost
functions between firms implies that the optimal level of training to provide
differs between firms. Workers do not know the training cost function of a
particular firm.
4.2.3 Information Structure
Workers do not have full knowledge of the level of training provided during
their apprenticeship. I have assumed that workers observe the level of train-
ing with an error. So, instead of the real training level, workers observe (see
also Lang, 1994):
h∗ = h+ u,E(u) = 0, V AR(u) = σ2u, 0 ≤ σ2u <∞ (4.4)
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This observation error has zero expectation and a variance σ2u . If σ
2
u →
0, workers can observe the training level quite well, and for σ2u = 0 their
observation is perfect. If, on the other hand, σ2u → ∞, the observation
h∗ gives hardly any information on the real training level. Note that it is
assumed that all workers observe the same training level, which means that
the observation error, u, in a specific firm, is equal for all workers.2 Firms do
not know the observation error in advance, but they do know its variance.
Furthermore, workers know the distribution of the training output in the
economy. Let h be the expected output from training. It then follows that:
h = h+ e (4.5)
where e is defined as the deviation from the expected level of training, which
is e = h− h. By definition E(e) = 0. The variance in training output, given
by σ2e , 0 < σ
2
e <∞, is known by both workers and firms.
Workers combine their observations of the training level in their firms with
this additional information on the average output from training to obtain an
optimal estimate of the training level. This optimal estimate for the level of
training is given by:
ĥ = λh+ (1− λ)h∗ (4.6)
The optimal weight, λ, depends on the variance of the two error terms.
Minimising the mean square error of the estimate ĥ:
E
(
ĥ− h
)2
= λ2σ2e + (1− λ)2 σ2u
gives λ =
σ2u
σ2u + σ
2
e
The more accurate the observation by workers of the training level, the
more weight will be given to this observation. If information is perfect, that
is σ2u = 0, the conjectured training level is equal to the real training level.
If, on the other hand, the observation is very inaccurate, workers will place
more weight on the average training level in the economy and less on their
observation in the firm.
2If the observation error were not firm-specific, the training firm would search for the
worker with the most favourable observation of the training level.
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4.2.4 Training Wages and the Participation Constraint
It is assumed that workers participate in the costs of training by accepting
lower wages than their market wages in the absence of training. If the worker
does not participate in the training programme, his wage will be equal to his
initial productivity in both periods. A worker will therefore be willing to
participate in the training programme as long as his life-time earnings will
be at least equal to 2h0.
If information is imperfect, however, a worker will not perfectly observe
the level of training and will therefore not have full knowledge of his returns to
training before the start of the second period. In that case, it is not possible
to have training wages completely contingent on the level of training.
Workers will use their estimation on the training level to estimate their
future market wage, which I have denoted by ŵ2. Substituting ĥ for h in
(3) gives ŵ2 = h
0 + (1 − δ)ĥ. As long as the estimated life-time earnings in
the case of apprenticeship training are at least equal to the earnings in the
case of no training, workers will participate. The participation constraint for
workers is thus given by:
w1 + ŵ2 ≥ 2h0 (4.7)
To determine the eventual training wage outcome, it is necessary to make
some additional assumptions on the wage bargaining process at the start of
the first period. It is assumed that at the time of bargaining the firm has
already made the training investment. The firm therefore decides on the level
of training before knowing the workers’ estimation of the training level. As
mentioned before, the observation error is equal for all workers. Since the firm
has all bargaining power, the participation constraint (4.7) is binding and the
eventual training wage will be given by w1 = h
0 − (1 − δ)ĥ. The eventual
wages may be very unfavourable for the training firm, but since the firm has
already made the training investment, it will not withdraw its training offer
if workers accept the lowest wages that satisfy their participation constraint.
Note that if the training is completely firm-specific, workers do not share
in the costs of training. The firm is willing to pay the full costs of firm-specific
training because there is only exogenous turnover.
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4.3 Investment in Training
4.3.1 Perfect Information
In the case of perfect information, workers know the level of training perfectly.
This means that h∗ = h and σ2u = 0. In that case, the training wage is
completely contingent on the level of training and given by: w1 = h
0 −
(1− δ)h. Total profits of a firm i are given by:
pii = y1 − w1 − Ci(h) + (1− γ)(y2 − w2) (4.8)
If a firm is very efficient in providing training, there may exist a train-
ing level, h > 0, for which the first-period net productivity of workers
(y1 − Ci (h)), exceeds the first-period wage costs. In that case, the firm will
offer training even if this training is completely general and as a consequence
the future benefits of training to the firm are zero.
Substituting first-period and second-period productivity and wages in
(4.8) gives:
pii = (1− γδ)h− Ci(h) (4.9)
From (4.9) it follows that the profits of training for a firm are equal to
the social profits of training. This is because, having all bargaining power,
the training firm can appropriate the full returns from training by charging
the worker a training fee equal to his returns from training. The optimal
training level for the firm is found by maximising (4.9) with respect to the
training level. The optimal training level is given by hp satisfying:
C ′i(h
p) = 1− γδ (4.10)
Since C ′′i (h) > 0, it follows that pi
′′
i (h) < 0 , for all h, and therefore by
assumption the second order condition holds.
If the market for training were competitive, that is, if firms had equal cost
functions, total benefits would equal total costs. Then, the costs of training
would be shared according to the share in the benefits for both parties. So
the training firm paid the firm-specific part and workers paid the general
part of training, and both parties had zero profits. This is not true, however,
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Figure 4.1: Training level under perfect information
Training level
1-γδ
MC
MBp
MB, MC
hp
Note: The private optimal training level under perfect information (hp) is given
by the intersection of the marginal benefits under perfect information (MBp) and
the marginal costs (MC).
if costs for a given training level differ between firms. Firms that have low
training costs at a given level of training make more profits than firms that
have high training costs. As mentioned above, firms can even make a profit
if the training is completely general. Workers will not share in these profits
as they have no bargaining power.
4.3.2 Imperfect Information
Under perfect information, workers have perfect knowledge of their future
returns to training and are therefore prepared to pay for their training by
accepting lower wages during the training period than their market wages in
the case of no training. If workers do not have full knowledge of the returns,
however, an increase in the level of training will not be fully reflected in
the expected training wages that the firm has to pay. Maximising profits
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with respect to training, the firm has to allow for the expected training wage
it has to pay at a given amount of training, which is given by: Ew1 =
h0 − (1− δ)(λh+ (1− λ)h).
Expected profits for firm i are then given by:
Epii = (1− δ)λh+ (1− λ+ λδ − γδ)h− Ci(h) (4.11)
The first order condition of the profit maximisation problem of the firm
is now given by:
C
′
i(h) = 1− λ+ λδ − γδ (4.12)
Since 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1, it follows that the optimal training level
for the firm under imperfect information is less than the optimal training
level under perfect information. This can also be seen from Figure 4.2. The
optimal amount of training under perfect information (λ = 0) is given by hp.
Imperfect information decreases the expected marginal returns from training
for all h. This is because an increase in the training level does not lead to an
equivalent expected decrease of the training wages. An increase in the level
of training by 1 increases general human capital of the worker by 1 − δ and
as a consequence, training wages need to fall by the same amount. Under
imperfect information, however, the firm expects workers only to incorporate
an increase in the training level of 1−λ in their estimation, and the expected
wage decrease in the first period then equals (1−λ)(1− δ). Because the firm
does not expect the worker to pay fully for his increase in general human
capital, the marginal returns line shifts down. The optimal training level for
the firm under imperfect information (λ > 0) is given by hnp.
As λ increases, the optimal training level for the firm decreases. Since
workers only pay for an increase in their general human capital, the underin-
vestment problem will be more severe to the extent that the training is more
general. If the training is completely firm-specific, δ = 1, profits depend
solely on the real level of training, while if the training is completely general,
the firm’s profits depend solely on the conjectured training level. For δ = 0
and σu →∞ we have h→ 0 and C ′i → 0. So, imperfect information with
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respect to the training level will lead to less training than is socially optimal
and the underinvestment problem becomes more serious as the training is
more general.3
Note that if the variance in training levels between firms is low, for ex-
ample because the training cost functions do not differ much, we also have
λ→ 1. In that case, the average training level in the industry can be much
lower than the social optimum, even if the variance of the observation error
is low.
Figure 4.2: Training levels under perfect and imperfect information compared
Training level
1-γδ
MC
hphnp
MBnp
MBp
MB, MC
1-λ+λδ-γδ
Note: The private optimal training levels under perfect and imperfect information
(hp and hnp) are given by the intersections of the marginal benefits under per-
fect and imperfect information (MBp and MBnp) and the marginal costs (MC),
respectively.
3Note that the assumption that the firm-specificity of the training is exogenous is of
crucial importance for this conclusion. If firms could decide freely on the extent of firm-
specificity of the training, they would, in this setting, choose δ = 1 and no underinvestment
would occur.
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The underinvestment problem cannot be solved by having the firm reveal
the level of training. This is because the level of training that would be
socially optimal is not credible to workers. The firm has an incentive to
announce a higher level of training than it will actually provide.
4.4 The Optimal Degree of Firm-Specificity
The problem of underinvestment due to imperfect information is more severe
when the training is more general. On the other hand, a higher degree of
firm-specificity leads to a higher loss if the worker leaves after the training.
The question is what degree of firm-specificity maximises social profits? Let
h(δ) be the firm’s optimal choice of the level of training as a function of
the degree of firm-specificity following from (4.12). The social profits from
training as a function of δ are then given by:
pis = (1− δγ)h(δ)− C(h(δ)) (4.13)
which can be rewritten as the sum of the expected profits for the worker and
the expected profits for the firm:
pis = (1− δ)λh(δ) + (1− λ+ δλ− δγ)h(δ)− C(h(δ)) (4.14)
The first term on the right-hand side of equation (4.14) represents the part of
the social profits that is appropriated by the worker. The training firm does
not allow for this part when deciding on the training level. Maximisation
of (4.14) with respect to δ gives the first order condition (provided that the
restriction 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1 is not binding):
(1− δ)λh′(δ)− γh(δ) = 0 (4.15)
The first term of equation (4.15) gives that part of a marginal increase in the
level of training that is not paid for by the worker. A marginal increase in
the degree of firm-specificity at a given training level will, however, lead to
a larger loss when the worker leaves the training firm. This loss is given by
the second term.
If λ < γ, the negative effect of the quit rate dominates the effect of incom-
plete information and h′(δ) < 0 ∀ δ. In that case, it is never socially optimal
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for training to be partly firm-specific and the solution of the optimisation
problem is given by δ = 0 . If, on the other hand, λ ≥ γ, it will be optimal
for part of the training to be firm-specific. Lastly, if all workers stay in their
training firms, that is if γ = 0, the solution of the optimisation problem is
given by δ = 1.
Figure 4.3 illustrates the optimisation problem. The figure presents the
social profits as a function of λ in the case that the training is completely
general, completely firm-specific or chosen as the solution of equation (4.15).
The cost function is chosen to be quadratic and the quit rate is set at 10
percent. The figure shows that if the training is completely firm-specific,
social profits do not depend on the degree of information incompleteness. If,
on the other hand, the training is completely general, social profits decrease
as information becomes more incomplete. This decrease can be partly offset
by making the training partly firm-specific.
4.5 Conclusions and Policy Implications
This chapter investigates the impact of informational asymmetries during
the training period. Workers have incomplete information on the level of
training in firms. It is therefore not possible to have training wages that are
contingent on the amount of training provided. As a result, training wages
are too low, which, in turn, prevents firms from recouping the full benefits
from training and leads to underinvestment in training.
This finding has important consequences for government policies aimed
at increasing the number of apprenticeships. If such policies mainly stimu-
late firms without investment motives to hire apprentices, average training
intensity will fall. This will be the case with, for example, wage cost subsidies
for firms that employ apprentices. Wage cost subsidies make it profitable to
hire apprentices but give no incentive to provide these apprentices with good
training. Therefore, there is a risk that most of the additional apprenticeship
places generated by these subsidies are in firms that provide little training.
To prevent underinvestment in training, informational asymmetries
should be removed. Or, in other words, the variance of the observation
error, σ2u, must be reduced. This problem could be solved with a system of
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Figure 4.3: Social profits from training and the optimal degree of firm-specificity
(δ∗) as a function of the degree of information incompleteness (λ)
Social
Profits
0 1
δ=0
δ= δ*
δ=1
λ
0 1λ
δ
δ*
Note: Social profits are drawn for different degrees of firm-specificity of the train-
ing, namely completely firm-specific (δ = 1), completely general (δ = 0),and the
optimal degree of firm-specificity (δ = δ∗). δ∗ is the degree of firm-specificity that
maximises social profits at a given level of λ.
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training certification, in which training standards are fixed and controlled
by external bodies. If training in firms is regulated, workers are guaranteed
a certain value of their training and will therefore be more prepared to ac-
cept low training wages. The case of Germany clearly supports this view.
Apprenticeship training in Germany is regulated to a high degree and ap-
prentices’ wages are low (Casey, 1986; Steedman, 1993) resulting in a high
level of training.
This is precisely the opposite of what Katz and Ziderman (1990) suggest.
They argued that ‘certification may lead to less rather than more general
training’ because firms would then be less prepared to finance general train-
ing, since they risk losing their investment. The problem with this argument
is, of course, that it is not firms but workers who should invest in general
training. Under perfect information and in the absence of any other restric-
tions, such as credit constraints or minimum wages, there is no reason why
firms should make the investment instead of workers. If credit constraints do
prevent workers from investing in their human capital, other imperfections
may indeed induce firms to invest. Still, it may be more efficient to remove
these credit constraints and reduce informational asymmetries.
It is, however, probably not feasible to remove informational asymmetries
completely. Even if training standards were fixed, external bodies would have
problems in controlling these standards. For example, if certain standards
were not reached, it would not always be clear whether this was due to the
firm not providing enough training or the apprentice not putting in enough
effort or not being able enough. Therefore firms should be given enough
freedom to adapt part of their training to their own specific needs and cir-
cumstances. That is, training standards should not aim at training that is
completely general. If part of the training is firm-specific, firms will have an
incentive to provide good training.
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4.6 Appendix to Chapter 4
4.6.1 List of Symbols
h level of training
y1 first-period productivity of the worker
h0 initial amount of human capital of the worker
y2 second-period productivity of the worker
δ degree of firm-specificty
w2 second-period wage
C(.) training cost function of firm i
γ quit rate
h∗ observed level of training
u workers’ observation error
h average training level
e deviation from average training level
hˆ estimated level of training
λ optimal weight
w1 first-period wage
pii profits of firm i
pis social profits
hp firm’s private optimal training level under perfect information
hnp firm’s private optimal training level under imperfect information
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Chapter 5
The Dutch Apprenticeship
System
5.1 Introduction
In the Netherlands apprenticeship training is a formal part of the national
educational system.1 Figure 5.1 gives an overview of the Dutch system. Af-
ter finishing primary education (BAO), at the age of twelve, pupils move
on to secondary education (VO). They can either choose vocational training
(VMBO) or general secondary education (HAVO or VWO).2 The latter pre-
pares for higher professional education (HBO) and University (WO). Pupils
who choose the vocational track start with pre-vocational education (VMBO)
and can continue in senior secondary vocational education (MBO). In 2002
about one third of all Dutch school-leavers had a vocational qualification at
the MBO-level (see Table 5.1). Most qualifications at this level can both be
acquired by doing an apprenticeship (BBL) and by attending school-based
education (BOL). Since 1996 both routes lead to formally equivalent diplomas
(OCenW, 1996). Both routes have a practical component, for the appren-
ticeship route this component must be at least 60% of the study-duration, for
1This section draws mainly on a publication of the Dutch Ministry of Education (Min-
istry of Education, Culture and Science, 2003).
2The first two or three years of secondary education is called ‘basic education’ and is
equal for all school types.
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school-based education it must be minimal 20% and maximal 60%. The the-
oretical part of the training is attended at a school for vocational education.
About one third of the pupils at the MBO-level serves an apprenticeship.
Apprenticeship training is most prominent in agriculture, technical and care
occupations.
Figure 5.1: The Dutch education system
Source: OCenW
Although most people enter into an apprenticeship immediately after fin-
ishing pre-vocational education, there are also many people that choose first
to work a few years before starting an apprenticeship. Very often they start
the training on initiative of the firm they work for, for example because they
lack the necessary skills to move up. In that case, the training has to be seen
in the light of their career path.
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Table 5.1: Intake at the labour market: education level of 24-34 year-old, 2000
%
Unqualified 10
VMBO 24
HAVO/VWO 6
MBO 35
Higher Education 24
Total 100
Source: OCenW
5.2 Organisation of the Apprenticeship Sys-
tem
On average an apprenticeship takes two till four years. Normally, the ap-
prentice attends theoretical off-the-job training at a school for vocational
education one day per week. Four levels of qualifications can be distin-
guished: assistant (level 1), novice tradesman (level 2), journeyman (level 3)
and specialist or master tradesman (level 4).
The training is organised by industry or occupational category. For each
industry there is a body for vocational education.3 The bodies are responsi-
ble for the qualification structure, the quantity and quality of apprenticeship
places and the control on the examinations. The bodies are independent or-
ganisations managed by representatives of employers and employee organisa-
tions in the industry and sometimes representatives of schools for vocational
education.
Apprenticeship places in the Netherlands can be subdivided into two
groups; traditional apprenticeship places and new style apprenticeship places.
At a traditional apprenticeship place, apprentices not only have an learning
contract with their training firm, but also an employment contract. In this
case, the apprentice receives a wage. These wages are usually set by sectoral
agreements. This type of apprenticeship places is most prevalent in economic
sectors that traditionally looked to the apprenticeship system as a means to
train workers, for example the printing industry (Borghans and Smits, 1996).
3In Dutch: Kenniscentra Beroepsonderwijs Bedrijfsleven.
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In the eighties the offer of apprenticeship places fell short of the demand,
as a result of the economic decline in those years (Frietman, 1990). Youth
unemployment was high but at the same time there was a concern that the
low training incidence would lead to skill shortages in the future, when labour
demand would rise again. For that reason new types of apprenticeship places
were introduced in several sectors of industry. These new style apprenticeship
places are less tied to the labour organisation and the production process.
Usually apprentices only have a learning contract but no employment con-
tract which means that they do not earn a salary, although sometimes they
obtain some allowances depending on the firm’s individual policy. So, these
contracts are much cheaper for the training firm.
Another development was the coming of training co-operations. In many
sectors firms started to co-operate their training activities. In that case
apprentices do not have a learning contract with a single firm but with a
co-operation of firms. Apprentices then circulate between the co-operating
firms. The advantage of such constructions is that firms that are too small
to offer apprenticeship places, for example because they do not have all the
required machinery the apprentice should practice with, can still participate
in the apprenticeship system.
Nowadays the share of new style apprenticeship places is substantial.
In Borghans, Smits, Vlasblom, and Jacobs (2000) we show that in 30% of
the training firms, apprentices only have a learning contract and 9% of the
firms employ apprentices through a co-operation. The differences between
economic sectors are substantial, however. In administrative occupations in
the service sector, new style apprenticeships are the rule, 65% of the firms do
not give their apprentices an employment contract, while in the wholesale and
retail trade this is only the case for 17% of the firms. Contracts through co-
operations are very common in the building trade and the hotel and catering
industry.
The organisation of training and working at the apprenticeship differs
between sectors and within sectors also between firms. Of course, it will
also depend on the type of apprenticeship place. In traditional apprentice-
ship places the apprentice is an employee of the firm who takes part in the
production process and usually most of the training is informal on-the-job
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Table 5.2: Type of apprenticeship contract
Learning Learning& Contract with
contract employment co-operation
contract
Sector of Industry % % %
Industry 36 51 12
Garages 21 64 10
Building Trade 27 52 20
Hotel and Catering 35 50 14
Business Services 65 34 1
Wholesale/retail trade 17 82 1
Non-profit 50 41 9
Total 30 60 9
Source: Borghans, Smits, Vlasblom, and Jacobs (2000)
(Frietman, 1990). In new style apprenticeship places often part of the train-
ing takes place off-the-job. Mostly the apprentice has a task book from the
school that gives the practical assignments the apprentice has to fulfill in he
firm.
The apprentice has a supervisor from the school and a supervisor from
the training firm. The supervisor from the school visits the training firm
a few times during the apprenticeship period to discuss the progress of the
apprentice. The supervisor in the firm, the so-called practical trainer, is
responsible for the daily supervision at the workplace. Large firms sometimes
employ a full-time practical trainer. In smaller firms, on the other hand, the
practical trainer is usually a craftsman who only spends part of his time on
supervision.
5.3 Responsibility for the Quality of Appren-
ticeships
Since 1996, apprenticeship training has been organised within the framework
of the Adult & Vocational Education Act (WEB) which aimed to improve
the quality of education. Before the introduction of the WEB, the bodies for
vocational education and training were responsible for the supervision of the
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apprentice during the term of apprenticeship. A consultant of the concerning
body visited the training firm on a regular basis to see how the apprentice
was doing. Within the WEB responsibilities have shifted. The bodies are still
responsible for the quantity and quality of apprenticeship places but they do
not interfere with individual apprentices, this responsibility now rests with
the school for vocational education. The school is also responsible for the
examination of the practical component at the apprenticeship place.
Firms that want to train apprentices need to be approved by the con-
cerning body for vocational education. Although there are some minimum
criteria set by the national body for vocational education and training, the
umbrella organisation of the industry bodies (see Table 5.3), the criteria for
approvement differ between bodies. Some bodies have strict criteria and, for
example, require practical trainers in firms to undertake special training for
supervisors. A potential problem is that the bodies are both responsible for
the quantity and the quality of apprenticeship places. These responsibilities
may conflict with each other (Kraayvanger, 1998). Indeed, the criteria for
approvement seem to be less severe in industries where less firms are pre-
pared to participate within the apprenticeship system. For that reason there
exist considerable differences in quality both between and within sectors of
industry.
Given these differences between sectors, it is not surprising that the qual-
ity of apprenticeship places demands some concern. There are still many
firms with a low training consciousness as stated by Frietman (1999). Espe-
cially small firms often seem to consider apprentices as cheap labour. The
schools for vocational education that are responsible for the supervision of
apprentices do not have the means to supervise the training in the firm
intensively (Den Boer, Frietman, and Ho¨vels, 2001). Nieuwenhuis (2001)
concludes, based on interviews with managers of schools for vocational edu-
cation, that the schools for vocational education leave the responsibility for
the quality of the learning at the apprenticeship place to the practical trainer
in the training firm. From a survey among schools for vocational education,
Leenknegt (2001) also concludes that very often the apprenticeship place is
of insufficient quality. Blokhuis, Jellema, and Nijhof (2002) have studied the
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quality of the apprenticeship places and internships4 of pupils of one school
(ROC Eindhoven) and state that there are several problems with the quality
of the apprenticeship places. Problems mentioned are that firms give priority
to production, apprentices are not always given the possibility to work on
their practical assignments from their task book and production tasks are
not always relevant for their training.
All in all, it can be concluded that although the apprenticeship system
in the Netherlands is highly regulated, the quality of apprenticeship training
varies between firms. These differences in training quality mainly concern the
training intensity and no so much the curriculum of the training programme.
In chapters 7 and 8 I will investigate whether these variations in training
intensity, are connected to differences in training motives between firms.
4The practical component of school-based vocational education (BOL).
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Table 5.3: Minimum criteria for recognition
Condition 1
A company offering apprenticeships provides the apprentice with a place to work
which fits within its everyday operations. In addition, the apprentice is able to
practise the occupation for which he or she is being educated. A company of-
fering apprenticeships is able to allow the apprentice to carry out (a large part
of the assignments that he or she needs to have fulfilled in order to comply with
the final attainment requirements (through intermediate tests).
Condition 2
A company offering apprenticeships offers students the facilities that are neces-
sary for proper practical training. The guarantees for an optimal learning place
are contained in five specific quality statements.
Statement 1
A company offering apprenticeships shall appoint a practical trainer. A practical
trainer is an individual who has at least the level of subject-specific knowledge
and skills for which the apprentice is being trained. In addition, the practical
trainer must be able to adequately transfer professional knowledge to the stu-
dent. The practical trainer may give proof of such teaching skills by submitting
relevant diplomas, certificates or verifiable experience.
Statement 2
A company offering apprenticeships shall contact the apprentice’s school regu-
larly, in order to stay informed of the progress of the practical training.
Statement 3
A company offering apprenticeships shall use a practical learning plan or super-
vision tools to ensure that the apprentice is trained in a structured way.
Statement 4
A company offering apprenticeships shall be prepared to make time, space and
resources available for practical training.
Statement 5
A company offering apprenticeships shall avail of the support of a consultant
from the body for vocational education and training for its practical training.
Source: Colo
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Measuring Training Intensity
6.1 Introduction
The theoretical relationship between training motives and training intensity
deduced in Chapter 4 will be tested empirically in the following chapters. To
this end a measure for training intensity is needed. As learning takes place
within the head of the apprentice the learning process itself is not observable.
What we can (partly) observe is the firm’s input and/or the output of the
learning process.
Training intensity can thus be measured both in terms of input and in
terms of output. Training output will not only depend on the firm’s train-
ing input but also on inputs the firm cannot control, like apprentice ability
or motivation. So even if we had a perfect measure for training output, it
would not be clear to what extent this output is due to the firm’s training
input or to other (unobservable) inputs. Therefore the firm’s training input
is better suited to test the relation between training motives and training in-
tensity empirically, than the training output. However, the relevance of such
a relation depends on the extent to which output from training is eventually
affected. Therefore both the relation between training motives and training
intensity and the relation between training input and training output needs
to be considered.
The economic literature on school quality shows that it is not straight-
forward to measure inputs in the learning process. Most inputs considered
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in the literature, such as the pupil/teacher ratio and indicators for teacher
quality (teacher education), are not found to have much impact on schooling
output (Hanushek, 2003), suggesting that other not observable school inputs
are more important. The input in training is even more difficult to mea-
sure than the input in schooling because training interacts with working. It
will very often be difficult to state whether certain activities are aimed at
working or at learning. Moreover, not only the formal part of the training
which is regulated and therefore better observable should be measured but
also the less formal parts of the training programme. Indeed, training firms
have more possibilities to cheat on the latter than the first. In this chapter I
will give an overview of input and output measures for training (and school-
ing) used in the literature and I will introduce a measure for training input
which explicitly takes into account the interaction of working and learning.
This measure will be used to test the relation between training motives and
training input. The chapter will start by deriving the empirical model for
the relation between training motives and training input and the relation
between training input and output that will be tested in chapters 7 and 8.
6.2 The Empirical Model
Suppose the firm’s profit of training an apprentice is given by:
pif (h,X,Z) = l(Z)H(h,X)− C(h) (6.1)
where = H(h,X) represents the human capital production function, with h
the training input of the training firm, and X the input that is exogenous
to the training firm, for example the ability or motivation of the apprentice.
Assume that ∂H
∂h
≥ 0, ∂2H
∂h2
< 0, ∂H
∂X
≥ 0 and ∂2H
∂h∂X
> 0. C(h) is the cost
function, including forgone productivity and apprentice wages,1 ∂C
∂h
≥ 0,
∂2C
∂h2
≥ 0. l(Z), 0 ≤ l(Z) ≤ 1, dl
dZ
> 0, is a function of a an exogenous variable
Z that determines the part of the returns to training that can be appropriated
by training firms, for example the degree of firm-specificity (see Chapter 4).
1For simplicity I assume that C does not depend on X. This assumption does not
affect the outcomes of the model.
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For ease of presentation, I will refer to Z as the training motive of the firm. If
l(Z) > 0, the firm has future benefits from training. It is assumed that there
are constant returns to scale, so we can concentrate on the training decision
for a single apprentice. The aim of the empirical chapters that follow is to
find the relation between training input (h) and the training motive (Z).
The first order condition for the firm’s optimal training input is given by:
l(Z)
∂H
∂h
=
∂C
∂h
(6.2)
The firm’s input will depend positively on Z since
dh
dZ
=
dl
dZ
∂H
∂h
(
∂2C
∂h2
− l(Z)∂
2H
∂h2
)−1
> 0 (6.3)
Furthermore, if it is possible for the firm to react on X, training input will
increase in X as well since
dh
dX
= l(Z)
∂2H
∂h∂X
(
∂2C
∂h2
− l(Z)∂
2H
∂h2
)−1
> 0 (6.4)
In Chapter 4 it was assumed that H(h,X) = h, training input was equal
to output and there where no exogenous factors, like apprentice ability, af-
fecting training output. Although this assumption has no impact on the
results of the theoretical model, it is not valid empirically. Differences in
output between firms need not to be due entirely to differences in training
inputs of the firm, they may also depend on factors exogenous to the training
firm. If there is no data on the exogenous factors affecting training output,
a regression of H instead of h on Z will lead to overestimating the effect of
Z. On the other hand, the relation between h and Z is only relevant if h has
indeed impact on H. Therefore, I will consider both the relation between
training motives and training input and the relation between training input
and output.
To illustrate the issue of missing data on exogenous input X, suppose
that H(h,X) = 1
γ
Xδhγ, C(h) = h and l(Z) = Zρ. Substituting in (6.2) gives
h = ZαXβ (6.5)
where α = ρ
1−γ and β =
δ
1−γ
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Taking logs, rewriting the model in deviation form and allowing for mea-
surement errors in training input and output, we obtain the following statis-
tical model to be estimated.
h˜ij = Z˜ijα + X˜iβ + εij (6.6)
H˜ij = h˜ijγ + X˜iδ + ηij (6.7)
Where εij and ηij are independent normal distributed measurement errors
(zero mean). Equation (6.6) gives the relation between training input for
apprentice i in firm j and the training motives firm j has for this apprentice,
thereby controlling for the indirect effect of exogenous input for apprentice
i. Equation (6.7) gives the relation between training output and input for
apprentice i in firm j while controlling for the direct effect of exogenous
input.
Missing Data on Exogenous Input A problem that is often encountered
is that data on exogenous input (X) is missing.2 Regressing h˜ on Z˜ gives the
OLS-estimator αˆ with mean
E(αˆ) = α+ (Z˜ ′Z˜)−1Z˜ ′X˜β (6.8)
If data on exogenous input (X) is missing, the OLS-estimator is biased only
in the case that the training motive (Z) is correlated with exogenous input
X.
Regressing H˜ on h˜ gives OLS-estimator γˆ with mean:
E(γˆ) = γ + (h˜′h˜)−1h˜′X˜δ (6.9)
This bias consists of two components (h˜′h˜)−1α′Z˜ ′X˜δ and (h˜′h˜)−1β′X˜ ′X˜δ.
The second component will be equal to zero if β = 0, that is if the firm’s
training input h is not affected by exogenous input X. That is the case
if firms cannot react on exogenous input X, for example because X is not
observed by firms.
2Compare Todd and Wolpin (2003) who discuss missing data issues which play a role
when estimating educational production functions.
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Missing Data on the Firm’s Training Input If there is no data avail-
able on the firm’s training input h, the relation between training motives and
training output can be estimated directly. Substituting (6.6) in (6.7) gives
the relation between output and training motives.
H˜ij = Z˜ijγα + X˜i(γβ + δ) + εijηijδ (6.10)
The effect of training motives (Z) on training output (H) depends both
on the effect of (Z) on training input (h), that is α, and the effect of training
input (h) on training output (H), γ.3 In that case, regression of H˜ on Z˜
gives an estimator αˆγ with
E(αˆγ) = αγ + (Z˜ ′Z˜)−1Z˜ ′X˜(βγ + δ) (6.11)
There are two sources of a bias. First, there is a direct effect (δ) of
exogenous input (X) on output (H). The larger the impact of X on output
the larger the bias. Secondly there is an indirect effect due to the effect of
exogenous input (X) on training input (h). So, if data on X is missing and
there is a correlation between Z and X the bias of αˆγ is larger than the bias
of γˆ.
6.3 Training Input and Output in the Liter-
ature
6.3.1 The Economic and Sociological literature
Training Input
The literature on the effects of school inputs on educational performance
considers various inputs. Roughly two types of inputs can be distinguished,
teacher quality and resources per pupil. Measures for teacher quality include
teacher education, teacher experience and teacher test scores (Hanushek,
2003). The pupil/teacher ratio and expenditure per pupil are examples of
resources per pupil (Card and Krueger, 1992; Hanushek, 2003). A problem
3These effects cannot be identified separately.
81
CHAPTER 6. MEASURING TRAINING INTENSITY
of these input measures is that they do not take into account the factors
that, according to educational research, matter for educational performance,
like teaching methods, contact between teachers and pupils, or time spent on
certain subjects (Jonker, 2001). For example, Rivkin, Hanushek, and Kain
(2002) show that teacher quality matters a lot for educational performance
but that the usual measures for teacher quality, like teacher education, only
explain a small part of variations in teacher quality.
The input in training is even more difficult to measure because training
interacts with working. Equivalent to teacher quality as a school input, the
quality of the practical trainer could be taken as a measure of training input.
However, while in a school the teacher will dominate the learning process,
this is not necessarily true for the practical trainer at the workplace. For
example, other (qualified) colleagues may also instruct the apprentice during
the work. Furthermore, it is important whether the practical trainer indeed
takes the time necessary to teach the apprentice. Unlike a teacher in school
whose primary activity is to teach, a practical trainer often combines training
activities with production activities.
Training input measures equivalent to the resources per pupil are the
expenditures per apprentice4 or the time spent on training. For example,
Bailey, Hughes, and Barr (1998) and Bailey and Hughes (1999) tried to mea-
sure the quality of work-based learning placements for high-school students.
One measure of training input they considered, is the percentage of the in-
ternship spent on learning. A problem with this measure is that it is often
difficult to decide whether an activity should be classified as a learning or
a production activity, since it will often be both. For the same reason the
expenditure per apprentice is also difficult to measure since not only direct
costs have to be incorporated but also the opportunity costs, as emphasis
on learning may be at the cost of productivity (see also the discussion of
training costs in Chapter 2).
Another measure for input considered by Bailey, Hughes, and Barr (1998)
is based on the characteristics of the internship. Is there a written training
agreement and an individual training plan for each student? Is there any doc-
umentation of learning at the work site? Is there a supervisor in the training
4In this case, input is equal to training cost, that is C(h) = h.
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firm? Adding the positive responses, they obtain a measure of training in-
tensity. An advantage of such a measure is that it takes into account more
aspects of the training place. A disadvantage is that it only considers the for-
mal aspects of the training programme, which are easily observable. Whether
training actually takes place is not taken into account.
Training Output
The output from training is the apprentice’s increase in human capital, that
is the increase in (the level of) skills and knowledge he has. In the economic
literature on educational performance, this output is either measured by
standardised test scores or by labour market outcomes, like wages (Loeb and
Bound, 1996). Test scores are usually not available for apprentices. If the
training is completed with an examination, like in the Netherlands, the exam
results can be used as a measure of training output. For example, Frietman
(1990) studied the quality of different types of apprenticeship places in the
Netherlands by looking at the completion rate, that is the percentage of
apprentices that successfully completes an apprenticeship with a certificate
of qualification.
Labour market outcomes, such as wages after the apprenticeship, can
also be used as indicators of training output. However, as the training may
be partly firm-specific, a distinction has to be made between ex-apprentices
who move and ex-apprentices who stay because the former cannot use their
firm-specific skills and knowledge anymore (Werwatz, 1996). Other labour
market indicators for training output that are used in the literature are the
chance to find a job after completing the training and the level of this job
(Borghans and Smits, 1997; Frietman, 1990).
6.3.2 The Educational Literature
The educational literature emphasises the importance of the workplace as a
learning environment (Resnick, 1987) but there is little empirical evidence
about the optimal configuration of the workplace for learning. How should
the apprenticeship place be organised to obtain the highest learning effect?
Effectiveness of the learning process will depend on characteristics of the
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apprenticeship place, characteristics of the apprentice and characteristics of
the occupation the apprentice is trained for (Onstenk, 1997; Van der Klink,
1999; Blokhuis, 2003; Poortman, Nijhof, and Nieuwenhuis, 2003). Appren-
tice characteristics include qualification, experience, learning abilities and
motivation (Onstenk, 1994, 1997) and intelligence, learning style, personal
traits, age, gender, social economic and social cultural background and so-
cial competence (Poortman, Nijhof, and Nieuwenhuis, 2003). The occupation
matters as well; a technical occupation may demand other didactics than an
occupation in the care sector.
Onstenk (1997) argues that the complexity and content of the job deter-
mine the learning possibilities. The same is true for the possibility to make
mistakes. Blokhuis (2003) gives an overview of factors at the workplace that
may affect the effectiveness of the training. First of all, it is important that
an apprentice participates at working activities and that there is an oppor-
tunity to perform and to use what is learned (interaction between theory at
school and activities at the apprenticeship place). Furthermore there needs
to be variation in work situations. A high work load is supposed to have
a negative effect on learning because it negatively affects the time to learn.
Finally interaction with others at the workplace (colleagues and supervisors)
and support of colleagues (‘approval of managers and employees that a stu-
dent is participating in a work process as part of a learning process’ which
‘implies making mistakes and doing it in their own pace’) are supposed to
increase the effectiveness of the training.5
None of the above studies gives a definite answer to the question of how
the apprenticeship place should be designed to generate optimal learning
possibilities. It seems to be important that the job is complex and does
not consist of routine tasks only, and there must be enough room to make
mistakes. Apart from that, empirical research on this subject is still in its
infancy and is far from conclusive yet.
5Blokhuis (2003) also mentions some factors that are less relevant for apprenticeship
places but that will determine the learning possibilities of jobs that are not especially
designed for learning. These factors include tasks obscurity (is it clear what is expected of
the worker), task autonomy (level of control) and task information (with respect to results
and performance).
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6.4 A Novel Measure for Training Input
Because of the interaction of work and training, training input involves more
dimensions than time spent on training or the quality of a practical trainer.
Training at the apprenticeship place can take different forms. It may take
place on-the-job or off-the-job, it may be either formal or informal learning-
by-doing. For my aim, testing the relation between training input and train-
ing motives, it is important to consider all aspects of the apprenticeship place,
including the informal aspects that are more difficult to observe. To measure
the training input I will therefore consider the total training effort of a firm.
This is the effort to organise training and work at the apprenticeship place
in favour of learning. Do firms give priority to activities that are useful for
the learning process or alternatively to activities that engender a high direct
productivity?
I will consider various aspects of the apprenticeship place, both the pro-
ductive work the apprentice is employed at and the formal parts of the train-
ing programme. From the educational literature it can be concluded that
it is important that the production tasks the apprentice has to perform are
sufficiently complex. So the first aspect I will consider is the complexity of
production tasks. Is the apprentice introduced to all aspects of the trade or
is he given simple supporting tasks in which he is directly productive?
The second aspect is the learning content of production tasks. Is the
apprentice given tasks from which he can learn or tasks in which he reaches
a high productivity? As the educational literature provides little evidence
on the optimal configuration of the apprenticeship place I will not study the
exact nature of production tasks but I will study whether they are aimed
(in the view of the firm or the apprentice) at learning. I will also examine
whether there is a relation between the production tasks and what is learnt
at school.
The third and fourth aspect I will consider, the formal learning activities
and the instruction and supervision of the apprentice in the training firm
both refer to the formal part of the training programme. Is the apprentice
given enough time to perform his practical assignments for school (which
usually have no value for the firm). Is there enough time for instruction or
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supervision or is the practical trainer too busy with his own productive work.
Due to asymmetric information, the effort of the training firm is difficult
to observe for the researcher. Ideally one would like to inspect the organ-
isation of the apprenticeship place directly during a longer period. Such a
method, however, is very costly to carry out on a large scale. Apart from
that, there is a risk that in firms where such an inspection takes place train-
ing practices would be adjusted and training quality would be better than it
had been otherwise.
To measure the training effort I therefore interviewed both ex-apprentices
(Chapter 7) and training firms (Chapter 8). I formulated a number of state-
ments concerning the organisation of training and work at the apprenticeship
place and the respondents had to indicate to what extent these statements
applied to their former apprenticeship place/firm. These statements try to
capture the extent to which firms gives priority to learning relative to produc-
tion. The exact formulation of the statements is discussed in the following
chapters.
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6.5 Appendix to Chapter 6
6.5.1 List of Symbols
pif firm’s profit
h firm’s training input
X other training input
H(., .) human capital production function
C(.) training cost function
l(.) part of the returns to training appropriated by the training firm
γ,δ,ρ,α, β parameters
i indexes apprentices
j indexes firms
ε, η error terms
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Chapter 7
Training Intensity and Training
Motives I: Evidence from
Former Apprentices
7.1 Introduction
In this chapter the relation between training motives and training intensity
will be tested on data on former apprentices. The chapter draws upon a writ-
ten survey among newly qualified apprentices in the Netherlands. Appren-
tices, being the recipients of the training, observe the training continuously.
Ryan (1994) argues that apprentices have difficulties to assess the quality
of the training at the start of the apprenticeship but that they will obtain
more information during their training. Former apprentices are therefore in
a good position to provide information on training input. They must be able
to judge whether some tasks were useful for their training because they know
what skills they learned when performing specific tasks.
To assess the training input at their former apprenticeship place, respon-
dents received a number of items formulated as statements and were asked
to indicate to what extent these statements applied to their apprenticeship
place. The items tried to capture the effort of the training firm to give
priority to the learning process relative to production.
Based on these items I will construct a training input measure. This
89
CHAPTER 7. TRAINING INTENSITY AND TRAINING MOTIVES I
training input measure will be related to both the firm’s training motives
and the training output. The characteristics of the apprenticeship place will
be used as an indicator for firms’ training motives. I will consider two output
indicators, namely the chance that the training is completed with a diploma,
and the wages after the apprenticeship.
7.2 The Survey
The analyses in this chapter are based upon a written survey among indi-
viduals who had finished an apprenticeship in the Netherlands about a year
and a half before.1 This survey, which was carried out in 1997, addressed
both the situation during their apprenticeship and the current labour market
position of former apprentices. About 6,000 individuals were approached, of
whom 4,000 had done an apprenticeship at the lower level (level 1 or 2), and
about 2,000 had done an apprenticeship at a higher level (level 3 or 4). The
response was 19 percent for the first mentioned and 27 percent for the sec-
ond. Eventually, this resulted in a data set with 975 respondents, of whom
747 had successfully completed the training with a certificate of qualification
and 228 dropped out without a qualification. Table 7.1 shows the number
of respondents by training level and training sector and presents some char-
acteristics of the respondents. For more survey details see also Smits (1999)
and Willems and Welters (1999).
A low response may affect the results if the non-response is selective.
One might especially worry about a low response by those apprentices who
were already with the training firm before the start of the training and had
a permanent employment contract. The survey was designed for school-
leavers and is therefore less identifiable for former apprentices who entered
the labour market much longer ago. However, it appears that nearly one
third of the respondents already worked in the training firm before the start
of the training. This number is reasonably in line with other research, so
there is no evidence that this group is under-represented (Borghans, Smits,
Vlasblom, and Jacobs, 2000). The sample is therefore not selective with
1This survey was part of the school-leaver survey RUBS.
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respect to apprentices who start an apprenticeship immediately after leav-
ing school relative to apprentices who work a few years before starting an
apprenticeship. Another possible source of selectivity is the firm’s training
input. One could worry that apprentices who were disappointed with their
apprenticeship place were less inclined to respond. Since the estimates of the
relation between training motives and training input will be biased down-
wards in the presence of this type of selectivity they should be seen as a
lower bound.
Dropouts included only those apprentices who had dropped out in their
final year. It is to be expected that early dropouts will have more prob-
lems answering questions about their former apprenticeship place and have
less information about the quality of the apprenticeship place. Therefore
apprentices who dropped out before their final year were not included in
the sample. Note that if there is a strong relation between the training in-
put and the chances of dropping out, the average training input would be
overestimated.
Table 7.1: The number of respondents by level and sector of training
Training occupation Women Average age n
%
Apprenticeship level 1/2 40 25.2 566
Technical 11 24.7 305
Administration 67 25.0 198
Social services 97 28.2 63
Apprenticeship level 3/4 37 26.5 439
Technical 11 25.3 246
Administration 46 25.3 97
Social services 96 30.8 96
7.3 Items on Training Input
To investigate the effort of the firm to organise training and work in such a
way that a high learning effect can be achieved, I formulated a number of
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statements on items such as the training itself and the training firm. Re-
spondents were asked to indicate for each item on a 4-point response scale to
what extent it applied to their former apprenticeship place. Table 7.2 gives
the distribution of each item on the response scale. Items 3 and 6 refer to
the complexity of production tasks. To introduce apprentices to all aspects of
the trade, they should perform the same tasks as qualified tradesmen (item
3). For most former apprentices, this was indeed the case. Priority to direct
productivity, on the other hand, implies simple tasks in which apprentices
are directly productive (item 6). Only a small proportion of the former ap-
prentices agree that they were given the irksome tasks at the workplace.
Items 1, 2 and 4 refer to the learning content of production tasks. As can
be seen from Table 7.2, nearly 60% of the former apprentices fully agrees that
their tasks in the training firm were useful for their training and 35% fully
agrees that they were given special tasks to learn the job well. The relation
between formal off-the-job training at school and on-the-job training in the
firm appears to be less satisfying. Less than a quarter of the former appren-
tices fully agrees with the statement that there was a close link between the
subjects dealt with at school and their tasks in the training firm.
Item 5 (‘Sometimes I missed lessons at school because I was too busy with
my work at the training firm’) refers to time for formal learning activities.
Only few former apprentices said that they missed school because it was too
busy at work. Item 8 refers to instruction and supervision at the training
firm. Most former apprentices seem to be quite satisfied with the supervision
at the training place. Nearly half of them agreed that supervision in the
training firm was good. Lastly, item 7 gives a direct measure of the quality
of the training place. More than half of the former apprentices fully agree
that their training firm was a good place to learn the occupation. An overall
measure for the training input can be obtained by taking the average score
of all the items.
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To test the reliability of the scale, both the item total correlation and
Cronbach’s alpha were calculated. The item total correlation gives the re-
lation between the score of a specific item and the total score. A high cor-
relation indicates that the item concerned measures the same construct as
the other items. Cronbach’s alpha is a coefficient of reliability and gives the
correlation between the sum of the variances of the scores for the individ-
ual items and the variance of the total score (Mueller, 1986). It measures
how well a set of items measures an unidimensional underlying construct, in
this case training input. Usually a coefficient of 0.7 or higher is considered
acceptable (Nunnaly, 1978). If the value of Cronbach’s alpha increases by
leaving an item out, it can be concluded that this item does not measure the
same as the total scale.
Table 7.3 shows for each item the average score2, the standard deviation,
the item total correlation and Cronbach’s alpha if that item is deleted from
the analysis. Both tests concluded that item 5 (‘Sometimes I missed lessons
at school because I was too busy with my tasks in he training firm’) does not
measure the same construct as the other items. The item total correlation
is very low – only 0.01 – and Cronbach’s α increases considerably if this
item is deleted from the analysis. A possible explanation is that while it is
difficult for third parties to judge the quality of on-the-job training, school
attendance is easily observed. It is therefore much easier for training firms to
save costs on on-the-job training without being perceived, than on off-the-job
training. It was therefore decided to leave item 5 out of the input measure.
Item 6 (‘Very often I was given the irksome tasks’) also has a low item total
correlation, but Cronbach’s α does not increase if we leave this item out.
As alpha gives the reliability of the scale under the assumption that the
set of items is unidimensional (Cortina, 1993) additionally I conducted a
principal component analysis on all items to test for the dimension of the
scale. This analysis yields two components. The first component has a very
low loading for item 5 and the second component has a high loading on
item 5 but very low loadings on the other items. Furthermore the second
component accounts for only 13% of the total variance (eigenvalue 1.049). It
2The scores of items that are negatively formulated are mirrored. A high average score
indicates high training input.
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can therefore be concluded that, apart from item 5, all items concerning the
training in the firm indeed form a unidimensional reliable scale.
Table 7.3: Tests for reliability of the scale
Item Average Score Standard Item Total Cronbach’s α
(range 1-4) Deviation Correlation if item deleted
1 3.37 0.88 0.61 0.67
2 2.76 1.12 0.51 0.68
3 3.20 1.01 0.37 0.71
4 2.57 1.05 0.45 0.70
5 3.43 1.06 0.03 0.78
6 3.57 0.81 0.32 0.72
7 3.33 0.91 0.61 0.67
8 3.17 0.94 0.57 0.67
All items 0.73
Note: Items that are negatively formulated are first mirrored. A high average
score thus means a high appreciation of the training input
An indicator for training input is then obtained by taking the average
score on all items except item 5. Figure 7.1 gives the cumulative distribution
of the training input indicator. If we define low training input by an average
score of 2.5 (which is the median range of the response scale), then 16% of
all respondents has had low training input.
In addition to the statements concerning the training place, the former
apprentices were also asked about supervision at the school for vocational
education. As the apprentices’ progress at the training firm is supervised by
the school and the school is also responsible for examinations of the practical
component, the training input will to some extent also depend on the quality
of the supervision by the school. Former apprentices were less satisfied with
the supervision from the side of the school than with the supervision of the
training firm. Only 29% said that supervision by the school was good (see
Table 7.4). The item total correlation of the item concerning the supervision
at school with the items concerning the training place, is 0.23, suggesting that
the supervision of the school indeed has some impact on the firm’s training
input.
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Figure 7.1: Cumulative distribution of the training input measure
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Table 7.4: Supervision from the school
%
Good 29
Sufficient 41
Moderate 22
Insufficient 8
n=858
Note: The survey question reads ‘How do you judge the supervision from the
school?
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7.4 Measures for Training Motives
I will use the characteristics of the apprenticeship place, the type of appren-
ticeship place and the type of appointment, as indicators for firms’ training
motives. As discussed in Chapter 5, there are two types of apprenticeship
places in the Netherlands; traditional apprenticeship places and new-style
apprenticeship places. Apprentices in traditional apprenticeship places have
both a learning and an employment contract while apprentices in new-style
places only have a learning contract. Borghans and Smits (1997) argue that
firms which offer traditional apprenticeship places more often employ ap-
prentices because of a future need for skilled workers than firms that offer
new-style apprenticeship places, as they more often retain their workers. The
type of appointment during the apprenticeship is an even better measure for
a firm’s motive for employing apprentices. It is plausible that firms which
offer their apprentices permanent employment before the end of the training
period, train them because of a future need for qualified labour. The same is
true for firms that give apprentices a prospect of permanent employment, al-
though it is not precluded that such firms simply want to keep the apprentice
motivated to work hard. Firms that do not offer apprentices any prospect of
renewal of their contract, are less likely to have investment motives.
Table 7.5: Type of apprenticeship place and type of appointment
%
Type of apprenticeship place
Traditional 70
New style; payment of expenses 20
New style; no payment of expenses 10
n=896
Type of appointment during apprenticeship
Temporary; prospect of permanent appointment 24
Temporary; no prospect of permanent appointment 33
Permanent 43
n=845
Note that the incidence of a permanent contract, may be correlated with
apprentice ability. Apprentices who have a permanent appointment during
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the training period were very often already employed in the training firm
before they started the training. In that case the training firm knew the
ability of the apprentice. The incidence of a temporary appointment with or
without prospect on a permanent appointment is less likely to correlate with
apprentice ability. If the apprentice starts working in the training firm, the
firm has little information about the ability of the apprentice.3 In that case,
a firm with investment motives will offer the apprentice the prospect to stay
but whether it will actually retain the apprentice will of course depend on
apprentice ability.
More than 40% of the respondents had already a permanent appointment
during the training period (see Table 7.5). These all concerned apprentices
in traditional apprenticeship places. Another 33% of the respondents were
during their training period, given the prospect of obtaining permanent em-
ployment after completing their training. These also included apprentices
from new-style apprenticeship places.
7.5 Determinants of Training Input
The training input measure has been regressed on the indicators for training
motives.4 Control variables included in the analysis are; personal character-
istics (age, gender and origin, previous education), training characteristics
(training level and occupational group), characteristics of the training firm
(firm size, sector of industry) and a dummy for good or sufficient supervision
from the side of the school.
Table 7.6 shows the estimation results. The type of appointment indeed
affects the training input in the way that was expected. Those who had a
temporary appointment without any prospect of this becoming permanent
3Indeed, several economists suggest that it is only during the training period that the
real capacities of apprentices are revealed. They argue that the main reason for firms to
train apprentices is to select the best among them to stay after completing their training
(Franz and Soskice, 1995; Acemoglu and Pischke, 1998).
4Strictly speaking the training input measure has no metrical scale. It can take on 22
values with a minimum of 1 and a maximum of 4. For that reason it makes little sense to
estimate a model in logarithms like the example in Chapter 6.
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after completing their training, received lower training input than those with
a permanent appointment or a prospect of a permanent appointment, indi-
cating that there is indeed a relation between training motives and training
input.
Table 7.6: Determinants of training input (average score)
(1) (2) (3)a
Traditional apprenticeship 0.104 −0.081
(0.094) (0.131)
New style (expenses) 0.239 0.101
(0.096)∗∗ (0.129)
New style (no expenses) -Reference-
Temporary appointment (prospect) 0.025 −0.026
(0.062) (0.073)
Temp. appointment (no prospect) −0.189 −0.205
(0.068)∗∗∗ (0.087)∗∗
Permanent appointment -Reference-
Good supervision from school 0.174 0.158 0.193
(0.05) (0.050)∗∗∗ (0.066)∗∗∗
Firm size 1-9 workers −0.115 −0.106 −0.072
(0.061)∗ (0.061)∗ (0.074)
Firm size 10-99 workers −0.010 −0.081 −0.070
(0.054)∗ (0.054) (0.063)
Firm size ≥ 100 workers -Reference-
Non-profit sector 0.363 0.424 0.323
(0.098)∗∗∗ (0.101)∗∗∗ (0.120)∗∗∗
Social service occupation 0.117 0.096 0.080
(0.101) (0.102) (0.121)
Technical occupation −0.134 −0.177 −0.168
(0.065)∗∗ (0.066)∗∗∗ (0.079)∗∗
Administrative occupation -Reference-
Apprenticeship level 1/2 0.016 0.014 0.014
(0.048) (0.048) (0.057)
Previous years of schooling −0.004 −0.002 −0.007
(0.018) (0.018) (0.020)
Previous schooling: apprenticeship 0.102 0.090 0.140
(0.099) (0.099) (0.107)
continued on next page
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Table 7.6: continued
(1) (2) (3)a
Previous schooling: vocational −0.024 −0.016 −0.086
(0.055) (0.055) (0.067)
Age −0.008 −0.010 −0.008
(0.004)∗∗ (0.004)∗∗ (0.005)∗
Immigrant −0.133 −0.144 −0.028
(0.117) (0.116) (0.183)
Woman −0.057 −0.036 −0.000
(0.066) (0.066) (0.079)
Constant 3.356 3.330 3.603
(0.212)∗∗∗ (0.239)∗∗∗ 0.279
adjusted R2 0.098 0.116 0.115
F-test 6.936∗∗∗ 6.486∗∗∗ 4.293∗∗∗
n 712 712 432
Notes: asample restricted to former apprentices who would choose the same
training again. *=significant at 10% level,**=significant at 5% level,
***=significant at 1% level
The type of apprenticeship place also affects the training input. Those
who had a new-style apprenticeship place but received some pecuniary reward
had higher training input than those with a new-style apprenticeship place
without any compensation for expenses. The quality of a traditional (paid)
apprenticeship place is not significantly better, however. This result is due
to the strong link between the type of appointment and the type of appren-
ticeship place. Only apprentices who have a traditional apprenticeship place
can have a permanent employment contract with the training firm. When
we correct for the type of appointment, the positive effect of the traditional
apprenticeship found by Borghans and Smits (1997) disappears.
The quality of the supervision from the school indeed matters for the
firm’s training input. Former apprentices that report sufficient or good su-
pervision from the school had a higher training input than apprentices for
which the supervision from the school was moderate or insufficient.
One might worry that the effect of training motives is overestimated some-
what because the type of appointment is correlated with apprentice ability,
this is especially the case for a permanent appointment during the appren-
ticeship. Note, however, that there is no significant difference in training in-
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put for those former apprentices who had a permanent appointment already
during the training period and those who had a prospect of a permanent
appointment after the training. This result suggests that the possible bias
resulting from the correlation between apprentice ability and a permanent
appointment is limited.
This conclusion is reinforced by the fact that observable characteristics
that measure apprentice ability have no significant impact on training input.
The number of years of education provides some information on the academic
level of the candidate, while the fact that the candidate has completed voca-
tional education and/or an earlier apprenticeship reveals something about his
vocational qualities. Neither the number of years nor the type of education
has any effect on training input. So there is no evidence that the best ap-
prentices are selected for better apprenticeship places, although there may be
some selection on apprentice characteristics unobservable for the researcher.
Nevertheless even if better apprentices were selected for the best training
places this would not invalidate the conclusion that firms with investment
motives provide higher training input, since in this case firms provide better
training to better apprentices precisely because they have investment motives
and expect the returns to training to be highest for the most able apprentices.
As the former apprentices were interviewed one and a half year after they
finished the training their responses may be influenced by their situation at
the moment of the survey. Those who were more successful after the training
might unjustly give a more positive picture of their former training place than
former apprentices who had less success. As current (labour market) success
will partly depend on the type of appointment during the apprenticeship,
those who had a permanent appointment have a much lower chance to become
unemployed after the training, the positive relation between training input
and training motives, as measured by the type of appointment, that is found,
may be due to retrospective bias.
To test for this retrospective bias I will check whether the relation be-
tween training input and training motives still holds if we restrict the sample
to former apprentices who would choose the same training again. This vari-
able can be interpreted as an indication of the overall satisfaction with the
training retrospectively. It is to be expected that this variable strongly cor-
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relates with the former apprentice’s (labour market) situation at the moment
of the survey. If the relation between the type of appointment and the train-
ing intensity were only due to a retrospective bias, because those who are
not satisfied with their current situation and for that reason report a lower
training intensity, more often had a temporary contract during the training,
than this effect would disappear if the sample were restricted to apprentices
who are satisfied with the training retrospectively.5
Table 7.7: Type of appointment during apprenticeship and average training input
for apprentices who would choose the same training again retrospectively and
apprentices who would not
Choose again?
yes no
Type of contract % %
Temporary; prospect of permanent appointment 64 36
Temporary; no prospect of permanent appointment 52 48
Permanent 69 31
Total 62 38
N=975
Training input
Mean 3.24 2.97
Std. Error Mean 0.026 0.039
t-test for equality of means: 5.89***
n=806
***=significant at 1%
As can be seen from Table 7.7 62% of the former apprentices said that
they would choose the same training again. This percentage is clearly related
to the type of appointment during the apprenticeship. From those who had
no prospect on a permanent appointment only 52% would choose the same
training again. Furthermore average training input is significantly higher
for former apprentices who would choose the same training again (see Table
7.7). When restricting the sample to apprentices who would choose the same
5Under the assumption that the retrospective error of the training input measure is
perfectly correlated with the retrospective overall satisfaction of the training.
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training again, I still found a positive relation between training motives and
training input, however (see Table 7.6, third row). So it can be concluded
that there is no evidence that the positive relation between training input
and training motives is solely due to a retrospective bias.
7.6 Training Input and Training Output
It is to be expected that the training input has a considerable impact on
the production of new skills. The consequences of low training input may
be twofold. First, apprentices who receive low training input have a smaller
chance of completing their training successfully. Secondly, low training in-
put will lead to a lower skill level, even for those who acquire a certificate of
qualification. This lower skill level will subsequently affect the labour market
position of the former apprentice. In this section, both the chances of com-
pleting the apprenticeship successfully (acquire a certificate) and the wages
of former apprentices will be explained by training input.
Table 7.8: Determinants of the chance to acquire a certificate
of qualification (logit-estimation)
(1) (2) (3)
Training input 0.587 0.560
(0.155)∗∗∗ (0.158)∗∗∗
Good supervision from school 0.580 0.564
(0.207)∗∗∗ (0.208)∗∗∗
Traditional apprenticeship 0.586
(0.410)
New style (expenses) 0.815
(0.434)∗
New style (no expenses) -Reference-
Temporary appointment (prospect) 0.338
(0.273)
Temporary appointment (no prospect) 0.016
(0.293)
Permanent appointment -Reference-
Firm size 1-9 workers −0.803 −0.724 −0.674
continued on next page
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Table 7.8: continued
(1) (2) (3)
(0.262)∗∗∗ (0.268)∗∗∗ (0.272)∗∗
Firm size 10-99 workers −0.366 −0.243 −0.182
(0.242) (0.249) (0.256)
Firm size ≥ 100 workers -Reference-
Non-profit sector 0.205 0.014 0.198
(0.457) (0.471) (0.517)
Social service occupation −0.391 −0.514 −0.481
(0.439) (0.453) (0.470)
Technical occupation −0.492 −0.399 −0.439
(0.293)∗ (0.300) (0.307)
Administrative occupation -Reference-
Apprenticeship level 1/2 −0.271 −0.290 −0.310
(0.210) (0.215) (0.216)
Previous years of schooling 0.047 0.057 0.060
(0.086) (0.089) (0.091)
Previous schooling: apprenticeship 1.803 1.813 1.833
(0.762)∗∗ (0.771)∗∗ (0.775)∗∗
Previous schooling: vocational −0.243 −0.282 −0.236
(0.246) (0.252) (0.255)
Age 0.050 0.053 0.058
(0.020)∗∗ (0.020)∗∗∗ (0.022)∗∗∗
Immigrant −0.358 −0.318 −0.348
(0.499) (0.509) (0.515)
Woman 0.014 0.015 0.076
(0.293) (0.301) (0.304)
Constant 0.650 −1.765 −2.550
(0.991) (1.116) (1.296)∗∗
LR-test 49.737∗∗∗ 74.992∗∗∗ 80.331∗∗∗
n=712
*=significant at 10% level
**=significant at 5% level
***=significant at 1% level
Table 7.8 gives the estimated coefficients of a logistic regression equation
for the chances of obtaining a certificate of qualification. Both the training
input measure and the dummy for sufficient or good supervision from the
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school are included.6 Furthermore I have included several control variables
for previous education, personal characteristics, training characteristics, and
characteristics of the training firm and apprenticeship place.
The training input has indeed an impact on the chances of successfully
completing one’s training. The higher the value of the input measure, the
greater the chances of success. The same is true for supervision. Apprentices
who report good supervision from the side of the school, have a greater chance
of success.
The type of appointment, an indicator for the firm’s training motives
has no effect on the chance of acquiring a certificate of qualification. As ex-
pected, previous training affects the chance of completing the apprenticeship
successfully. Apprentices who did an apprenticeship before, have a higher
chance of success than those who only had vocational education at school or
general secondary education. Older apprentices also have a greater chance
of success. This may be explained by the fact that older apprentices usually
have some work experience before they start their training, which probably
facilitates the acquisition of new skills.
Table 7.9 shows the estimated coefficients of a wage equation. Apart
from the explanatory variables that were also included in the analysis of
the chance of obtaining a qualification, there are now also dummy variables
included for those who are still employed in their training firm and for current
training activities. Furthermore, the variables of firm size and sector of
industry now refer to the current employer and not to the training firm.
The effect of training input on future wages is considerable. The estimated
wage difference between those with the highest training input and those
with the lowest training input, is about 17%. Surprisingly, good supervision
from the side of the school has a negative impact on future hourly wages.
This result may be explained by a substitution effect of training input and
supervision quality. Supervision from the side of the school may be less
important if the training input is good. To test for this substitution effect, I
have included the interaction of training input and supervision in the wage
6As the supervision from the school not only concerns the apprentice’s progress at the
training firms but also his progress at the school itself, it may both indirectly, through the
firm’s training input, and directly impact on training output.
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equation. This substitution effect has the expected negative sign but is not
significant. However, the negative effect of good supervision from the side of
the school disappears in this case.
Table 7.9: Wage determinants (OLS, dependent variable is
the natural logarithm of the hourly wages)
(1) (2) (3)
Training Input 0.061 0.063
(0.025)∗∗ (0.025)∗∗∗
Good supervision from school −0.063 −0.065
(0.032)∗∗ (0.032)∗∗
Traditional apprenticeship −0.028
(0.063)
New style (expenses) 0.010
(0.064)
New style (no expenses) -Reference-
Temporary appointment (prospect) −0.040
(0.041)
Temporary appointment (no prospect) −0.145
(0.048)∗∗∗
Permanent appointment -Reference-
Still with training firm 0.025 0.018 −0.032
(0.031) (0.031) (0.035)
Firm size 1-9 workers −0.088 −0.082 −0.089
(0.040)∗∗ (0.040)∗∗ (0.040)∗∗
Firm size 10-99 workers −0.086 −0.082 −0.078
(0.034)∗∗∗ (0.034)∗∗ (0.033)∗∗
Firm size ≥ 100 workers -Reference-
Non-profit sector 0.035 0.022 0.033
(0.054) (0.054) (0.054)
Social service occupation −0.110 −0.118 −0.130
(0.060)∗ (0.060)∗∗ (0.061)∗∗
Technical occupation 0.066 0.075 0.061
(0.042) (0.042)∗∗ (0.042)
Administrative occupation -Reference-
Apprenticeship level 1/2 −0.119 −0.119 −0.117
(0.032)∗∗∗ (0.032)∗∗∗ (0.032)∗∗∗
continued on next page
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Table 7.9: continued
(1) (2) (3)
No diploma −0.052 −0.047 −0.057
(0.038) (0.039) (0.039)
Previous years of schooling 0.004 0.003 0.006
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
Previous schooling: apprenticeship 0.010 0.006 −0.006
(0.058) (0.058) (0.058)
Previous schooling: vocational −0.054 −0.046 −0.046
(0.036) (0.036) (0.037)
Currently apprenticeship −0.022 −0.014 −0.028
(0.049) (0.048) (0.048)
Currently training −0.064 −0.060 −0.058
(0.045) (0.044) (0.044)
Age 0.101 0.109 0.101
(0.016)∗∗∗ (0.016) (0.017)∗∗∗
Age squared/100 −0.014 −0.013 −0.012
(0.003)∗∗∗ (0.003)∗∗∗ (0.003)∗∗∗
Immigrant −0.075 −0.065 −0.068
(0.068) (0.067) (0.067)
Woman −0.074 −0.069 −0.063
(0.042) (0.042) (0.042)
Constant 0.982 0.837 1.039
(0.257)∗∗∗ (0.265)∗∗∗ (0.279)∗∗∗
adjusted R2 0.365 0.376 0.385
F-test 15.119∗∗∗ 14.233∗∗∗ 12.361∗∗∗
n=417
*=significant at 10% level
**=significant at 5% level
***=significant at 1% level
The type of appointment during the apprenticeship has the expected sign.
Apprentices who had a permanent appointment or the prospect of a perma-
nent appointment have higher earnings than those who had no prospect of
continuing their employment relation with the training firm after completing
the apprenticeship.
It is important to note that if actual training input were correlated with
unobserved apprentice ability, because the best apprentices are selected for
the best apprenticeship places, then the effects of ability and training input
are difficult to unravel. Without correcting for the effect of unobserved ability
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the effect of training input would then be overestimated (see also Chapter 6).
To correct for omitted variable bias by IV-estimation I need an instrument
that correlates with training input but not with apprentice ability. The only
possible candidates in the data set are the region of the training firm and the
sector of industry of the training firm. The idea is that the demand for and
offer of apprenticeship places is fixed in each region since apprentice mobility
between regions is very low. Also, most apprentices have a clear preference
for a certain trade and will not easily switch between trades. However, it
turns out that neither of these variables has a significant effect on training
input.7
Nevertheless it is not very likely that the estimated positive effect of
training input is solely due to ability bias since variables indicating ability,
like the level of the apprenticeship, do have a significant positive wage effect
but do not affect training input. For example, if firms were only prepared
to provide high training input to the best apprentices we would expect the
training input on average to be higher for apprentices doing an apprenticeship
at level 3/4 than for apprentices at level 1/2 since average ability will be
higher at level 3/4. However, the level of the apprenticeship has no effect on
training input (see Table 7.6)
7.7 Conclusions
In this chapter, I conducted a survey among former apprentices to study the
relation between training input and training motives for apprenticeship train-
ing in the Netherlands. I measured input by looking at the extent in which
firms let the learning interests of the apprentice prevail over productivity
interests. Although training input is regulated and the training is certified,
I have found that there is indeed a relation between training input and the
motives of firms to hire apprentices. On average, firms that hire apprentices
because of investment motives provide higher training input than firms that
7As a result the F-statistic of the first stage regression is very low (F[24,563]=5.31)
meaning that the instruments are weak (Stock, Wright, and Yogo, 2002; Staiger and
Stock, 1997; Wooldridge, 2002) which leads to very large standard errors for estimates of
the coefficient of interest, namely training input, in the second stage.
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hire apprentices for current production motives. Regulation in itself is not
sufficient to guarantee good training to everyone if there are training firms
that have no investment motives. I have also found some evidence that train-
ing input indeed matters for the production of new skills. First, the training
input affects the chances of successful completion of the training. Second,
higher training input leads to higher wages after the apprenticeship.
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7.8 Appendix to Chapter 7
Table 7.10: Descriptive statistics
mean st. dev. n
Type of apprenticeship place
Traditional 0.70 0.447 886
New style; payment of expenses 0.20 0.386 886
New style; no payment of expenses 0.10 0.292 886
Type of appointment during apprenticeship
Temporary; prospect of permanent appointment 0.24 0.428 845
Temporary; no prospect of permanent appointment 0.33 0.471 845
Permanent 0.43 0.495 845
Training firm size
1-9 workers 0.24 0.428 839
10-99 workers 0.40 0.490 839
≥ 100 workers 0.35 0.478 839
Training firm in non-profit sector 0.17 0.380 840
Occupational group
Social service 0.15 0.360 975
Technical 0.58 0.496 975
Administration 0.28 0.449 975
Apprenticeship level 1/2 0.59 0.492 975
Previous schooling
Years of schooling 10.60 1.486 883
Apprenticeship 0.06 0.238 929
Vocational education 0.70 0.460 929
Current firm is training firm 0.41 0.492 947
Size current firm
1-9 workers 0.23 0.418 776
10-99 workers 0.36 0.479 776
≥ 100 workers 0.42 0.494 776
Current firm in non-profit sector 0.17 0.374 785
Gross hourly earnings guilders 15.35 5.694 567
Current training
Apprenticeship 0.12 0.321 954
Other training 0.15 0.352 954
Personal characteristics
Age 25.35 7.239 960
Immigrant 0.06 0.241 969
Woman 0.38 0.486 974
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Chapter 8
Training Intensity and Training
Motives II: Evidence from
Firms
8.1 Introduction
An alternative approach to investigate the relation between training intensity
and training motives is to use firm level data. The advantage of firm-level
data compared to apprentice data is that firms can provide better information
on training motives than apprentices. I conducted a survey among Dutch
training firms in four sectors, the construction industry, the printing industry,
the metal industry and the care sector (hospitals and nursing homes). The
survey included a number of questions about the way in which training and
work are organised in the firm. Based on these questions I have constructed
training input measures for the aspects of the training programme discussed
in Chapter 6, namely the complexity of production tasks, the learning content
of production tasks, and the time for formal learning activities and instruction
and supervision.
Not all aspects of the training are equally well observable by a third
party. This difference in observability allows me to investigate whether the
relation between training motives and training intensity also depends on the
degree of information imperfection as predicted in Chapter 4. To check the
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observability of the different aspects of the training that I consider, I will test
whether the training input measures affect the firm’s training reputation. It
is to be expected that mainly training efforts that are easily observable matter
for the training reputation. An indicator of the firm’s training reputation is
the chance that the firm is nominated for the yearly elections for the best
training firm in the sector.
To measure the firm’s training motives, I included several questions refer-
ring to factors that determine the firm’s expected future benefits from train-
ing, namely the degree of firm-specificity, the degree of monopsony power
and the expected quit rate. I also included some questions to measure di-
rectly whether the firm has current and/or future benefits from apprentice-
ship training.
Firstly, I will regress the measures for training input on the measures
for expected future benefits. Secondly, I will test whether the measures for
training input matter in the sense that they impact on the output from
training. The indicator for training output I will consider, is the chance that
the apprentice completes the training with a certificate of qualification.
8.2 The Survey
The survey was addressed at recognised training firms in the construction
industry, the printing industry, the metal industry and the care sector (hospi-
tals and nursing homes) that employed apprentices or had recently employed
apprentices. These are all sectors in which the apprenticeship system has a
strong tradition. The intended respondent was the contact of the firm with
the concerning body for vocational education and training. This could be the
practical trainer, the co-ordinator of training activities but also the owner of
the firm.
To make sure that the questions were sufficiently linked with the daily
practice in training firms, I discussed a draft of the questionnaire with ex-
perts from the bodies of vocational education. The exact questions and their
relation to the theoretical concepts from Chapter 6 are discussed in the next
sessions. The complete questionnaire can be found in the appendix to this
chapter.
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The bodies for vocational and training of the concerning sectors provided
data files with addresses and contacts of recognised training firms in their
sector. To obtain a relatively homogeneous group of firms for each sector,
I selected only firms that train for certain qualifications.1 Table 8.34 in the
appendix gives an overview of the selected qualifications for each sector.
The survey took place either by internet or by a telephone interview. All
contacts in the sample received a letter with the invitation to participate in
the survey and an instruction of how to fill in the questionnaire by internet.
Those contacts that were not able or not willing to fill in the questionnaire by
internet within two weeks were approached for a telephone interview. This
was the case for most of the respondents, only 17% of the respondents filled in
the questionnaire by internet. The internet questionnaire and the telephone
questionnaire were identical. By telephone, the interview took on average
about 20 minutes.
Table 8.1: Method of interview and no apprentices at the moment of the survey
by economic sector
Sector Interview No apprentices Total
by internet at survey date
% %
Construction industry 11 19 227
Printing industry 10 38 191
Metal industry 22 10 250
Hospitals and nursing homes 23 2 251
Total 17 16 919
About 3,500 firms have been approached. The initial response rate was
40%. However, not all responding firms were employing apprentices at the
moments of the interview or had employed apprentices recently.2 If a firm
had no apprentices at the moment of the survey and had no apprentices
during any moment in the last two years either, the interview was broken off.
1Only in the printing industry, all firms were included in the sample because the number
of firms that train apprentices in this sector is rather small.
2This is due to the fact that not all firms that have a recognition to train apprentices
actually do train.
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This was the case for 35% of the responding firms. The final sample consists
of 919 training firms, 16% of which had no apprentices at the moment of the
survey but had employed apprentices during the past two years (see Table
8.1) The respondent was in most cases either a practical trainer or the firm’s
co-ordinator of training activities (46% and 35% of the respondents) (see
Table 8.2). Table 8.3 gives the distribution of firm size by economic sector.
Table 8.2: Position of the respondent in relation to the apprenticeship system by
economic sector
Sector Position respondent
Trainer Co-ordinator Other
% % %
Construction industry 25 45 30
Printing industry 54 25 21
Metal industry 69 18 12
Hospitals and nursing homes 37 43 20
Total 46 33 21
n=919
Table 8.3: Firm size by economic sector
Sector Number of employees
<10 10-99 100-499 ≥ 500
% % % %
Construction industry 23 62 15 0
Printing industry 35 53 9 2
Metal industry 12 65 19 4
Hospitals and nursing homes 0 28 38 34
Total 16 52 21 11
n=906
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8.3 Items on Training Input
The survey included 16 items on training input. These items try to capture
the extent in which the firm gives priority either to training or to production.
For each item respondents were asked to which extent it applied to appren-
tices in their firm on a 4-point scale. Some items give a positive indication
of training input and others a negative indication of training input. The
training input possibly is a delicate issue for many firms. It can be expected
that respondents are not willing to declare that the training input in their
firm falls short, even if they think that this is the case. Therefore I tried to
formulate the questions meant to measure training input in a neutral way
so that it is not directly clear to the respondent whether a certain item is
a positive or a negative indication of training input. For example the item
‘apprentices carry out the same tasks as qualified colleagues’ is a positive
indication for training input meant to measure the complexity of the appren-
tice’s tasks. Table 8.4 gives an overview of the items and their distribution on
the response scale. The respondent was asked to keep in mind an apprentice
of level 2 (construction, printing and metal) or level 3 (hospitals and nursing
homes) halfway his training programme.3
As discussed in Chapter 6, the weigh off between training and production
may affect different aspects of the training program. In Chapter 7 my aim
was to find one underlying construct for training input based on all aspects of
the training. In this chapter, it is possible to measure the different aspects of
the training input separately because I have more items for each aspect. The
items all refer to the formal and informal aspects of the training programme
I distinguished in Chapter 6.
3If the respondent had no experience with apprentices at this level than the reference
was level 3 for the construction, printing and metal industries and level 4 for hospitals and
nursing homes.
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8.3. ITEMS ON TRAINING INPUT
The first aspect is the complexity of production tasks (productive work)
the apprentice performs in the firm. Priority to production implies simple
tasks in which the apprentice is directly productive while priority to learning
implies more complex tasks in which the apprentice needs more supervision
and is less productive. Items 1, 2 and 3 are a negative indicator for training
input (simple tasks) and items 4 and 5 a positive indicator for training input
(complex tasks).
The second aspect is the learning content of production tasks. Is the
apprentice given special tasks to learn the occupation? All items concerning
this aspect are a positive indicator of training input.
The third aspect is the time for formal learning activities. The practi-
cal assignments from the school are part of the training program and the
apprentice has to complete these assignments before he can pass the final ex-
amination. Is the apprentice given enough room within the firm to perform
these tasks? Items 10 and 11 are negative indicators of training input, they
indicate that priority is given to productive work, while item 12 is a positive
indicator.
Finally there is a group of items that refer to time for instruction and
supervision of the apprentice in the training firm. Items 13 and 16 are positive
indicators, there is time reserved for this activity and the apprentice is guided
whenever he needs help. Items 14 and 15 are negative indicators, suggesting
that productive work is given priority to guidance and instructions.
To check whether the items in a category indeed measure the same un-
derlying construct, first of all I considered the item total correlation.4 This
is the correlation of a specific item with the total score of all other items.
To facilitate the interpretation of the results the scale is reversed for items
that give an indication of low training input5 so that in what follows a high
score indicates high training input for all items. Table 8.5 gives the item
total correlation both for all items combined and for the four quality cate-
gories separately. The correlation between the items seems to be quite low
and sometimes even negative. The item total correlations within the four
4As it is expected that, unlike in Chapter 7, the items do not form a unidimensional
scale Cronbach’s alpha is not reported here.
5This is the case for items 1, 2, 3, 10, 11, 14 and 15.
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categories are much higher but still there seem to be some items that do not
fit in the category they are assigned to.
For that reason I will next examine whether the four training input cate-
gories considered are supported by the data or whether there are other train-
ing input categories underlying the data. First, I will consider whether there
are items that turn out not to measure training input and should therefore be
deleted from the analysis. Secondly, I will check whether the remaining items
in a category measure the same underlying construct or should be rearranged
to form new more meaningful categories. To this end I will again consider
the item total correlation. Additionally, I will perform a factor analysis for
each (new) category.6
A closer look at the items that negatively correlate with the total score
suggests some explanations. While items 12 and 13 were included to mea-
sure whether firms give priority to training whenever possible, they probably
are an indication for something else, namely indifference to training. If the
apprentice does not express any need for instruction there will be no in-
struction. Furthermore item 1 is probably too vague to be an indicator for
training input because it doesn’t tell anything about the complexity of the
work apprentices can be employed at.7 Moreover, this item does not reveal
whether apprentices perform really productive tasks, but only whether it is
possible to employ them. As a consequence, this item seems to be true for
nearly all firms, only 6% of the respondents reports that this item does not
apply for apprentices in their firm. The same critique holds for item 15, less
than 6% of the respondents reports that this item does not apply for their
firm. So this item has little discriminative power with respect to training
input.
6Although a factor analysis assumes that the items have a normal distribution, which
is clearly not the case here, since the items have categorical scale, it can be used as an
indication for the validity of the training input categories (Bartholomew and Knott, 1999).
7If it concerns complex tasks it is a positive indicator of training input; if it concerns
simple tasks it is a negative indicator.
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If items 1, 12, 13 and 15 would be dropped, than the category supervision
and instruction would only contain two items (14 and 16) which have a low
correlation. In the category time for formal learning activities there would
remain two items as well but these have a high correlation (items 10 and
11). As both items refer to time and occasion apprentices have to perform
the practical assignments they may correlate with item 14 which refers to
time and occasion the supervisor has for training the apprentice. We could
thus drop item 16 and form a new category time for formal learning and
instruction with items 10, 11, 14. A factor analysis shows that items 10,
11 and 14 indeed measure the same underlying construct while item 16 does
not.
A factor analysis on the items in the category learning content of pro-
duction tasks suggests that item 7 should be deleted as well, as this analysis
turns up two factors the first with high loadings on item 6, 8 and 9 and a
second with a high loading on item 7.
Finally a factor analysis on the remaining items in the category complexity
of production tasks suggests that there are two factors. The first factor has
positive loadings on all items although items 4 and 5 have somewhat higher
loadings than items 2 and 3. The second factor has positive loadings on items
2 and 3 and negative loadings on 4 and 5. A possible explanation for this is
that these items not only explain the complexity of the tasks the apprentices
has to fulfill8 (the first factor) but also whether apprentices perform any
productive tasks at all, irrespective of the complexity of these tasks. The
first factor is a measure for training input, the second is not. Therefore I will
only consider the first factor.
To summarise we now have three categories namely complexity of produc-
tion tasks with items 2, 3, 4 and 5, learning content of production tasks with
items 6, 8 and 9 and time for formal learning and instruction with items 10,
11 and 14 (see Table 8.6). To obtain training input scores for each category,
it will be assumed that each item and each score have equal weigh.9 So
8In which case the positive effect of complex tasks on training input is bigger than the
negative effect of simple tasks.
9The factor scores are no reliable weights because the items do not have a normal
distribution. Alternatively we could estimate a logit-probit latent variable model for poly-
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the average item score within each category is taken as the training input
measure for that category.
Table 8.6: New training input categories
Complexity of production tasks
2. Apprentices can usefully be employed to carry out activities that
qualified employees dislike*
3. Apprentices generally carry out simple support activities*
4. Apprentices are fully integrated in all operations
5. Apprentices carry out the same tasks as qualified colleagues
Learning content of production tasks
6. Apprentices mostly carry out activities from which they can learn
8. Apprentices only carry out activities that are useful for their
training programme
9. The activities carried out by apprentices are adapted to their
training programme
Time for formal learning and instruction
10. Apprentices carry out their practical assignments for school mostly when it
is quiet at work*
11. Apprentices sometimes postpone their practical assignments for school when
it is too busy at work*
14. Guidance and instruction of apprentices takes place
mostly when the practical trainer has less to do himself*
*=Negative indication of training input. Scale has been reversed.
tomous data and use the conditional mean of the component score (Bartholomew and
Knott, 1999; Knott and Albanese, 1999). This method allows for different weights by item
and score. For the items in the category complexity of production tasks I estimated a two
factor model and for the items in the two other categories a one factor model. A measure
for training input in each category is obtained by taking the estimated conditional means
of the latent variables. However, due to the limited number of observations, the standard
errors of the estimates are very large. Therefore the conditional mean is not expected to
be a a more accurate measure than the average item score. For that reason I decided to
use the average item score instead.
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8.3.1 Observability of the Training
Not all aspects of the training program are equally well observed by the
apprentice or a third party. These differences in the degree of observability
allow me to test whether the relation between training motives and training
intensity depends on the observability of the training as predicted in Chapter
4. If firms give priority to production only with regard to aspects of the
training program that are difficult to observe, we would expect that the
relation between training input and training motives will be strongest for
those aspects that are the least observable.
The time for learning and instruction will, in general, be better observable
than the complexity of production tasks. Also, because it is better observable
this first aspect of the training is often regulated.10 As a result it will be
easier for a training firm to save on training costs by lowering the complexity
of production tasks than by devoting less (formal) time to learning and in-
struction. The observability of the learning content of production tasks will
be somewhere in between the observability of the complexity of production
tasks and the time for formal learning and instruction.
These expected differences in observability of the three training aspects
are indeed supported by the data. It is to be expected that the measurement
error will be higher if the training is less observable. The respondents have
different positions with respect to training. Practical trainers are in a good
position to observe all aspects of the training but this is often not true for
training co-ordinators who are remoter of the daily training practise. Re-
spondents who are less certain about a particular aspect of the training will
tend to avoid the extremes of the response scale. Although the measurement
error will increase, the variance of the input measure will thus decrease. As
expected the variance of the complexity of production tasks is lower than the
variance of the other two aspects of the training (see Table 8.7 and Figure
8.1).
Another indication of the observability of the different aspects of the
training, is their effect on the firm’s training reputation. It is very likely that
10Only those aspects of the training program that are verifiable can be successfully
regulated.
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Table 8.7: Mean and standard deviation of training input measures
Input measure Mean Standard deviation N
Complexity of production tasks 2.89 0.56 896
Learning content of production tasks 2.70 0.62 906
Time for formal learning and instruction 2.73 0.79 892
especially those aspects of the training that are easily observable by a third
party determine the training reputation. An indicator of the firm’s training
reputation is the probability to win the award of the best training firm within
the sector. To stimulate good training practices in each sector of industry,
the training bodies yearly elect the best training firm in the sector. In the
survey it was asked whether the firm would make a chance to be nominated
in these elections. Table 8.8 shows that 10% of the training firms estimates
this chance to be great. Another 20% of the respondents does not know
whether the firm makes any chance. The idea is that firms that have a good
reputation for training will perceive this chance as higher than other firms.
I estimated a probit model to explain the probability that the chance to be
nominated is perceived as great relative to the categories fair, small and don’t
know. In addition to the training input measures, I included a wide range
of control variables. Table 8.9 gives the significance of the training input
measures.11 The complexity of production tasks has no effect on the chance
to be nominated but the other two input measures, the learning content of
production tasks and time for formal learning and instruction, do affect this
chance. This might either mean that, in the view of the firm and/or the
board for vocational education, the complexity of production tasks does not
really matter for overall training input or that this aspect of training input
is not very well observable and therefore does not contribute to the training
reputation. If the latter is indeed the case, firms may put too much accent
on the observable aspects of the training and neglect the aspects of training
that are less easily observed by a third party, especially if the firm has no
investment motives for apprenticeship training.
11Table 8.29 in the appendix to this chapter gives the full estimation results.
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Table 8.8: Subjective chance to become the best training firm in the sector
Sector Chance
great fair small unknown
% % % %
Construction industry 8 29 45 18
Printing industry 9 18 53 20
Metal industry 9 23 46 22
Hospitals and nursing homes 13 41 27 19
Total 10 28 42 20
n=919, Chi2, P=0.000
Note: The survey question reads ‘Every year, one company in each sector is chosen
as best apprenticeship company. What chance do you think your company has to
be nominated?’.
Table 8.9: Chance to be nominated for the best training firm award explained:
The effects of training input and expected future benefits
Complexity of production tasks Chi2(1)=0.01
Learning content of production tasks Chi2(1)=17.22***
Time for formal learning and instruction Chi2(1)=10.89***
Notes: The effects of training input are tested against a model where only
background variables explain the chance to be nominated.
* significant at 10% level,** significant at 5% level,*** significant at 1% level.
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Figure 8.1: Densities of the training input measures
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8.4 Measures for Training Motives
Measures for training motives that I will consider are the factors that de-
termine the firm’s expected future benefits from training, namely the degree
of firm-specificity, the degree of monopsony power and the exogenous quit
rate and a number of direct measures for current and/or future benefits from
training.
Degree of Firm-Specificity
To measure the degree of firm-specificity I included two questions in the sur-
vey. First, the degree of firm-specificity was asked directly. Table 8.10 gives
an overview of the results. The degree of firm-specificity of apprenticeship
training is quite high in most firms. More than 40% of the respondents re-
ports a firm-specificity of more than 30%. Only 8% says that apprentices
do not learn any firm-specific skills and knowledge. The degree of firm-
specificity does not vary much between the sectors. Only the construction
industry reports on average a lower degree of firm-specificity. The most im-
portant firm-specific knowledge the apprentice learns is the knowledge of
specific operational processes and procedures (see Table 8.11).
Table 8.10: The degree of firm-specificity of apprenticeship training
Sector Firm-specificity
0 1-10% 11-20% 21-30% >30%
% % % % %
Construction 12 15 19 19 35
Printing 9 12 20 15 44
Metal 5 12 20 19 44
Hospitals/Nursing homes 7 14 21 17 41
Total 8 13 20 18 41
n=869, Chi2, P=0.427
Note: The survey question reads ‘Some knowledge and skills that employees have
is specific for the company in which they work. Examples are the company culture,
its client base, and specific equipment. Which part of the knowledge and skills that
apprentices acquire in your company is specific for your company?’.
126
8.4. MEASURES FOR TRAINING MOTIVES
Table 8.11: Most important type of firm-specific skills and knowledge learnt during
the apprenticeship
Skill type %
Knowledge of the company culture 18
Operation of specific machines and equipment 21
Knowledge of specific operational processes and procedures 38
Knowledge of the client base 13
Knowledge of specific company products 10
Knowledge of company computer programs 1
n=820
Note: The survey question reads ‘I will mention various types of company-specific
knowledge and skills. Which of these is the most important one that apprentices
learn in your company?’.
A second measure for firm-specificity is the number of weeks a worker
who was trained for the same qualification in an external firm would need to
become as productive as an internally trained worker. In 50% of the firms this
is 8 weeks or less (Table 8.12). This result seems to contradict the high degree
of firm-specificity reported through the direct question. Table 8.13 gives the
median and the mean of the necessary number of weeks by the degree of
firm-specificity from the direct question. The median and mean number of
weeks increases with the degree of firm-specificity but the standard deviation
is very high. This suggests that the question on the number of weeks is not
answered very accurately. Also, note that the number of missing values is
very high for this question (19%) indicating that the question was difficult
to answer.
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Table 8.12: Time needed for an externally trained worker to reach the same pro-
ductivity as an internally trained worker (in weeks)
Sector Percentile number of weeks
p10 p25 p50 p75 p90
Construction 1 4 6 10 25
Printing 3 4 8 12 26
Metal 3 4 8 20 30
Hospitals/Nursing homes 2 4 6 10 16
Total 2 4 8 12 26
n=746
Note: The survey question reads ‘If your company were to employ qualified em-
ployees trained as apprentices by another company, how many weeks would it take
for them to achieve the same productivity level as employees trained as apprentices
in your company?’.
Table 8.13: Time needed for an externally trained worker to reach the same produc-
tivity as an internally trained worker (number of weeks) by level of firm-specificity
of the training
Firm-specificity Weeks
Median Mean St. dev.
0% 4 6.59 8.50
1-10% 6 7.94 8.75
11-20% 8 11.46 14.45
21-30% 8 13.14 15.97
More than 30% 8 12.01 13.47
Unknown 6 9.57 10.92
Total 8 11.07 13.35
n=746
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Degree of Monopsony Power
For the degree of monopsony power I will consider three measures. The first
measure is the number of firms with similar economic activities as the train-
ing firm in a geographical area of 25 km around (see also Harhoff and Kane
(1997)). These similar firms have the same skills needs as the training firm
and therefore are the potential future employers of the training firm’s appren-
tices who do not want to leave the region. Table 8.14 gives the percentiles
of the number of firms by sector of industry. Note that this variable mainly
gives an indication of differences in monopsony power within sectors. Differ-
ences in monopsony power between sectors depend not only on the number
of competitors but also on the size of the competitors (number of employees).
For example, for hospitals and nursing homes the median number of com-
petitors is much smaller than in the other sectors but the average number of
employees in hospitals and nursing homes is much higher.
Table 8.14: Number of similar firms in the region (25 km radius)
Sector Percentiles of the number of firms
p10 p25 p50 p75 p90
Construction 10 20 40 80 100
Printing 3 10 30 70 150
Metal 4 10 20 50 100
Hospitals/Nursing homes 1 3 6 12 25
n=727
Note: The survey question reads ‘How many other construction compa-
nies/graphics firms/metal firms/similar care institutions are there in your region
(roughly a 25-km radius)?’.
Another measure for monopsony power I will consider is the urbanisation
grade of the place of business (Table 8.15). The urbanisation grade is mea-
sured by the number of addresses in a surrounding of 1 km2 of the place of
business. The higher the degree of urbanisation, the less monopsony power
the training firm will have. The absolute number of competitors does not
necessarily depend on the urbanisation grade, as there are differences in the
total number of firms by sector.12 Therefore, when considering the relation
12For example, there are much more construction companies than nursing homes but
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between the two measures, the number of similar firms and the urbanisation
grade, a correction has to be made for sector. When correcting for sector the
number of similar firms increases with the urbanisation grade. Furthermore
I considered the relation between urbanisation grade and a missing value for
the number of similar firms. As expected, respondents of firms in an area
with a low urbanisation grade have less difficulties to give the number of
similar firms in the region than respondents of other areas. While in total
the number of similar firms is missing for 21% of the responding firms, this
is the case for only 12% of the responding firms in an area with a low or very
low urbanisation grade.
Table 8.15: Urbanisation grade of place of business
Sector Urbanisation Grade
very high high moderate low very low
% % % % %
Construction industry 7 19 20 32 22
Printing industry 18 29 20 21 13
Metal industry 4 19 22 36 18
Hospitals/ nursing homes 17 34 22 15 12
Total 11 25 21 26 16
n=919, Chi2, P=0.000
Note: With more than 2,500 addresses in a surrounding of 1 km2 the urbanisation
grade is classified as very high, between 2,500 and 1,500 addresses as high, between
1,500 and 1,000 addresses as moderate, between 1,000 and 500 addresses as low
and with less than 500 addresses as very low (Source: CBS-Statline).
A final measure for the degree of competition is the ease with which the
firm’s apprentices will find a similar job in an external firm in the same region
once they have completed their training. More than 30% of the respondents
thinks that apprentices would face some difficulties to find a similar job in an-
other firm (Table 8.16). There are, however, considerable differences between
economic sectors. For workers trained in hospitals and nursing homes it is
much easier to find a similar job in the region than for workers trained in the
printing industry. Nevertheless when comparing this measure for monopsony
power with the number of similar firms in the surrounding or the urbanisa-
nursing homes are found more often in areas with a high urbanisation grade.
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tion grade we find (1) that it is easier to find a similar job when the mean
number of firms in the region is higher and (2) the percentage of firms that
reports that it is very easy to find a similar job increases with the urbanisa-
tion grade (Tables 8.17 and 8.18). So, the various measures for monopsony
power, considered here, all point into the same direction.
Table 8.16: Possibility to find a similar job in the region (25 km radius)
Sector Easy to find a similar job?
very reasonably fairly very
easy easy difficult difficult
% % % %
Construction industry 33 45 16 6
Printing industry 21 35 26 18
Metal industry 30 48 17 6
Hospitals and nursing homes 56 39 4 1
Total 36 42 15 7
n=870, Chi2, P=0.000
Note: The survey question reads ‘Is it easy for employees who have been trained in
your company through the apprenticeship system to find a similar job at another
construction company/ graphics firm/ metal firm/ care institution in the same
region (roughly a 25-km radius)?’.
Table 8.17: Number of similar firms in the region by the ease to find a similar job
in the region (25 km radius)
Similar job Number of firms
mean st. dev.
Very easy 156.28 1075.77
Reasonably easy 69.16 589.98
Fairly difficult 34.90 40.06
Very difficult 48.63 72.36
Unknown 58.33 180.18
Total 93.06 740.13
n=727
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Table 8.18: Possibility to find a similar job by urbanisation grade of place of
business
Similar job Urbanisation Grade
very high high moderate low very low
% % % % %
Very easy 42 37 34 32 28
Reasonably easy 36 37 39 42 46
Fairly difficult 12 13 12 16 16
Very difficult 6 8 8 5 7
Unknown 4 5 7 6 3
n=870, Chi2, P=0.532
The Quit Rate
To measure the exogenous quit rate, I included a question on the chance that
an apprentice trained in the firm would want to keep working in the firm
after completing the training. However, this question could not be asked in
all cases. In many firms, apprentices are given a permanent contract already
during the training period. During the try-out of the questionnaire it became
clear that respondents assume that apprentices with a permanent contract
always want to stay in the firm after completing the training.13 Therefore
the question concerning the chance that an apprentice wants to keep working
in the firm has been posed only to firms in which apprentices do not have a
permanent contract.
Table 8.19 shows that in 29% of the responding firms apprentices have
a permanent contract. Among hospitals and nursing homes the number of
companies that offer apprentices a permanent contract is even higher (59%).
Only in the construction industry the number of firms that offer apprentices
a permanent contract during the training period is very small (13%). This is
related to the fact that in this sector most apprentices do not have a learning
contract with a single firm but with a training co-operation that places the
apprentices at the affiliated firms.
13In fact, most respondents thought the same question was asked two times which lead
to irritation.
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Table 8.19: Type of contract during the apprenticeship
Sector Type of contract
Learning&Employment Learning Training
co-ope-
ration
Permanent Temporary Total
% % % % %
Construction industry 13 9 22 9 69
Printing industry 31 34 65 24 10
Metal industry 36 43 81 15 4
Hospitals/nursing homes 59 30 79 7 3
Total 35 29 66 13 21
n=903
Note: The survey question reads ‘What type of contract do apprentices usually
have in your company? [if both a learning contract and an employment contract]
Is this usually a permanent employment contract or a temporary employment
contract?’.
Most firms estimate the chance that an apprentice without a permanent
contract wants to stay quite high. Nearly half of the respondents estimated
this chance to be between 75% and 100% and only 25% of the respondents
estimated this chance to be lower than 75% (see Table 8.20). In hospitals
and nursing homes the chance that a worker will stay is estimated somewhat
higher than in the other sectors considered here.
Not only the quit rate but also the total time the worker stays in the
training firms after completing the training is an important determinant of
the expected future benefits. I included a question about the average time
an internally trained worker who has accepted a job offer in the training firm
or had a permanent contract during the training period already, would stay
with the training firm after completing the training. In about 60% of the
responding firms the average duration is more than 5 years (Table 8.21).
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Table 8.20: Chance the apprentice wants to keep working in the firm (apprentices
without a permanent contract)
Sector Chance
≤75% 75-100% 100%
% % %
Construction industry 24 46 29
Printing industry 34 39 28
Metal industry 26 52 22
Hospitals and nursing homes 12 59 29
Total 25 48 27
n=575, Chi2, P=0.005
Note: The survey question reads ‘How great is the chance that an apprentice who
is trained in your company wants to keep working in your company after having
completed the training programme?’.
Table 8.21: Average time an apprentice stays in the training firm after completing
the training (conditional on staying)
Sector Number or years
0-2 3-4 >5 not applicable
% % % %
Construction industry 11 18 66 5
Printing industry 13 19 54 14
Metal industry 7 24 55 14
Hospitals and nursing homes 6 27 61 6
Total 9 22 59 10
n=738, Chi2, P=0.002
Note: The survey question reads ‘The next question concerns apprentices who
entered into employment with your company after having completed the training
programme. On average, how many years do such former apprentices remain with
your company?’.
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Current or Future Benefits?
The degree of firm-specificity, the degree of monopsony power and the ex-
pected quit rate all affect future training benefits. To measure whether firms
indeed have future benefits from apprenticeship training it was also asked
whether apprentices are financially attractive for the firm. It was asked how
interesting apprentices are if costs are weight against the benefits in general
and if all apprentices were to leave the training firm after completing the
training. The idea is that if the apprenticeship system is financially attrac-
tive only if apprentices stay after the training, the firm must have future
training benefits. Firms for which the apprenticeship system is attractive
even if all apprentices leave must have some current benefits that compen-
sate the training costs.
For more than 90% of the firms, the apprenticeship system is slightly or
very interesting from a financial perspective (Table 8.22). If apprentices all
were to leave after completing the training the apprenticeship system would
be attractive for less than 30% of the training firms, meaning that future
benefits are important for most firms.
Does this mean that firms always want to retain apprentices after the
training? Table 8.19 showed that 35% of the firms offers apprentices a per-
manent contract during the apprenticeship period already. From Table 8.23 it
becomes clear that among those firms that do not offer a permanent contract
already during the apprenticeship, a quarter certainly offers a continuation
of the appointment after the training. In 35% of the firms, the chance on
a continuation of the contract is between 75% and 100% and in 40% of the
firms it is less than 75%. So although for most firms apprenticeship are only
financially attractive if the apprentice is to stay in the training firms after
completing the training, it is not certain at forehand, that all apprentices are
offered a continuation of their contract. One reason might be that firms train
apprentices to select the best workers and only offer the best apprentices a
continuation (Franz and Soskice, 1995; Acemoglu and Pischke, 1999a). Table
8.24 shows that the probability that the apprentice is suitable to continue
working in the firm is for most firms greater than the chance that the firm in-
deed offers employment. This means that the screening mechanism is not the
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only explanation. Firms face uncertainty with respect to the future labour
demand they have. Therefore they are not certain that they can keep all ap-
prentices that they train. Nevertheless it can be expected that the higher the
chance a firm wants to retain the apprentice after the training, the higher the
expected future returns will be, all other things equal. Therefore the chance
that the firm offers the apprentice a continuation of his appointment is also
an indication for future benefits.
Table 8.22: How interesting are apprentices for the firm if costs are weight against
the benefits in general and if the apprentice were to go after having completed the
training
Sector
very slightly slightly very
interesting interesting uninteresting uninteresting
In general % % % %
Construction 20 67 8 5
Printing 33 58 8 2
Metal 37 54 7 2
Hospitals 48 46 3 2
Total 35 56 6 3
Apprentice quits
Construction 7 21 28 44
Printing 9 22 22 47
Metal 5 17 26 52
Hospitals 11 24 31 33
Total 8 21 27 44
n=883, Chi2, P=0.004
Note: The survey question reads ‘How interesting are apprentices for your company
if you weigh the costs against the benefits? and How interesting are apprentices
for your company if they were to go and work for another company after having
completed their training?’.
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Table 8.23: Chance the apprentice is offered an appointment at the firm (appren-
tices without a permanent contract)
Sector Chance
≤75% 75-100% 100%
% % %
Construction industry 44 31 26
Printing industry 58 23 20
Metal industry 29 49 22
Hospitals and nursing homes 24 35 40
Total 40 35 26
n=569, Chi2, P=0.000
Note: The survey question reads ‘How great is the chance that an apprentice who
is trained in your company is offered an appointment at your company after having
completed the training programme?’.
Table 8.24: Chance the apprentice is suitable to continue working in the firm
(apprentices without a permanent contract)
Sector Chance
≤75% 75-100% 100%
% % %
Construction industry 33 35 32
Printing industry 29 35 35
Metal industry 24 46 30
Hospitals and nursing homes 7 35 59
Total 25 38 37
n=585, Chi2, P=0.000
Note: The survey question reads ‘How great is the chance that an apprentice who
is trained in your company is suitable to continue working in your company after
having completed the training programme?’.
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8.5 Determinants of Training Input
The three measures for training input, discussed in section 8.3, have been
regressed on the measures for training motives; the degree of firm-specificity,
the degree of monopsony power, the quit rate and the incidence of current
and/or future benefits from apprenticeship training. Table 8.25 gives an
overview of all the measures for training motives included in the regression.
For firm-specificity I included a dummy variable for a firm-specificity of
more than 10%14 and dummy variables for more or less than two months
time needed for an external worker to reach the same productivity as an
internally trained worker.
Monopsony power is represented by a dummy variable for less than 10
competitors in the region,15 a dummy variable for a high or very high urban-
isation grade and a dummy variable indicating that it will be difficult to find
a similar job in another firm in the region.
For the quit rate I included dummy’s for the chance that the apprentice
will stay and dummy variables for the average time the former apprentice
will stay in the training firm after completing the training.
Finally I included a dummy variable indicating that the firm has only
future benefits16 and dummy variables for the chance that the firm offers
the apprentice a continuation of his appointment after completing the train-
ing.1718
14Including separate dummy variables for all response categories separately does not
change the results.
15I also included a dummy variable for less competitors than the first quartile in the
sector but this variable has no explanatory power.
16This is the case if the apprenticeship system is only financially attractive for the firm
if the apprentice is going to stay after completing the training.
17The chance that an apprentice is suitable to stay is not included in the regressions
because it is too highly correlated with the chance that the apprentice is offered employ-
ment.
18For both the chance that the apprentice wants to stay and the chance that the ap-
prentice is offered employment after completing the training, the 100% category includes
permanent contracts. So the coefficient of the dummy variable for a permanent contract
during the apprenticeship has to be interpreted relative to the 100% categories of these
two variables.
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As discussed in section 8.4 some questions of the survey were not very
well answered and so the variables based on these questions contain a lot of
missing values. To save on observations the missing values for these variables
are included in the regression as a separate dummy category.19
Table 8.25: Measures for training motives
Degree of firm-specificity
Dummy for firm-specificity 10% or more
Dummy for ≤2 months needed to reach productivity
Dummy for > 2 months needed to reach productivity (reference)
Dummy for number of months needed to reach productivity unknown
Degree of monopsony power
Dummy for more than 10 competitors (reference)
Dummy for less than 10 competitors
Dummy for number of competitors is unknown
Dummy for difficult to find a job
Dummy for high urbanisation grade
Quit rate
Dummy for permanent contract
Dummy for chance the apprentice wants to stay 100%
Dummy for chance the apprentice wants to stay between 75% and 100%
Dummy for chance the apprentice wants to stay below 75% (reference)
Dummy for 0-2 years in training firm after completing the training
Dummy for 3-4 years in training firm after completing the training
Dummy for ≥5 years in training firm after completing the training (reference)
Dummy for number of years unknown
Current or future benefits?
Dummy for only future training benefits
Dummy for chance the apprentice is offered employment 100%
Dummy for chance the apprentice is offered employment 75% and 100%
Dummy for chance the apprentice is offered employment below 75% (reference)
19This is the case for the number of competitors in the region, the time needed for an
externally trained worker to reach the same productivity as an internally trained worker
and the average number of years a stayer remains with the training firm.
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Firm characteristics included in the regressions are economic sector, firm
size, a dummy for no apprentices at the time of the survey,20 a dummy for
firms with only one apprentice, a dummy for the function of the respondent,
dummy’s for the type of contract, dummy’s for the qualification level of
the training and a dummy indicating whether the interview took place by
internet or not.
Table 8.26 gives the joint significance of the training motive measures.21
The first measure for training input, the complexity of production tasks, is
clearly affected by training motives. The explained variance increases by
more than 50%. The most important factor is the degree of monopsony
power. The degree of firm-specificity does not affect the complexity of pro-
duction tasks. This suggests either that the degree of firm-specificity is not an
important determinant of the expected future benefits or that the complexity
of production tasks can only be high if the training is little firm-specific. The
latter is not very plausible, however.
For the other training input measures, the learning content of production
tasks and the time for formal learning and instruction, training motives seem
to have little impact. For the learning content of production tasks only the
firm-specificity of the training has a positive impact whereas for time for
formal learning and instruction only the degree of monopsony power matters.
One reason why training motives matter mostly for the complexity of pro-
duction tasks and not for the learning content or the time for formal learning
and instruction is that this first aspect of the training is more difficult to ob-
serve. As explained in section 8.3, the training firm can more easily cheat
on aspects of the training programme that are difficult to observe. For that
reason, firms will only have an incentive to pay attention to these aspects of
the training if there is a future benefit of doing so.
20This concerns firms that employed apprentices only during the past two years.
21Tables 8.30, 8.31 and 8.32 in the appendix to this chapter give the full estimation
results for the three training input indicators.
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Table 8.26: Training input explained: tests on the effect of training motives
Complexity Learning Time for
production content learning and
tasks production instruction
tasks
Firm-specificity F(3,685)=0.88 F(3,684)=2.35* F(3,676)=0.72
Monopsony power F(4,685)=4.03*** F(4,684)=0.55 F(4,676)=2.19*
Quit rate F(6,685)=2.71** F(6,684)=1.59 F(6,676)=0.76
Current/future benefits F(3,685)=2.53* F(3,684)=0.89 F(3,676)=0.59
* significant at 10% level
** significant at 5% level
*** significant at 1% level
8.6 Training Input and Training Output
In this section, I will test whether training input matters for training out-
comes. The subjective chance that an apprentice in the firm will obtain a
diploma is used as an output indicator. In firms that have high training in-
put this chance is expected to be higher than in firms that have low training
input. Table 8.27 shows that less than 15% of the firms estimates this chance
below 75%. About half of the firms estimates this chance between 75% and
100% and nearly one third says that this chance is 100%.
I estimated the relation between the chance on a diploma and the input
quality measures by use of an interval regression.22 Table 8.28 shows that the
subjective chance to obtain a diploma is strongly affected by the complexity
of production tasks but not by the learning content of productions tasks or the
time for learning and instruction. So although, as the results of this chapter
show, it does not pay for the firm to pay attention to this first aspect if it
has no investment motives, it is still an important aspect of training input.
One might worry that the relation between training input and training
output is overestimated because the best training firms are able to attract
the best apprentices. However, apprentices will choose their apprenticeship
22Table 8.27 gives the full estimation results.
141
CHAPTER 8. TRAINING INTENSITY AND TRAINING MOTIVES II
place based on the observable aspects of the training programme, and the
effect found here is based on aspects of the training that are unobservable for
apprentices at the moment they start their training. Nevertheless to control
for selection, I included the chance that the firm thinks an apprentice is
suitable to stay in the training firm after completing the training as a proxy
for apprentice ability. This does not alter the results.
Table 8.27: Subjective chance that an apprentice obtains a diploma
Sector Chance
≤75% 75-100% 100%
% % %
Construction industry 16 49 36
Printing industry 12 48 40
Metal industry 18 54 28
Hospitals and nursing homes 16 61 22
Total 16 54 31
n=887, Chi2, P=0.004
Note: The survey question reads ‘How great is the chance that an apprentice who
is trained in your company obtains a diploma?’.
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Table 8.28: Chance to obtain a diploma explained: The effects of training input
and expected future benefits
Complexity of production tasks Chi2(1)=6.50***
Learning content of production tasks Chi2(1)=2.31
Time for learning and instruction Chi2(1)=1.48
Firm-specificity Chi2(3)=5.37
Monopsony power Chi2(4)=4.12
Quit rate Chi2(6)=52.74***
Current/future term benefits Chi2(3)=2.08
Notes: The effects of training input are tested against a model where only back-
ground variables explain the chance to obtain a diploma and the effects of expected
future benefits are tested against a model where both background characteristics
and the training input indicators explain this chance. * significant at 10% level,
** significant at 5% level, *** significant at 1% level.
8.7 Conclusions
In this chapter, I tested whether there is a relation between a firm’s training
motives and training intensity. I conducted a survey among training firms
in the construction industry, the printing industry, the metal industry and
the care sector to obtain measures for both the training input and training
motives. I constructed input measures for three aspects of the training place,
namely the complexity of production tasks, the learning content of production
tasks and the formal time for learning and instruction. For the firm’s training
motives I considered the degree of firm-specificity, the degree of monopsony
power, the quit rate and a direct measure for the incidence of future benefits
from apprenticeship training.
I found that the complexity of production tasks does not affect the firm’s
training reputation, measured by the chance to be nominated for the elections
of the best training firm in the sector, while the two other aspects of training
that are more easily to observe, the learning content of production tasks and
the formal time for learning and instruction do matter for the firms’ s training
reputation.
Furthermore I found that training motives matter mostly for that aspect
of the training input that is most difficult to observe by third parties, namely
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the complexity of production tasks. For the learning content of production
tasks and the time for learning and instruction there is less evidence that
training motives matter for training input. I also found that the complexity
of productions tasks, is the most effective training input, as it has the highest
impact on the output from training, the chance to obtain a diploma.
So, the complexity of production tasks is the most effective part of training
input, but firms only have an incentive to pay attention to this aspect if they
have investment motives. Firms without investment motives tend to pay
more attention to the aspects of the training that are easily observable, but
less effective in terms of training output, because these aspects contribute to
their reputation.
The results of this chapter again suggest that regulation of the training
is not sufficient to guarantee good training if the firm does not have invest-
ment motives. Regulation will only be possible for the observable parts of
the training while precisely the unobservable aspects of the training seem to
be very important determinants of training output. It is therefore important
that policies aimed at increasing the number of apprenticeship places do not
stimulate firms without investment motives to participate in the apprentice-
ship system.
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8.8 Appendix to Chapter 8
Table 8.29: Probit analysis for the probability that the chance
to be nominated as the best training firm in the sector is
perceived as great
(1) (2)
Complexity of production tasks −0.007
(0.096)
Learning content of production tasks 0.343
(0.083)∗∗∗
Time for learning and instruction 0.229
(0.070)∗∗∗
Construction industry −0.187 −0.266
(0.196) (0.201)∗
Printing industry −0.175 −0.159
(0.183) (0.187)
Metal industry −0.453 −0.501
(0.222)∗∗ (0.230)∗∗
Firm size < 10 workers −0.129 −0.014
(0.255) (0.261)
Firm size 10-99 workers −0.051 −0.024
(0.196) (0.199)
Firm size 100-499 workers 0.214 0.209
(0.195) (0.197)
No apprentices −0.518 −0.536
(0.175)∗∗∗ (0.179)∗∗∗
1 apprentice −0.400 −0.374
(0.136)∗∗∗ (0.139)∗∗∗
Employment and learning contract −0.055 −0.021
(0.168) (0.172)
Learning contract −0.231 −0.265
(0.207) (0.210)
Practical trainer 0.088 0.052
(0.138) (0.142)
Co-ordinator 0.136 0.086
(0.138) (0.141)
Surveyed by internet 0.153 0.160
(0.134) (0.136)
Q13 refers to level 2 0.134 0.093
(0.218) (0.225)
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Table 8.29: continued
(1) (2)
Q13 refers to level 4 −0.290 −0.309
(0.304) (0.306)
Constant 0.011 −1.522
(0.248) (0.458)∗∗∗
Observations 700 700
Standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10% level
** significant at 5% level
*** significant at 1% level
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Table 8.30: Training input explained (OLS): Complexity of
production tasks
(1) (2)
Firm-specificity 10% or more 0.056
(0.051)
≤ 2 months needed to reach productivity 0.063
(0.048)
Number of months unknown 0.045
(0.068)
Less than 10 competitors −0.042
(0.055)
Number of competitors is unknown 0.097
(0.058)∗
Difficult to find a job −0.012
(0.052)
High urbanisation grade −0.161
(0.046)∗∗∗
Permanent contract 0.256
(0.078)∗∗∗
Chance apprentice wants to stay 75%-100% 0.060
(0.071)
Chance the apprentice wants to stay 100% 0.022
(0.082)
0-2 years in training firm 0.043
(0.086)
3-4 years in training firm −0.063
(0.056)
Number of years in training firm unknown −0.072
(0.055)
Only future training benefits −0.003
(0.044)
Chance employment offer 75%-100% 0.099
(0.066)
Chance employment offer 100% 0.202
(0.074)∗∗∗
Construction industry 0.109 0.096
(0.083) (0.086)
Printing industry 0.038 0.082
(0.077) (0.082)
Metal industry −0.140 −0.152
(0.090) (0.093)
continued on next page
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Table 8.30: continued
(1) (2)
Firm size < 10 workers −0.023 −0.010
(0.106) (0.109)
Firm size 10-99 workers −0.141 −0.151
(0.083)∗ (0.085)∗
Firm size 100-499 workers −0.046 −0.037
(0.082) (0.083)
No apprentices −0.196 −0.202
(0.071)∗∗∗ (0.072)∗∗∗
1 apprentice −0.011 −0.016
(0.056) (0.055)
Employment and learning contract 0.087 0.049
(0.071) (0.076)
Learning contract −0.045 −0.020
(0.084) (0.084)
Practical trainer 0.104 0.083
(0.057)∗ (0.057)
Co-ordinator 0.016 0.016
(0.058) (0.058)
Surveyed by internet 0.165 0.155
(0.057)∗∗∗ (0.059)∗∗∗
Q13 refers to level 2 −0.082 −0.091
(0.087) (0.087)
Q13 refers to level 4 −0.024 0.015
(0.130) (0.130)
Constant 2.900 2.756
(0.105)∗∗∗ (0.144)∗∗∗
Observations 717 717
Adjusted R-squared 0.05 0.08
Standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10% level
** significant at 5% level
*** significant at 1% level
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Table 8.31: Training input explained (OLS): Learning con-
tent of production tasks
(1) (2)
Firm-specificity 10% or more 0.145
(0.059)∗∗
≤2 months needed to reach productivity 0.070
(0.055)
Number of months unknown 0.029
(0.079)
Less than 10 competitors 0.037
(0.064)
Number of competitors is unknown −0.014
(0.066)
Difficult to find a job −0.079
(0.060)
High urbanisation grade −0.014
(0.053)
Permanent contract −0.095
(0.090)
Chance apprentice wants to stay 75%-100% 0.024
(0.082)
Chance apprentice wants to stay 100% 0.153
(0.094)
0-2 years in training firm 0.049
(0.100)
3-4 years in training firm −0.079
(0.064)
Number of years in training firm unknown −0.064
(0.064)
Only future training benefits −0.016
(0.051)
Chance employment offer 75%-100% −0.012
(0.076)
Chance employment offer 100% −0.122
(0.085)
Construction industry −0.013 −0.002
(0.095) (0.099)
Printing industry −0.040 −0.035
(0.088) (0.095)
Metal industry −0.101 −0.094
(0.103) (0.107)
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Table 8.31: continued
(1) (2)
Firm size <10 workers −0.248 −0.242
(0.121)∗∗ (0.127)∗
Firm size 10-99 workers −0.082 −0.080
(0.095) (0.098)
Firm size 100-499 workers −0.028 −0.024
(0.094) (0.096)
No apprentices 0.079 0.094
(0.081) (0.083)
1 apprentice 0.030 0.041
(0.064) (0.064)
Employment and learning contract −0.070 −0.008
(0.081) (0.088)
Learning contract 0.122 0.144
(0.096) (0.097)
Practical trainer 0.041 0.030
(0.065) (0.066)
Co-ordinator 0.064 0.054
(0.066) (0.067)
Surveyed by internet −0.001 0.010
(0.065) (0.068)
Q13 refers to level 2 0.147 0.146
(0.099) (0.100)
Q13 refers to level 4 −0.035 −0.021
(0.146) (0.148)
Constant 2.770 2.640
(0.120)∗∗∗ (0.167)∗∗∗
Observations 716 716
Adjusted R-squared 0.00 0.01
Standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10% level
** significant at 5% level
*** significant at 1% level
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Table 8.32: Training input explained (OLS): Time for learn-
ing and instruction
(1) (2)
Firm-specificity 10% or more 0.035
(0.072)
≤2 months needed to reach productivity 0.030
(0.067)
Number of months unknown 0.133
(0.096)
Less than 10 competitors 0.157
(0.078)∗∗
Number of competitors is unknown −0.047
(0.081)
Difficult to find a job −0.117
(0.073)
High urbanisation grade 0.082
(0.065)
Permanent contract 0.137
(0.109)
Chance apprentice wants to stay 75%-100% 0.069
(0.100)
Chance apprentice wants to stay 100% 0.096
(0.115)
0-2 years in training firm 0.045
(0.121)
3-4 years in training firm −0.107
(0.079)
Number of years in training firm unknown −0.076
(0.078)
Only future training benefits 0.053
(0.063)
Chance employment offer 75%-100% 0.089
(0.093)
Chance employment offer 100% 0.060
(0.104)
Construction industry 0.364 0.408
(0.115)∗∗∗ (0.122)∗∗∗
Printing industry −0.095 −0.051
(0.108) (0.116)
Metal industry 0.188 0.237
(0.126) (0.132)∗
continued on next page
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Table 8.32: continued
(1) (2)
Firm size < 10 workers −0.099 0.013
(0.148) (0.155)
Firm size 10-99 workers 0.004 0.079
(0.117) (0.121)
Firm size 100-499 workers 0.061 0.111
(0.116) (0.119)
No apprentices −0.106 −0.088
(0.098) (0.101)
1 apprentice −0.237 −0.250
(0.078)∗∗∗ (0.078)∗∗∗
Employment and learning contract −0.040 −0.066
(0.098) (0.107)
Learning contract −0.041 −0.031
(0.117) (0.119)
Practical trainer 0.151 0.138
(0.079)∗ (0.080)∗
Co-ordinator 0.188 0.174
(0.081)∗∗ (0.082)∗∗
Surveyed by internet 0.003 −0.019
(0.079) (0.083)
Q13 refers to level 2 0.059 0.067
(0.120) (0.122)
Q13 refers to level 4 0.067 0.063
(0.181) (0.184)
Constant 2.566 2.281
(0.147)∗∗∗ (0.203)∗∗∗
Observations 708 708
Adjusted R-squared 0.07 0.07
Standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10% level
** significant at 5% level
*** significant at 1% level
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Table 8.33: Chance to obtain a diploma (interval regression)
(1) (2) (3)
Complexity of production tasks 2.865 1.935
(1.124)∗∗∗ (1.102)∗∗
Learning content of production tasks 1.446 1.335
(0.953)∗ (0.924)∗
Time for learning and instruction 0.994 0.864
(0.812) (0.783)
Firm-specificity 10% or more −1.364
(1.414)
≤ 2 months to reach productivity 0.213
(1.335)
Number of months unknown −3.396
(1.902)∗∗
Less than 10 competitors −0.534
(1.549)
Number of competitors unknown −1.989
(1.615)
Difficult to find a job −0.669
(1.444)
High urbanisation grade −1.958
(1.296)∗
Permanent contract 13.812
(2.327)∗∗∗
Apprentice wants to stay 75%- 100% 5.942
(2.150)∗∗∗
Apprentice wants to stay 100% 11.934
(2.451)∗∗∗
0-2 years in training firm 0.348
(2.385)
3-4 years in training firm −1.926
(1.565)
Number of years unknown −1.814
(1.545)
Only future training benefits −1.446
(1.247)
Chance employment offer 75%-100% 1.504
(2.085)
Chance employment offer 100% −0.157
(2.291)
Apprentice suitable to stay 75%-100% 1.727 1.825 4.202
continued on next page
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Table 8.33: continued
(1) (2) (3)
(1.543) (1.531) (2.472)∗∗
Apprentice suitable to stay 100% 5.756 5.465 6.440
(1.587)∗∗∗ (1.577)∗∗∗ (2.537)∗∗∗
Construction industry −0.782 −1.493 0.100
(2.396) (2.395) (2.434)
Printing industry −0.228 −0.207 1.093
(2.233) (2.219) (2.279)
Metal industry −6.630 −6.326 −5.633
(2.652)∗∗∗ (2.640)∗∗∗ (2.640)∗∗
Firm size < 10 workers 10.425 11.104 10.413
(3.081)∗∗∗ (3.069)∗∗∗ (3.080)∗∗∗
Firm size 10-99 workers 8.579 9.157 8.451
(2.452)∗∗∗ (2.440)∗∗∗ (2.429)∗∗∗
Firm size 100-499 workers 7.393 7.609 7.655
(2.452)∗∗∗ (2.434)∗∗∗ (2.390)∗∗∗
No apprentices −4.758 −4.293 −1.499
(2.037)∗∗∗ (2.031)∗∗ (2.016)
1 apprentice 1.748 1.935 1.873
(1.612) (1.611) (1.553)
Employment and learning contract 1.757 1.619 −0.749
(2.109) (2.096) (2.098)
Learning contract 1.111 1.200 2.707
(2.449) (2.432) (2.357)
Practical trainer 1.448 0.866 0.321
(1.648) (1.644) (1.590)
Co-ordinator 0.507 0.109 −0.134
(1.685) (1.680) (1.626)
Surveyed by internet −0.442 −0.887 0.020
(1.653) (1.647) (1.649)
Q13 refers to level 2 5.428 5.394 6.375
(2.545)∗∗ (2.529)∗∗ (2.450)∗∗∗
Q13 refers to level 4 −4.550 −4.565 −3.319
(3.867) (3.837) (3.729)
Constant 76.066 61.292 59.469
(3.243)∗∗∗ (5.413)∗∗∗ (5.750)∗∗∗
Observations 690 690 690
Standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10% level, ** significant at 5% level, *** significant at 1% level
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Table 8.34: Selected qualifications (Crebo codes between brackets)
Construction industry
Timmeren (10153, 10141)
Metselen (10802, 10842,10140)
Printing industry
Grafisch Assistent (10359)
Basisdrukker (10357)
Basisnabewerker (10356)
Basisvoorbereider (10358)
Behoudsmedewerker (10354)
Verpakkingsoperator (10355)
Grafisch Intermediair (10343)
Grafisch Management (10340)
Grafisch Vormgever (10342)
IT Mediaproductie (10740)
Multimedia Vormgever (10341)
Praktijkopleiders / Voorlieden (10339)
Audiovisueel Medewerker (10344)
Brocheerder (10347)
Diepdrukker (10351)
Elektronisch Voorbereider (10353)
Flexodrukker (10350)
Inspicint/theatertechnicus (10694)
Offsetdrukker (10352)
Uitgaafbinder (10346)
Vellenbewerker (10348)
Zeefdrukker (10349)
Metal industry
constructie (10124,10865,10121,10120,10864,10114)
plaatwerk (10123,10119,10118,10113)
cnc-techniek (10101,10097)
Hospitals and nursing homes
verzorgende (10427)
verplegende (10426)
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Questionnaire for Companies Offering Apprenticeships
Introduction on the phone:
Good morning/afternoon. I am <interviewer> from Intomart in Hilversum.
On behalf of the Research Centre for Education and the Labour Market,
we are conducting a study of apprenticeships places in your company or
institution. You should have received a letter explaining this project. For this
study, we would like to speak with <name >. Is that you? This questionnaire
will take about 15 minutes. Would that be possible now? Interviewer: If the
person concerned no longer works there or will be unavailable for a longer
period of time, ask the practical trainer or co-ordinator
Both versions:
The following questions concern the pupils in working-and-learning tracts,
formerly called <construction, printing, metal: apprenticeship system/ care:
in-service education >. This refers to those pupils who spend several days
a week working, while going to school for the remaining days. They will be
called apprentices in this questionnaire. We will not ask any questions about
so-called occupational education pupils, who spend an uninterrupted period
of time in a traineeship setup. This study is not concerned with trainees.
2a. What is your position in relation to the apprenticeship system in your
company? Is it - read the list below - (multiple answers possible)
• Practical trainer/construction: master
• Co-ordinator
• Other
• (do not read this aloud) Unknown
2b. How many apprentices does your company have at the moment?
• . apprentices
• unknown
If 0 apprentices or unknown:
2c. Were there any apprentices in your company during the past two years?
• Yes
• No > end of questionnaire
• Unknown > end of questionnaire
If practical trainer:
2d. How many apprentices are you personally supervising at this moment?
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• . apprentices
• unknown
2e. For which qualification levels does your company train apprentices? (mul-
tiple answers possible)
• level 1
• level 2
• level 3
• level 4
• unknown
3. What type of contract do apprentices usually have in your company? Is
it:
• both a learning contract and an employment contract
• only a learning contract
• a contract through training co-operation
• (do not read out loud) unknown
if both a learning contract and an employment contract:
4. Is this usually a permanent employment contract or a temporary employ-
ment contract?
• permanent employment contract
• temporary employment contract
• unknown
5. How great is the chance that an apprentice who is trained in your company
obtains a diploma?
• 0%
• between 0 % and 25%
• between 25 % and 50%
• 50%
• between 50% and 75%
• between 75% and 100%
• 100%
• unknown
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If no permanent contract (Q4 must be code 2 or 3, or Q3 must be code 2
through 4):
6. How great is the chance that an apprentice who is trained in your company
wants to keep working in your company after having completed the training
programme?
• 0%
• between 0 % and 25%
• between 25 % and 50%
• 50%
• between 50% and 75%
• between 75% and 100%
• 100%
• unknown
If no permanent contract (Q4 must be code 2 or 3, or Q3 must be code 2
through 4):
7. How great is the chance that an apprentice who is trained in your company
is suitable to continue working in your company after having completed the
training programme?
• 0%
• between 0 % and 25%
• between 25 % and 50%
• 50%
• between 50% and 75%
• between 75% and 100%
• 100%
• unknown
If no permanent contract (Q4 must be code 2 or 3, or Q3 must be code 2
through 4):
8. How great is the chance that an apprentice who is trained in your com-
pany is offered an appointment at your company after having completed the
training programme?
• 0%
• between 0 % and 25%
• between 25 % and 50%
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• 50%
• between 50% and 75%
• between 75% and 100%
• 100%
• unknown
9. The next question concerns apprentices who entered into employment with
your company after having completed the training programme. On average,
how many years do such former apprentices remain with your company?
• 0-2 years / 3-4 years / 5 years or more
• not applicable
• unknown
10. How interesting are apprentices for your company if you weigh the costs
against the benefits?
• Very interesting
• Slightly interesting
• Slightly uninteresting
• Very uninteresting
• Unknown
11. How interesting are apprentices for your company if they were to go and
work for another company after having completed their training?
• Very interesting
• Slightly interesting
• Slightly uninteresting
• Very uninteresting
• Unknown
12. I will now list a number of possible reasons for training apprentices,
instead of recruiting qualified employees from the labour market. Can you
please indicate to what extent these reasons are important for your company?
You may choose from the following options to indicate how important it is
for your company to train apprentices
• Very important
• Slightly important
• Slightly unimportant
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• Very unimportant
• (do not read out loud) unknown
a. The knowledge and skills of employees who have been trained in this
company match the needs of this company better than the knowledge
and skills of employees trained elsewhere.
b. In the case of employees trained in this company, we know better what
their capabilities are than in the case of employees trained elsewhere.
c. Employees who have been trained in this company need less introduc-
tion than employees trained elsewhere.
d. In the case of employees who have been trained in this company, we
know better what they have learned during their studies than in the
case of employees trained elsewhere.
e. Qualified employees are hard to find.
13. I will now list a number of statements with regard to the training,
supervision and activities of apprentices in your company. Can you indicate
to what extent these statements apply. Think of an apprentice at ** level
who is halfway through the training programme?
Indicate for each statement whether for your company it
• does not apply at all
• does not apply to some extent
• applies to some extent
• applies completely
• unknown
** determining the level: for construction/printing/metal, if question 2e has
code 2: 2 if no code 2: 3 for care, if question 2e has code 3: 3 if no code 3: 4
a. It is easy to involve apprentices in work activities
b. Apprentices can usefully be employed to carry out activities that qual-
ified employees dislike.
c. Apprentices generally carry out simple support activities.
d. Apprentices carry out their practical assignments for school mostly
when it is quiet at work.
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e. Guidance and instruction of apprentices is provided mostly when the
apprentice feels a need.
f. Apprentices mostly carry out activities from which they can learn.
g. Apprentices sometimes postpone their practical assignments for school
when it is too busy at work.
h. Apprentices have room to make mistakes.
i. Guidance and instruction of apprentices takes place mostly when the
practical trainer has less to do himself.
j. Apprentices only carry out activities that are useful for their training
programme.
k. Apprentices carry out their practical assignments for school whenever
it suits them best.
l. Apprentices are fully integrated in all operations.
m. Guidance and instruction of apprentices takes place mostly during the
apprentices’ regular work activities.
n. The activities carried out by apprentices are adapted to their learning
programme.
o. Guidance and instruction of apprentices takes place mostly outside the
place of work/work floor, for example in a special instruction room, in
a classroom or in an office.
p. Apprentices carry out the same tasks as qualified colleagues.
14. <if practical trainer (Q2a):> Have you <if other (Q2a):> Has a practical
trainer (for construction: master) of apprentices in your company completed
a special course to supervise apprentices?
• Yes
• No
• Unknown
15. How much working time, on average, <if practical trainer (Q2a):> do
you <if other (Q2a):> does a practical trainer (for construction: master) of
apprentices in your company spend on guidance and instruction of appren-
tices? Is this:
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• Up to a quarter of the time
• Between a quarter and a third of the time
• Half to three quarters of the time
• More than three quarters of the time
• (do not read out loud) unknown
If 1 or more pupils at this time (Question 2b):
16. How many pupils, on average, <if practical trainer (Q2a):> do you <if
other (Q2a):> does a practical trainer (for construction: master) of appren-
tices in your company have at the same time? In this case, the number of
pupils includes both apprentices (BBL) and trainees (BOL).
• . pupils
• unknown
17. How much of the working time of the apprentices in your company is
spent on learning and instruction? Is this:
• Up to a quarter of the time
• Between a quarter and a third of the time
• Half to three quarters of the time
• More than three quarters of the time
• (do not read out loud) unknown
18. Every year, one company in each sector is chosen as best apprenticeship
company. What chance do you think your company has to be nominated?
• A great chance
• A fair chance
• A small chance
• Unknown
19. Some knowledge and skills that employees have is specific for the company
in which they work. Examples are the company culture, its client base, and
specific equipment. Which part of the knowledge and skills that apprentices
acquire in your company is specific for your company?
• 0% (nothing)
• 1- 10%
• 10-20%
• 20-30%
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• more than 30%
• unknown
If at least some knowledge is company-specific (Q19 code 2-6):
20. I will mention various types of company-specific knowledge and skills.
Which of these is the most important one that apprentices learn in your
company? And which the second most important one? And the third? (up
to 3)
a. knowledge of the company culture
b. operation of specific machines and equipment
c. knowledge of specific operational processes and procedures
d. knowledge of the client base
e. knowledge of specific company products
f. knowledge of company computer programs
21. If your company were to employ qualified employees trained as appren-
tices by another company, how many weeks would it take for them to achieve
the same productivity level as employees trained as apprentices in your com-
pany?
• . weeks
• unknown
22. How many other <construction companies/graphics firms/metal firms/
similar care institutions> are there in your region (roughly a 25-km radius)?
• . companies/institutions
• unknown
23. Is it easy for employees who have been trained in your company through
the apprenticeship system to find a similar job at < another construction
company/graphics firm/metal firm/ care institution > in the same region
(roughly a 25-km radius)?
• Very easy
• Reasonably easy
• Fairly difficult
• Very difficult
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• Unknown
24. How many people are currently employed in your company? (INTER-
VIEWER: you may help, an approximate figure is also allowed)
• . people
• unknown
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Conclusion
9.1 Main Findings and Policy Implications
The apprenticeship system is attributed many pedagogical advantages com-
pared to school-based education. An important question is, however, whether
these potential advantages indeed materialise. The training firm’s main ac-
tivity is producing goods or services. Training is not a goal in itself but has
to be seen in the light of this main activity. The production interest of the
firm may therefore conflict with the learning interest of the apprentice. This
conflict of interests will have consequences for the quality of training. Two
aspects of training will be affected, the training intensity and the content of
the training programme. In this study I have analysed the consequences of
conflicting interests for both aspects.
As most of the training takes place at the workplace, learning and working
are closely interwoven. It will often be unclear whether an activity is aimed at
learning or production. The training intensity is therefore difficult to verify
by the apprentice or a third party. This means that the training firm can
decrease the training intensity without this being perceived immediately. For
this reason, it is expected that the firm’s training motives have an impact on
training intensity.
Firms may have several motives to offer apprenticeships. They may train
apprentices because of a future need for qualified labour, in which case they
have an investment motive. They may also employ apprentices because ap-
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prentices are relative cheap labour; in that case they have a current produc-
tion motive. If a firm employs apprentices because of a current production
motive, it does not benefit from the training itself and therefore the firm may
be tempted to save on training costs by lowering the training intensity.
In this study, I have found that firms with investment motives indeed
provide better training than firms with current production motives. Espe-
cially those aspects of the training that are not easily observable by a third
party are neglected if the firm has no investment motives. Unfortunately it
turns out that these are also the aspects that are most effective in terms of
training output. Furthermore, I found that neglecting these aspects has no
negative impact on the firm’s training reputation. The firm’s training rep-
utation depends on those aspects of the training that are easily observable
but at the same time not very effective for training output.
If a firm trains because of investment motives, it has an interest in pro-
viding good training but there may still be a conflict of interest between the
firm and the apprentice. This conflict stems from the fact that the apprentice
often has a different skill need than the firm. Firms have a preference for
skills that can be used in the training firm, the occupation or the industry
for which the apprentice is being trained. The apprentice, on the other hand,
also wants to acquire skills that have a wider applicability, so-called generic
skills. On the basis of a theoretical model for the choice between generic and
industry- or occupation-specific skills, I have shown that firms have an in-
centive to avoid generic training. If the apprentice has no say in the training
decision, firms will not provide any generic training at all.
The policy implication of the latter finding is that regulation of the cur-
riculum of the training programme, is very important for the apprenticeship
system to function well. Representatives of both firms and workers should be
involved in decisions concerning the curriculum of the training programme.
Otherwise the training will tend to be too industry- or occupation-specific.
However, regulation is not sufficient to prevent firms from saving on train-
ing costs by lowering the training intensity. Regulation of the training inten-
sity will induce firms to pay attention to those aspects of the training that
are easily observable by training authorities but, as I have shown, may have
little impact on training output. Those aspects of the training that are not
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observed, but more effective, will still be neglected if a firm has no investment
motives. Therefore, it is important that training firms have future benefits
from training apprentices. One way to achieve this is to allow firms to make
a fixed part of the training firm-specific.
The findings of this study have important consequences for government
policies aimed at increasing the number of apprenticeships. If such policies
mainly stimulate firms without investment motives to hire apprentices, av-
erage training intensity will fall. This will be the case with, for example,
wage cost subsidies for firms that employ apprentices. Wage cost subsidies
increase current training profits, but do not affect future profits. Therefore,
there is a risk that most of the extra apprenticeship places generated by the
subsidy are in firms that employ apprentices because of current benefits.
9.2 Future Research
To analyse the effects of conflicting interests of firms and Apprentices, I
developed two theoretical models. First I modelled the choice between generic
and industry- or occupation-specific training. This model predicts that firms
want the generic component of the training to be as small as possible. This
prediction has not been tested empirically yet. To develop an empirical test
will be particularly difficult. This remains an issue for future research.
The prediction of the second theoretical model in this study - the higher
the expected (marginal) future benefits of training for the training firm, the
higher the training intensity - has been tested empirically for the Netherlands.
I used mostly indirect measures for future benefits from training. Empirical
evidence on the actual return of investment is still lacking. Therefore, a
promising direction for future research is to look at firms’ actual returns
to apprenticeship training. An important related question that remains to
be answered is what are the sources of future benefits for firms? Economic
theory provides several reasons as to why firms will have future benefits from
apprenticeship training, but the empirical evidence for these theories is weak.
It is most likely that several factors, such as firm-specificity of the training,
imperfect information on the apprentice’s ability and imperfect competition
on the market for occupational skills, play a role simultaneously, although
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their importance may differ between firms. Therefore, it is not very useful to
oppose these theories, a better strategy is to assess their relative importance.
Research in this area needs measures of actual productivity of internally and
externally trained workers.
Another promising direction for future research is to integrate more edu-
cational insights in the training input measures. The educational literature
provides little in terms of concrete guidelines as to how training and work
should be organised to reach an optimal learning effect. Input measures for
the type of productive work (complexity of production tasks) and the learn-
ing content of production tasks could gain from new educational insights.
On the other hand, my methodology offers fruitful directions for educational
research as well. For example, my methodology could be used to test the
educational effectiveness of different configurations of training and work by
relating input measures to output measures.
Lastly, a fertile line of further research would be to survey current and
former apprentices and their training firms simultaneously. The advantage
of such an approach is that for each aspect of the training programme the
most appropriate respondent can be interviewed. For example, apprentices
can probably give better information on training input while representatives
of the firm have a better knowledge of the training motives. Also, firms can
provide direct information on apprentice ability and motivation, which makes
it easier to control for possible selection.
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Summary
To investigate the effects of conflicting interests on training quality, I have
made both theoretical and empirical analyses. Chapter 2 gives a review of
the literature and presents the theoretical and empirical evidence for current
production and investment motives for training apprentices. It is shown
that although on average apprentices are a net cost for firms, there is great
variation between firms. There are also many firms that have negative net
costs. These firms may train apprentices because of current benefits. In
Germany, this concerns in particular small firms in the craft sector. Evidence
on future benefits is more scarce, but there is some evidence that large firms
in the industry have future benefits more often than small firms in the craft
sector, which is in line with empirical evidence on current benefits.
Chapter 3 models the choice between generic and industry- or occupation-
specific skills. Firms train because of expected future benefits, but have a
different skill interest than apprentices. Both types of skills - generic ones
and specific ones - are transferable in the sense that they can be used outside
the training firm but specific sills can only be used in a specific industry or
occupation while generic skills have a larger market. The market for specific
skills is imperfectly competitive. For that reason, firms in the industry (the
training firm or any other firm in the industry), can appropriate part of
the returns to industry or occupation-specific training. The expected share
decreases, however, with the level of generic training. The reason is that the
level of generic training determines the apprentice market wages outside the
industry and thus sets a minimum limit on the wages that have to be paid
within the industry. Therefore, firms have a preference for specific skills and
want the level of generic skills to be as low as possible. Apprentices, on the
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other hand, want a high level of generic skills.
If the training firm and the apprentice were to decide jointly on the cur-
riculum of the training programme, the level of generic skills would be too
high and the level of specific skills too low. Although the training firm wants
the generic component to be as small as possible, it does not allow for the loss
of the other firms within the industry. The expected benefits of the industry
can be increased if firms in the industry decided jointly on the curriculum
of the training. However, if the apprentice is not involved in the training
decision, the level of generic training will be too low.
Chapter 4 presents a theoretical model for the training intensity under
imperfect information. Apprentices do not perfectly observe the training in-
tensity. If firms have no future benefits from training, they may be tempted to
lower the training intensity to save on training costs, especially if the training
wages do not depend on actual training intensity. The apprentice, knowing
this, will not accept training wages that are sufficiently low to achieve the
socially optimal level of training. It is shown that the underinvestment prob-
lem will be less severe as the firm’s (marginal) expected future benefits from
training are higher. If the firm has future benefits from training, it will harm
itself if it lowers the training intensity. Apprentices are then prepared to
accept lower training wages. For that reason, it can be opportune to allow
firms to make a fixed part of the training firm-specific. The optimal degree
of firm-specificity depends on the degree of observability of the training and
the expected (exogenous) quit rate.
The relation between the firm’s training motives (current production or
investment motives) and the training intensity are tested empirically for the
Netherlands in Chapter 7 and 8. To clarify the setting of these empirical
analyses, Chapter 5 first gives an overview of the Dutch apprenticeship sys-
tem. In the Netherlands, apprenticeship training is organised at the industry
or occupational level. For each sector, the relevant body for vocational educa-
tion and training is responsible for the quantity and quality of apprenticeship
places in that sector. Although the training is highly regulated, there is still
considerable variation in training intensity between firms.
Chapter 6 discusses the measures for training intensity that will be used
for the empirical analysis. As training intensity itself is not observed, I
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consider both input and output from training. Training input is difficult to
measure as working and learning at the workplace are often interwoven. To
measure training input, I therefore consider the effort of the training firm to
give priority to training relative to production. I considered different aspects
of the training programme, the complexity of productions tasks, the learning
content of production tasks, the time for formal learning activities at the
workplace and the time for supervision and instruction. Output measures
that I considered include the chance to complete the training successfully
with a diploma and the wages after the apprenticeship.
In Chapters 7 and 8 I considered the relation between training input
and training motives, and the relation between training input and training
output. Chapter 7 is based on a written survey among former apprentices,
while Chapter 8 is based on a telephone and Internet survey among training
firms. Both surveys included items on the different aspects of the training
programme. On the basis of these items, I constructed training input mea-
sures. In Chapter 7, I used a single input measure, while in Chapter 8 I used
measures for each aspect of the training separately.
In Chapter 7, training motives are measured by characteristics of the ap-
prenticeship place. It is assumed that firms who train apprentices because
of investment motives offer their apprentices a permanent contract or the
prospect of a permanent contract after the training. I have found that train-
ing input was higher for those apprentices who had a permanent contract or
the prospect of a permanent contract, than for apprentices with a temporary
contract, which indicates that there is indeed a relation between training
intensity and training motives. I also found that training input matters for
training output, as both the chance of obtaining a diploma and post-training
wages were positively affected by the training input measure.
In Chapter 8, I considered three training input measures, namely the
complexity of productions tasks, the learning content of production tasks, and
the time for formal learning and instruction. Not all aspects are equally well
observable by a third party. It is argued that the complexity of production
tasks is more difficult to observe than the other aspects of the training.
This difference in observability allows me to investigate whether the relation
between training motives and training intensity also depends on the degree
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of information imperfection, as predicted in Chapter 4.
Firstly, I considered the relation between the training input measure and
the firm’s training reputation (measured by the chance of being nominated
for the elections of the best training firm in the sector). I found that only
the better observable aspects of the training, the learning content of produc-
tion tasks and the time for formal learning and instruction matter, while
the complexity of production tasks has no effect. This result suggests that
firms can save on the latter aspect of training without any damage to their
reputation.
To measure training motives, I constructed several measures for factors
that affect future profits (the degree of firm-specificity, the degree of monop-
sony power, and the exogenous quit rate) and measures for the incidence of
current and future benefits. I have found that training motives mainly mat-
ter for the complexity of production tasks and not for the other aspects of
the training that I considered. So firms without investment motives indeed
save on those aspects of the training that are more difficult to observe.
Lastly, I considered the relation between training output, measured by
the chance of an apprentice in a firm obtaining a certificate of qualification,
and the training input measures. For this chance, only the complexity of
productions tasks matters. So, although the complexity of production tasks
is the most effective part of the training, this aspect of the training will be
neglected if the training firm has no investment motives, because it is difficult
to observe by third parties and therefore does not contribute to the firm’s
training reputation.
It can be concluded that the results of the empirical analyses in Chapter
7 and 8 confirm the theoretical prediction that training intensity is higher in
firms with investment motives than in firms with current production motives.
Firms without investment motives will economise especially on those aspects
of the training that are not easily observable by a third party.
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In veel West-Europese landen, zoals Duitsland, Oostenrijk, Zwitserland en
Nederland, maar bijvoorbeeld ook in Australie¨ neemt het leerlingwezen een
belangrijke plaats in binnen het onderwijssysteem. De essentie van het leer-
lingwezen is dat een leerling een vak leert in een praktijkomgeving. De
potentie¨le voordelen van het leerlingwezen zijn velerlei. Ten eerste zijn er
didactische voordelen. Veel leerlingen leren makkelijker in de praktijk dan
op school. Bovendien doen ze kennis en vaardigheden op die direct toepas-
baar zijn in de praktijk zodat de transfer van het geleerde op school naar de
dagelijkse beroepspraktijk voor een groot deel kan worden vermeden. Daar-
naast kan het leerlingwezen de aansluiting tussen onderwijs en arbeidsmarkt
verbeteren. Bedrijven weten immers vaak beter dan scholen welke vaardig-
heden nodig zijn voor bepaalde beroepen. Ook hebben ze meer inzicht in
technologische ontwikkelingen in de bedrijfstak die vragen om nieuwe kennis
en vaardigheden.
Of deze potentie¨le voordelen van het leerlingwezen ook daadwerkelijk tot
uitdrukking komen is echter de vraag. De primaire activiteit van een bedrijf
is het produceren van goederen en diensten. Andere activiteiten zoals het
opleiden en trainen van werknemers zijn hier een afgeleide van. Het gevaar
bestaat daarom dat het opleidingsbelang in een bedrijf conflicteert met an-
dere bedrijfsbelangen. Dat betekent dat training in bedrijven nooit los kan
worden gezien van het totale productieproces. Voor een duidelijk beeld van
de merites van het leerlingwezen is het daarom niet alleen van belang om
inzicht te hebben in de didactische voor- en nadelen van deze leerweg maar
ook in de economische overwegingen van het leerbedrijf.
Economisch onderzoek naar het leerlingwezen richt zich over het algemeen
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voornamelijk op de vraag waarom bedrijven bereid zijn leerplaatsen aan te
bieden. In dit onderzoek wordt deze vraag vanuit een ander perspectief
benaderd. Gegeven dat bedrijven leerplaatsen beschikbaar stellen, wat zijn
dan de consequenties van hun opleidingsmotieven voor de kwaliteit van de
training. Twee aspecten van trainingskwaliteit worden onderzocht, namelijk
de trainingsintensiteit en het curriculum van de opleiding.
Bedrijven kunnen verschillende opleidingsmotieven hebben. Ze kunnen
leerlingen opleiden vanwege een toekomstige behoefte aan gekwalificeerd per-
soneel, in dat geval is er sprake van een investeringsmotief, of vanwege de
directe productiviteit van de leerling, in dat geval is er sprake van een pro-
ductiemotief. In het eerste geval verwacht het leerbedrijf de leerling in dienst
te nemen na afloop van de opleiding in het tweede geval niet.
Als een bedrijf enkel leerlingen in dienst heeft vanwege hun bijdrage aan
de productie, dan bestaat het gevaar dat het bedrijf meer ge¨ınteresseerd
in hun directe productiviteit dan in hun training. Het leerbedrijf kan dan
in de verleiding komen om op de opleidingskosten te bezuinigen door de
trainingsintensiteit te verlagen. Daarbij komt dat het voor leerlingen en
ook voor derden moeilijk is om de trainingsintensiteit waar te nemen omdat
werken en leren gedeeltelijk zijn ge¨ıntegreerd. Het zal bijvoorbeeld vaak
moeilijk zijn om te beoordelen of de organisatie van het werk optimaal is in
termen van het te behalen leereffect.
Als een bedrijf leerlingen opleidt vanuit een investeringsmotief heeft het
zelf baat bij een hoge trainingsintensiteit. Toch kunnen ook in dat geval de
belangen van het leerbedrijf conflicteren met de belangen van de leerling.
Leerlingen hebben er baat bij om zoveel mogelijk vaardigheden te leren die
breed toepasbaar zijn. Vaardigheden die niet alleen van belang zijn binnen
het leerbedrijf en de bedrijfssector maar ook in andere bedrijven in andere
bedrijfssectoren, zogenoemde generieke vaardigheden. Generieke vaardighe-
den vergroten de toekomstige flexibiliteit van de leerling. Het leerbedrijf
heeft echter veel minder baat bij deze flexibiliteit dan de leerling en heeft
een voorkeur voor bedrijfs- of bedrijfssectorspecifieke vaardigheden. Het ri-
sico bestaat daarom dat het leerbedrijf het curriculum van de opleiding te
specifiek maakt.
Om de effecten van opleidingsmotieven op de kwaliteit van de training
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te onderzoeken heb ik zowel theoretische als empirische analyses gemaakt.
Hoofdstuk 2 geeft een overzicht van de literatuur en presenteert de theoreti-
sche en empirische aanwijzingen voor productie- en investeringsmotieven. Ik
laat zien dat, hoewel uit de meeste studies naar voren komt dat leerlingen ge-
durende de leerperiode gemiddeld genomen een netto kostenpost vormen, de
variatie tussen bedrijven groot is. Er zijn ook vrij veel bedrijven voor wie de
opbrengsten tijdens de leerperiode de trainingskosten ruimschoots overstij-
gen. Het is goed mogelijk dat juist deze bedrijven voornamelijk leerlingen in
dienst hebben vanwege een productiemotief. In Duitsland betreft dit vooral
kleine bedrijven in de ambachtelijke sector. Aanwijzingen voor toekomstige
baten van het leerlingwezen zijn veel beperkter maar er zijn aanwijzingen dat
in Duitsland voornamelijk grote bedrijven in de industrie toekomstige baten
hebben.
In hoofdstuk 3 modelleer ik de keuze tussen generieke en industrie- of
beroepsspecifieke vaardigheden. Bedrijven leiden leerlingen op vanwege de
toekomstige baten maar hebben een voorkeur voor andere vaardigheden dan
leerlingen. Zowel generieke als specifieke vaardigheden zijn overdraagbaar
naar andere bedrijven maar specifieke vaardigheden kunnen enkel in een be-
paalde bedrijfstak of beroepsgroep worden gebruikt terwijl generieke vaardig-
heden een veel grotere markt hebben. De markt voor specifieke vaardigheden
is niet volledig concurrerend. Daarom kunnen bedrijven in de industrie, zowel
het trainingsbedrijf als elk ander bedrijf in de industrie, zich een deel van de
opbrengsten van specifieke training toe-eigenen. Het verwachte aandeel van
bedrijven neemt echter af met de hoeveelheid generieke training. De reden
hiervoor is dat de hoeveelheid generieke training het toekomstige marktloon
buiten de industrie bepaalt en dus een ondergrens zet aan het loon dat in de
bedrijfssector moet worden betaald. Bedrijven hebben daarom een voorkeur
voor specifieke vaardigheden en willen de hoeveelheid generieke vaardighe-
den zo laag mogelijk houden. Leerlingen willen daarentegen juist een grote
hoeveelheid generieke vaardigheden aanleren.
Als de leerling en het leerbedrijf samen over het curriculum zouden be-
slissen zou de hoeveelheid generieke vaardigheden te groot en de hoeveelheid
specifieke vaardigheden te klein zijn vergeleken met het sociale optimum.
Het leerbedrijf wil de generieke component weliswaar zo laag mogelijk hou-
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den maar houdt alleen rekening met het eigen verlies en niet met het verlies
van ander bedrijven in de sector. De verwachte opbrengsten voor de bedrijfs-
tak kunnen worden vergroot als alle bedrijven in de bedrijfstak gezamenlijk
over het curriculum beslissen. Als de leerling niet in de beslissing betrokken
is, zal de generieke component in dat geval echter te laag zijn.
In hoofdstuk 4 wordt een theoretisch model gepresenteerd voor de trai-
ningsintensiteit onder onvolledige informatie. Leerlingen kunnen de trai-
ningsintensiteit niet volledig waarnemen. Als bedrijven geen toekomstige
opbrengsten van training hebben kunnen ze in de verleiding komen om op de
trainingskosten te besparen door de trainingsintensiteit te verlagen. Leerlin-
gen, zich bewust van dit risico, zullen op hun beurt niet akkoord gaan met
een leerlingenloon dat laag genoeg is om de sociaal optimale trainingsintensi-
teit te realiseren. Dit onderinvesteringsprobleem is minder ernstig naarmate
de verwachte marginale opbrengsten van training voor het leerbedrijf hoger
zijn. Om deze reden kan het gunstig zijn om het leerbedrijf een vast gedeelte
van het trainingsprogramma bedrijfsspecifiek te laten invullen. De optimale
mate van bedrijfsspecificiteit van de training zal afhangen van de mate waar-
in de trainingsintensiteit waarneembaar is door leerlingen en derden en het
verwachte (exogene) vertrekpercentage na afloop van de training.
De relatie tussen opleidingsmotieven en de trainingsintensiteit wordt em-
pirisch getoetst voor het Nederlandse leerlingwezen in hoofdstukken 7 en 8.
Om de achtergrond van de analyses te verduidelijken wordt in hoofdstuk
5 eerst een overzicht gegeven van het Nederlandse leerlingwezen. In Ne-
derland is het leerlingwezen, ofwel de Beroepsbegeleidende Leerweg (BBL)
zoals het tegenwoordig wordt genoemd, georganiseerd op het niveau van be-
drijfstak of beroepsgroep. Voor elke sector is een kenniscentrum beroeps-
onderwijs bedrijfsleven verantwoordelijk voor de kwantiteit en kwaliteit van
leer(arbeid)plaatsen. Hoewel de training sterk gereguleerd is, is er toch een
aanzienlijke variatie in trainingsintensiteit tussen leerbedrijven.
Hoofdstuk 6 bespreekt hoe trainingsintensiteit zal worden gemeten in de
empirische analyses. Daar trainingsintensiteit een theoretisch begrip is dat in
de praktijk niet waarneembaar is, beschouw ik zowel de input en output van
training. Trainingsinput is moeilijk waarneembaar omdat werk en leren op
de leerarbeidsplaats vaak door elkaar lopen. Ik kijk daarom naar de inspan-
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ning van het leerbedrijf om voorrang te geven aan taken die nuttig zijn voor
de training en niet zozeer aan taken waarin de leerling zo productief mogelijk
is. Daarbij beschouw ik verschillende aspecten van het trainingsprogramma,
namelijk de complexiteit van productietaken, de leerinhoud van productieta-
ken, de beschikbare tijd voor formele leeractiviteiten op de leerarbeidsplaats
en de beschikbare tijd voor begeleiding en instructie. Output maten die ik
bekijk zijn de kans de training succesvol af te sluiten met een diploma en de
lonen na afloop van de training.
In hoofdstukken 7 en 8 onderzoek ik de relatie tussen trainingsinput en
opleidingsmotieven en de relatie tussen trainingsinput en trainingsoutput.
Hoofdstuk 7 is gebaseerd op een schriftelijke enqueˆte onder ex-leerlingen en
hoofdstuk 8 op een enqueˆte via internet en per telefoon onder leerbedrij-
ven. Beide enqueˆtes bevatten vragen over verschillende aspecten van het
trainingsprogramma. Op basis van deze vragen heb ik trainingsinputmaten
geconstrueerd. In hoofdstuk 7 betreft dit een enkele maat voor alle aspecten
van het training programma samen, terwijl in hoofdstuk 8 voor elk aspect
van het trainingsprogramma een afzonderlijke maat is geconstrueerd.
In hoofdstuk 7 worden opleidingsmotieven gemeten aan de hand van ken-
merken van de leerarbeidsplaats. Er wordt aangenomen dat bedrijven die
leerlingen opleiden vanwege investeringsmotieven hun leerlingen al tijdens
de opleiding een vast arbeidscontract of uitzicht op een vast arbeidscontract
aanbieden. Ik laat zien dat trainingsinput hoger is bij leerlingen die een
vast contract of een uitzicht op een vast contract hadden dan bij leerlingen
met een tijdelijk contract. Dit suggereert dat er inderdaad een relatie is
tussen trainingsintensiteit en opleidingsmotieven. Verder blijkt ook dat de
trainingsinputmaat die ik heb gebruikt van belang is voor trainingsoutput,
zowel de kans op een diploma als de lonen na afloop van de opleiding worden
positief be¨ınvloed door de trainingsinputmaat.
In hoofdstuk 8 bekijk ik drie verschillende trainingsinputmaten, name-
lijk een maat voor de complexiteit van productietaken, een maat voor de
leerinhoud van productietaken en een maat voor de tijd beschikbaar voor
formele leeractiviteiten en begeleiding. Niet alle aspecten van de training
zijn even goed waarneembaar door derden. De complexiteit van productie-
taken is moeilijker waarneembaar dan de ander aspecten van de training die
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in dit onderzoek worden bekeken. Het verschil in observeerbaarheid maakt
het mogelijk om te onderzoeken of de relatie tussen opleidingsmotieven en
trainingsintensiteit ook afhankelijk is van de mate van waarneembaarheid
van de training zoals voorspeld in het model van hoofdstuk 4.
Allereerst heb ik de relatie tussen de trainingsinputmaten en de trainings-
reputatie van het bedrijf bekeken. De trainingsreputatie wordt gemeten door
de kans dat het leerbedrijf wordt genomineerd voor de bedrijfstakverkiezin-
gen voor het beste leerbedrijf. Het zijn met name de beter observeerbare
aspecten van de training, de leerinhoud van productietaken en de beschik-
bare tijd voor formele leeractiviteiten en begeleiding die van belang zijn. De
complexiteit van productietaken heeft geen invloed op de trainingsreputatie.
Dit resultaat suggereert dat bedrijven op dit laatste aspect van de training
kunnen bezuinigen zonder negatieve gevolgen voor hun reputatie.
De opleidingsmotieven worden in hoofdstuk 8 gemeten door factoren die
van invloed zijn op de verwachte toekomstige opbrengsten van training, zoals
de mate van bedrijfsspecificiteit van de training, de mate van concurrentie
voor ex-leerlingen, en de exogene vertrekkans na afloop van de opleiding, en
enkele directe maten voor huidige en toekomstige baten van training. Het
blijkt dat opleidingsmotieven vooral van belang zijn voor de complexiteit van
productietaken en niet voor de andere aspecten van de training die ik bekijk.
Bedrijven die geen investeringsmotieven hebben besparen inderdaad op die
aspecten van de training die moeilijk waarneembaar zijn door derden.
Tenslotte heb ik nog de relatie bekeken tussen trainingsoutput, geme-
ten als de kans dat een leerling in een bedrijf een diploma behaalt, en de
trainingsinputmaten. Alleen de complexiteit van productietaken heeft een
positief effect op de trainingsoutput. De andere aspecten van de training
hebben geen significant effect. Dus, hoewel de complexiteit van productie-
taken het meeste effectieve aspect van de training is, zal dit aspect worden
verwaarloosd als het leerbedrijf geen investeringsmotief heeft omdat het niet
waarneembaar is door derden en daardoor niet bijdraagt aan de trainingsre-
putatie van het bedrijf.
Op basis van de empirische analyses kan worden geconcludeerd dat de
trainingsintensiteit inderdaad hoger is in bedrijven met investeringsmotieven
dan in bedrijven die enkel leerlingen in dienst hebben vanwege hun direc-
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te bijdrage aan de productie. Bedrijven zonder investeringsmotieven zullen
voornamelijk bezuinigen op die aspecten van het trainingsprogramma die
moeilijk waarneembaar zijn.
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